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Abstract 
 
What explains oil countries’ susceptibility to experience internal armed conflict? While this 
topic has received considerable scholarly attention in recent years, the question remains 
unsettled. This thesis introduces the perspective that differences in countries’ institutional and 
societal starting points may explain the divergent experience of armed conflict among oil 
countries. Two potential conditioning circumstances of the relationship between oil income 
and risk of armed conflict are explored: a country’s institutional legacy and a country’s 
conflict legacy at the commencement of oil income. Differences in countries’ institutional 
legacy is argued to anticipate divergent institutional trajectories in the wake of oil, with 
differential implications for conflict risk. Conflict legacy, on the other hand, is argued to 
proxy unusual opportunities of rebellion against oil-financed regimes with the best of 
available means to buy-off or repress opposition. The merit of these arguments is tested by 
logistic regression analysis of armed conflict onset among 170 oil and non-oil countries in the 
years 1961 to 2007. Findings indicate that for two indicators of institutional legacy: initial 
bureaucratic control and initial education attainment, there is partial support that institutional 
legacy mediates the effect of oil income on conflict risk. Under certain conditions, there is 
significant support that oil increases conflict risk among countries at the lower scale of initial 
institutions, while this effect is reduced and becomes inseparable from zero at the robust end 
of initial institutions. Conflict legacy, however, is found not to mediate the effect of oil, but 
rather to have a significant individual impact on conflict risk regardless of size of oil income. 
In sum, these findings suggest some new answers to the question of why the curse of armed 
conflict befalls some, but not other oil countries. Further, they support the notion that the 
relationship between oil income and conflict risk may be explained by the synergies between 
states’ institutional capacities and oil income, at the same time as they underscore that the 
impact of oil on institutions and conflict risk may not be unidirectional.  
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1 Introduction 
This thesis engages in the scholarly debate on why oil-producing countries are more prone to 
experience internal armed conflict than other countries. The overarching aim of the thesis is to 
examine whether differences in countries’ institutional legacies or conflict legacies at the 
commencement of oil income may account for the divergent experience of armed conflict 
among oil countries.  
While a range of studies concur on the finding that that oil wealth stands out as a salient 
determinant of internal armed conflict onset (de Soysa, 2002; de Soysa & Neumayer, 2007; 
Fearon, 2005; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Humphreys, 2005; Lujala, 2010; Ross, 2006, 2012), 
there is no consensus within the literature as to exactly how the identified relationship 
between oil wealth and heightened risk of armed conflict comes about. Suggested 
explanations tend to follow two contrasting paths: First, rebel-centered explanations which 
focus on petroleum resources as a financial or motivational source of rebel organizations; and 
second, state weakness-centered explanations which assert that the effect of oil on conflict 
risk works indirectly by weakening state institutions and economic performance.1 
Despite an array of suggested causal explanations, the question of which mechanisms mainly 
underlie and generate the relationship remains unsettled. To date, scholars disagree on this 
issue, and empirical analyses provide no unambiguous support of either causal story. In 
addition, present theorizing leave two puzzles unresolved. First, previous literature has little to 
say about why oil engenders ferocious armed conflict in some countries, while other oil-
producing countries emerge untouched by this curse. Second, there are opposing projections 
on the issue of feasibility of rebellion in oil wealthy countries: While one branch of 
explanations emphasize that oil induces fragile institutions and offers financial sources of 
organizing rebellion, another branch holds that oil wealth provides regimes with exceptional 
opportunities to repress or co-opt potential opposition. In light of such contradicting notions, 
rebels’ capacity to mount armed challenge to regimes with oil-financed counterinsurgency 
capacities and co-optative opportunities stands out as paradoxical. 
                                               
1
 Rebel-centered causal explanations include the honeypot mechanism, the availability of finance mechanism, 
and the oil-induced grievance mechanism. State weakness-centered explanations include the bureaucratic 
weakness mechanism, the government detachment mechanism, the rentier state mechanism and the vulnerable 
economy mechanism. 
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Addressing the gaps in our knowledge on the relationship between oil wealth and armed 
conflict, this thesis engages in the search of salient conditioning circumstances. I will 
introduce a perspective which has been missing in the debate so far; that countries’ very 
different societal and institutional starting points when oil income commences may be 
distinguishing for their subsequent propensity to experience armed conflict. With reference to 
both rebel-centered and state-weakness centered causal arguments; two conditions stand out 
as potentially salient in conditioning the effect of oil on conflict risk: a country’s initial 
institutional capacity (institutional legacy) and a country’s recent history of organized armed 
conflict (conflict legacy) when oil income commences. This leads me to the following 
research objective: 
Research objective: This thesis explores two conditioning factors in the relationship 
between petroleum resources and conflict risk. The two are a country’s institutional legacy, 
and a country’s conflict legacy, at the point in time when oil income commences. 
Refining explanations of the relationship between oil and armed conflict is not only desirable 
for the purpose of theory improvement. Petroleum reserves are increasingly being explored in 
poor and unstable countries. Kenya, Ghana, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Mozambique 
are among the countries anticipating to become petroleum exporting countries within the 
coming few years (Ross, 2012, p. 10). Improving our knowledge of the relationship between 
oil and armed conflict may aid policymaking aimed at helping these countries avoid the 
potential pitfalls and dangerous side-effects of oil.  
How may institutional legacy and conflict legacy be expected to condition the effect of oil on 
countries exposure to armed conflict? What do these conditions add to present 
conceptualizations of the relationship? 
First, institutional legacy, here understood as the initial capacity of state institutions in terms 
of bureaucratic control and quality of public service provision; may anticipate whether or not 
state-centered and rebel-centered mechanisms will be triggered following oil income. While 
state-centered explanations hold that oil income regularly induce bureaucratic weakness and 
unaccountable governments, which in turn increase feasibility and  motivations for rebellion, I 
argue that the robustness of such institutions at the commencement of oil income may play a 
distinguishing role for whether such institutional trajectories will arise or not. 
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Why may differences in countries’ conflict legacy be an important conditioning factor for the 
effect of oil on conflict risk? Presence of armed conflict may serve as an indicator of deficient 
state capacity, which according to present theory has poor prospects for improving following 
the onset of oil income into government coffers. Perhaps more important, however, is that 
structural and organizational legacies of conflict that persist in the post-conflict environment 
may serve as an important aid of future rebellion following oil. If the capacity of rebels’ to 
organize armed revolt against oil-financed regimes is a paradox, as is indicated by opposing 
projections on this point in previous theorizing, then organizational legacies and conflict-
specific capital inherited from previous conflict may be the answer.  
The observable implications of my theoretical arguments are specified in three hypotheses:  
H1: The conflict-inducing effect of oil income will be higher in countries with low bureaucratic 
control than in countries with high bureaucratic control at the commencement of oil income 
H2: The conflict-inducing effect of oil income may be lower in countries with high quality of 
public service provision than in countries with low quality of public service provision at the 
commencement of oil income 
H3. Oil income increases conflict risk more severely in countries with a legacy of armed 
conflict than in countries without such a conflict legacy at the commencement of oil income 
To test these expectations against empirical observations I conduct a logistic regression 
analysis of armed conflict onsets among 170 oil and non-oil countries within the years 1961-
2007, as well as in a sample of 100 oil countries within the same period. Comprehensive data 
on the value of oil produced in countries worldwide since 1960 is obtained from Ross (2012). 
Countries’ institutional legacy is proxied by indicators of bureaucratic quality and education 
attainment ratios, measured at the initial year of oil income. Conflict legacy is assessed on the 
basis of data on armed conflicts since 1946, measured within a period of ten years preceding 
first oil income.  
Main Findings 
The findings obtained in the empirical analysis partially support the proposition that the effect 
of oil on conflict risk is conditional on countries’ institutional legacy (H1 and H2). For both 
measures of institutional legacy, findings indicate that the conflict-inducing effect of oil 
income is highest among countries with a fragile institutional legacy in terms of initial 
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bureaucratic control and initial education attainment. The better performance of initial 
institutions, the lower is the estimated conflict-inducing effect of oil income. Under certain 
conditions, there is significant support that oil increases conflict risk among countries at the 
lower scale of initial institutions, while this effect is reduced and becomes inseparable from 
zero at the robust end of initial institutions. 
Findings do not support the proposition that the effect of oil may be conditional on countries’ 
conflict legacy (H3). When countries with an unknown conflict legacy are treated as a 
separate category, having or not having a conflict legacy does not differentiate the effect of oil 
on conflict risk. Yet, although conflict legacy can’t be understood  to mediate the effect of oil 
on conflict risk, there is clear support that conflict legacy prior to oil independently adds to 
conflict risk, regardless of the size of oil income. Graphed results show that for any sizes of 
oil income, predicted probability of onset is substantially higher among countries with a 
conflict legacy than without. Bivariate analysis of the relationship between armed conflict 
onset and pre-oil conflict legacy among oil countries support the significance of this finding.  
Robustness tests show that the consistency of these findings is not threatened by high 
multicollinearity among explanatory variables, and that they are not driven by a few 
influential cases. Rather, exclusion of a few influential observations yields stronger support of 
the theoretical argument that initial institutions may distinguish the effect of oil. Initial 
education is found to significantly condition the effect of oil on conflict risk when the logistic 
regression assumption of no large outliers is addressed. 
Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 defines a number of core concepts used throughout the thesis. Chapter 3 lays out 
my own theoretical argument and hypotheses, after identifying current knowledge gaps in the 
study of oil and internal armed conflict. Chapter 4 develops the quantitative research design 
applied in the test of hypotheses. Results, interpretations and robustness tests are presented in 
Chapter 5, while Chapter 6 concludes the endeavor.  
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2 Definitions 
This section defines a number of central concepts, in order to be specific about their meaning 
within the context of the theoretical framework employed here. The most important concepts 
include internal armed conflict (and conflict legacy), petroleum resources, institutional 
capacity (and institutional legacy), and causal mechanisms.2 
2.1 Internal Armed Conflict 
The main phenomenon of interest in this thesis is internal armed conflict. I follow the 
definition employed by the Uppsala/PRIO Conflict Data Program (Gleditsch et al., 2002).3 
Their theoretical definition differentiates intra-state conflicts from armed conflicts that occur 
between states, and from other forms of violence that occur within states.  
Most importantly, internal armed conflict is here defined as a phenomenon that involves 
armed competition for state control between the government of a state and an organized 
opposition group, which challenges a present regime’s control over central government or a 
part of the territory.4 Distinguishing internal armed conflict from other types of violence such 
as terrorism, genocide or organized crime, or even international war, may however not be 
uncomplicated, and the lines between internal armed conflict as it is defined here and other 
types of violence occurring within states sometimes come across as arbitrary (Sambanis, 
2004, p. 815). It is also not a trivial question whether petroleum resources may relate to other 
forms of political violence, such as interstate war and non-state violence.5  
Yet, when studying the relationship between petroleum resources and armed conflict, it does 
make sense to study the causes and variations of internal armed conflict separately from those 
                                               
2
 This section discusses conceptual delimitations of the terms used. Operational definitions are found in section 
4.2 of the Research Design. 
3
 See also the full definition at the UCDP website: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/ 
4
 As such, it may be regarded distinct from armed contestation between non-state groups. Short of stated political 
incompatibilities, criminal armed violence also falls outside the definition. The organized aspect differentiates 
internal armed conflict from spontaneous forms of violence that might take place between civilians and 
government. 
5
 Petroleum resources may for instance provide motivation for interstate invasion, such as in Iraq’s attempt to 
annex Kuwait in 1990; or give rise to border disputes, such as presently occurring between Lebanon and Israel 
following discovery of off-shore petroleum resources, Thailand and Cambodia, etc. Petroleum extraction has 
also been at the core of for lethal non-state violence, such as in the dispute between Huaorani and Tagaeri 
communities in remote jungle areas in Ecuador (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, 2014). 
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of inter-state or non-state armed conflict: They involve different sets of actors, and plausibly 
also different sorts of causal mechanisms.  
The term conflict legacy is here employed to refer to a country’s experience of internal armed 
conflict during the years preceding first oil income.   
2.2 Petroleum Resources 
This thesis focuses exclusively on the relationship between petroleum resources and armed 
conflict, and leaves the question of the impact of other natural resources on conflict risk 
unaddressed.  
While natural resources was studied as a unitary condition with a purported unitary impact on 
conflict risk in the initial stages of the debate on natural resources and civil war, there are both 
empirical and conceptual justifications for studying the effect of petroleum resources 
separately. Empirically, there is robust support for a relationship between petroleum resources 
and conflict, while the same is not true for natural resources in general (de Soysa, 2002; 
Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006).  
Conceptually, there are clear advantages with studying the impact of petroleum resources 
separately from natural resources in general. Natural resources are a broad category which 
encompasses a wide range of different resources, such as timber, agricultural and aquacultural 
produce, petroleum, and so forth. These resources differ greatly in terms of physical features, 
modes of extraction, “lootability”, trading options, as well as in the opportunity of revenue 
they represent for rulers and rebels.6 There is a commonly recognized point within the 
literature that different types of resources may vary in their impact on armed conflict, by 
different causal paths (see for instance de Soysa & Neumayer, 2007, p. 205; Le Billon, 2001, 
p. 570; Lujala et al., 2005, p. 542; Lujala & Rustad, 2012, p. 10; Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005, p. 
568). Studying petroleum resources separately thus facilitates more precise causal 
argumentation and empirical examination.  
So what are the defining features of petroleum as a natural resource? Materially, petroleum 
refers to different types of hydrocarbon compounds, including crude oil and natural gas, 
                                               
6
 This point has been particularly pronounced in criticisms of the widely used primary commodity exports 
measure (Fearon, 2005, p. 486; Lujala et al., 2005, p. 542; Ross, 2006, p. 272).  
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which are naturally occurring and found in upper strata of the earth.7 In Snyder and 
Bhavnanis’ typology (2005, p. 568), petroleum represents a typical “non-lootable” natural 
resource, which requires large amounts of capital, technology and infrastructure to extract. 
Non-lootable resources may not be easily or profitably exploited by individuals or groups, 
except if they control the state.8 Oil and gas typically presents favorable revenue opportunities 
for governments, as the high barriers to entry facilitates a great degree of government control 
over actors involved in the extraction process.9  
As reminded by Le Billon (2001, p. 565), the value assigned to natural endowments such as 
oil are products of historical processes of social construction, and derive from human desires, 
needs and practices. Thus, the value of petroleum arises from its intrinsic role in most 
practices of modern human life (transport and machinery fuel, heating, production of 
thousands of things such as synthetic fabrics for clothes and equipment, tires, refrigerators, 
makeup, medicines, etc.).  
The massive size of revenue generated by oil sales also differentiates oil from other types of 
natural resources. The size of government revenues in oil-producing countries (as fraction of 
GDP) is on average nearly 50% greater than that of non-oil countries (Ross, 2012, pp. 5, 27). 
The source of this revenue is not unimportant: oil-rents are considered an “easy” source of 
riches, unreliant on the state’s ability to raise tax from its population. The magnitude and 
source of rents accruing to governments from petroleum sales is both a defining feature of this 
natural resource and an argument for studying the impact of oil apart from other natural 
resources.  
2.3 Institutional Capacity  
A central proposition of this thesis is that states’ legacy of institutional capacity may 
distinguish the conflict-inducing effect of oil. This places my thesis within the scholarly 
debate on (state) institutional capacity and civil war.  
                                               
7
 I use the terms petroleum and oil interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
8
 This stands in contrast to more readily available natural resources such as surface diamonds and gemstones.  
9
 Governments may establish monopoly control either by nationalizing their oil industry, or by monitoring and 
taxing private companies involved in the extraction process. 
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In the study of civil conflict, state capacity and institutional capacity are vague theoretical 
concepts, which may subsume a range of different aspects. Attempts to systematize the 
different connotations include Hendrix (2010), and Fjelde and de Soysa (2009). Both 
contributions places relevance on how the performance of state institutions may affect the 
motive-and-opportunity structure of would-be rebels, contrasting capacities of repression or 
accommodation as alternative routes to limit the likelihood of rebellion. 
In this thesis, I particularly target two aspects of state institutional capacity: bureaucratic 
control and public service provision. These two aspects may be representative of the two 
different aspects of state capacity mentioned above: repressive/administrative capacity and 
accommodative/co-optative capacity.  
A state’s bureaucratic control may indicate its ability to monitor and administer its population, 
and the degree of people’s submission to state regulation. In Fearon and Laitins’ account 
(2003: 79), administrative and organizational strength is at the core of governments’ capacity 
to detect and deter rebellions before they materialize. This capacity not only rests on states’ 
ability to collect and manage information about its citizens, but is also sustained by the 
geographical reach of government institutions into rural areas and ability stay informed about 
goings-on at the local level. 
Public service provision may closely relate to an alternative source of state capacity, namely 
the ability of the state to accommodate its people. In Fjelde and de Soysa (2009, p. 9), co-
optation of potential opposition by political goods expenditure is argued to one of the main 
routes by which governments retain the loyalty of segments of society. In my theoretical 
framework presented further on, the quality of public service provision proxies the reciprocity 
of state-society relations. Implicit is the argument that a government that is able to learn and 
respond to citizens’ needs, will reduce motivations for revolt relative to a government that is 
detached from its populace.  
The term institutional legacy in this context refers to the quality of bureaucratic control and of 
public service provision in a country at the point in time when oil income commences.  
2.4 Mechanisms 
As causal mechanisms are a central focus of this thesis, I will in the following say a few 
words on what they conceptually are.  
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In everyday terms, mechanisms may be understood as the causal path (or causal narrative) 
linking a purported explanatory condition to an observed outcome. Mechanisms are central 
components of any causal explanation of social outcomes (Elster, 1989, p. 3).10 While no 
standard agreed upon definition of mechanisms is available, many definitions place social 
mechanisms somewhere in between the law-like relations of natural science and mere 
particularistic accounts of single events.11 Causal mechanisms in social sciences are usually 
conceptualized as probabilistic rather than deterministic causal paths, yet occurring in 
recurring and recognizable patterns.12  
In this thesis, the mechanism term is used to denote the different causal paths presented as 
explanations of the correlation between petroleum resources and armed conflict.13 
                                               
10
 Gerring (2005, p. 171) defines mechanisms as “the causal narrative” linking cause to effect, and constitutes 
one of several formal criteria of causal explanations in social sciences. 
11
 The term is found to carry different connotations among different users, possibly reflecting different 
ontological and epistemological positions. I refer to Mahoney (2001, p. 579) for a review of different definitions 
of mechanisms, as well as to Hedström and Swedberg (1996) for an attempt to conceptualize the differences. 
12
 Elster’s (1998) attempt to pin down the core of the term may serve as an example of this reasoning: “Roughly 
speaking, mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under 
generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences” (Elster, 1998, p. 45). 
13
 In the review of previous literature, the terms causal mechanism, causal argument and causal explanation are 
used interchangeably to denote mechanisms that are suggested to explain the oil-armed conflict relationship. 
While it may occur as imprecise to mix these terms, in reality the distinct mechanisms form central components 
of distinct causal arguments of what explains the relationship. 
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3 Theory 
This chapter will lay out the theoretical foundations of my research objective, and present the 
theoretical claim of this thesis. A thorough review of prevailing explanations in previous 
literature reveals that there are critical gaps in our ability to explain the established 
relationship between oil and conflict risk. There is disagreement among scholars on whether 
state-centered or rebel-centered mechanisms mainly account for this relationship. A joint 
theoretical shortcoming of the explanations is that they fail to address why oil induces conflict 
in some countries, but not in others.  
The perspective introduced by this thesis is that differences in countries’ institutional and 
societal starting points may importantly anticipate the effect of oil on conflict risk. More 
specifically, I argue that countries’ institutional legacy and conflict legacy at the 
commencement of oil income may plausibly condition the effect of oil income on conflict 
risk. First, variations in countries’ institutional legacy may influence whether or not the 
conflict-inducing mechanisms suggested in previous literature will be triggered following oil 
income. While many theorists claim that oil income prevents the development of institutional 
capacity facilitative of societal peace, including bureaucratic control and reciprocity of state-
society relations, I argue that this is a plausible path only from a fragile institutional starting 
point. In countries with robust institutional capacity developed prior to the commencement of 
oil, such institutions may be expected to persist rather than vane (upheld by shared norms, 
practices, expectations, organizational structures, physical offices etc.), and offset the conflict-
inducing effects of oil revenue.  
The second proposed conditioning factor, conflict legacy, is suggested to answer the paradox 
of rebel capacity of organizing armed revolt against oil-financed regimes with unusual means 
to repress or buy-off political opposition. It is argued that facilitative legacies from a previous 
conflict such as organizational capital and a latent support base among the population could 
be distinguishing for the capacity of rebels to mobilize against the regime in the wake of oil.  
Structure of the Chapter 
In the following, I begin with an examination of the variety of causal arguments and findings 
presented in research on this topic thus far. The section reveals a number of shortcomings in 
available theoretical explanations of the oil-armed conflict relationship. The second section 
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introduces my own theoretical perspective which addresses the gaps identified in previous 
research. The theoretical claims presented in this section will be summarized in a few testable 
hypotheses.  
3.1 Knowledge Gaps in the Study of Oil and Armed 
Conflict   
The scholarly debate on petroleum resources and armed conflict may be viewed as a branch of 
a larger debate on the role played by natural resources for countries’ exposure to civil war.14 
While the claim of a general conflict-inducing effect of natural resources has proved non-
robust in most empirical studies (de Soysa, 2002; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2002; Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006), petroleum resources have been found to be a 
particularly robust and sizeable determinant of armed conflict across a notable number of 
studies (de Soysa & Neumayer, 2007; Fearon, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Lujala, 2010; Ross, 
2006, 2012).15 Although the conflict-inducing effect of oil has been corroborated by 
numerous quantitative and qualitative works, the question of which causal path, or causal 
mechanism, mainly underlies and generates this relationship is far from settled.  
In the following, I will review prominent explanations of the oil-armed conflict relationship 
which figure in the literature. The purpose of the section is to show that there are a number of 
problems with present explanations that need to be solved if we are to improve our 
understanding of this relationship. The review identifies three main shortcomings of available 
explanations. First, scholars disagree on whether rebel-centered or state-centered mechanisms 
mainly generate the relationship, and empirical findings provide no conclusive support to 
either story. Second, the suggested mechanisms may not explain why oil only in some 
instances bring about armed conflict, while in other instances not. Third, rebels’ capacity to 
                                               
14
 This debate gained momentum with Collier and Hoeffler’s (1998, 1999; 2004 and more) identification of 
natural resources as the single most important determinant of civil war, coupled with the controversial claim that 
rebel greed and financial opportunities better explains the occurrence of conflict.  
15
 In a decisive critique of Collier and Hoeffler’s studies on natural resources, Fearon (2005) show how these 
theorists own results become insignificant when their missing data are recovered and sample frame is adjusted. 
Fearon suggests that the positive relation between natural resources and armed conflict identified by Collier and 
Hoeffler may be due to omitted variable bias: Oil is a major component of primary commodity exports, and also 
correlates significantly with conflict risk. Even in Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) own study, only oil correlates 
significantly with conflict risk when they disaggregate the primary commodity exports variable into different 
types of commodities (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, p. 580). 
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mount armed challenge to oil-financed regimes remains a paradox which none of the 
suggested mechanisms are adequately able to resolve.  
In previous literature, explanations of the relationship between oil and armed conflict tend to 
follow two main lines: rebel-centered and state-centered explanations.16 In rebel-centered 
explanations, oil directly influences rebel’s motivations or financial opportunities to carry out 
armed insurgency. In state-centered explanations, the effect of oil runs indirectly via the 
detrimental impact of oil income on state institutions and countries’ economic performance. 
The review will first present the various rebel-centered and state-centered explanations, 
before I discuss their theoretical and empirical shortcomings in the subsequent section.  
3.1.1 Rebel-Centered Explanations 
Rebel-centered explanations of the relationship between petroleum resources and armed 
conflict include the honeypot argument, the availability of finance argument and the 
grievance argument. 
The Honeypot Mechanism 
The honeypot argument posits that presence of petroleum resources may directly influence 
motivations for contenders to seize power because such high value natural resources increases 
the value controlled by incumbent authorities and thereby increases the “prize” of state 
control. Some scholars have argued that this may motivate armed contest over government 
(Fearon, 2005; Fearon & Laitin, 2003).17 Others argue that this motive in particular incites 
                                               
16
 Due to the large number of explanations of the oil-armed conflict relationship found in previous literature, the 
division into rebel-centered and state-centered explanations may occur as a simplification. Yet, similar 
categorizations of explanations recur in the literature (see for instance Basedau & Wegenast, 2009, p. 38; de 
Soysa & Neumayer, 2007, p. 202; Lujala, 2010, p. 16). One problem with the distinction is that it is not always 
so clear whether the focus is primarily on the state or on rebels’ incentives or capacities, as the explanations 
often comment both. Mechanism reviews are also found  in Humphreys (2005) and Ross (2004a, 2004b, 2006). 
17
 In Fearon’s words, “easy riches from oil make the state a more tempting prize relative to working in the 
regular economy”(Fearon, 2005, p. 487). Yet this is only half of Fearon (2005), and Fearon & Laitins’ (2003) 
causal argument, as their focus is on oil’s detrimental impact on states’ administrative and bureaucratic capacity. 
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secessionist attempts as the potential economic gains from controlling a region increase 
considerably with the availability of petroleum resources (Collier & Hoeffler, 2012, p. 4).18  
The Availability of Finance Mechanism 
The availability of finance (or “looting”) argument is rooted in the initially publicized 
“greed”-based or economic opportunity explanation of the relationship between natural 
resources and armed conflict. Natural resources may represent a source of finance which may 
aid rebels in overcoming organizational barriers to insurgency (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). 
While this argument may explain insurgencies in countries with easily lootable resources such 
as alluvial diamonds (Lujala et al., 2005), it appears of less relevance in the case of petroleum 
resources, as their non-lootable characteristics limit their revenue raising potential to rebel 
groups (Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005, p. 568). Yet, petroleum resources may provide indirect 
opportunities of rebel finance through theft and extortion from oil companies (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2012, p. 6; Ross, 2006, p. 281), or by the sales of future exploitation rights to 
companies (so-called “booty futures”) (Ross, 2004a, p. 58). However, such activities may not 
improve the relative capacity of rebels vis-à-vis the government, given incomparable levels of 
funds accruing to each side.19 Moreover, ransom and other types of payments from oil 
companies to rebel groups have become increasingly difficult due to legislation and increased 
public pressure (Collier & Hoeffler, 2012, p. 6). 
The Grievance Mechanism 
The final rebel-centered argument connecting petroleum resources to armed conflict is that 
focusing on grievances, which occurs in different versions.20 First, oil extraction may generate 
a sense of relative deprivation among the populace insofar as increasing expectations for 
redistribution, deliverance of public goods and work opportunities are unmet (Humphreys, 
2005). It is conceivable that such expectations may become particularly salient in the regions 
which harbor the resource reserves, due to locals’ perceptions of ownership to the resource in 
                                               
18
 According to Le Billon’s typology of natural resources, oil constitutes a “point resource” (meaning that it is 
geographically concentrated and exploitation involves extractive industries), and is likely to motivate rather than 
finance rebellion. The physical location, whether proximate to the power center or peripheral, will further 
influence whether it incites armed contest over government or secession (Le Billon, 2001, p. 573). 
19
 This point is also emphasized by Fearon (2005, p. 502), Thies (2010, p. 323), and Snyder & Bhavnani (2005) 
20
 This section only covers the grievance related arguments that propose a direct effect of oil production on 
social grievances, not the arguments that emphasize features of governance as a primary stage in the causal path.  
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question. A related argument holds that social and environmental degradation emanating from 
the extraction process, combined with the failure to bring gainful returns to local 
communities, incite rebellions in resource rich regions (Lujala & Rustad, 2012, p. 8).21  
3.1.2 State-Centered Explanations 
Turning to the other main branch of causal explanations: State-centered arguments purport 
that the conflict-inducing effect of oil runs indirectly via the detrimental impact of oil on state 
capacity. This argument also comes in different versions; the bureaucratic weakness 
argument, the government detachment argument, and the vulnerable economy argument. 
Central to each version, however, is the notion that availability of oil income creates states 
with weaker state institutions due to a reduced need of extracting taxes from the population.22 
Lacking incentives to develop socially intrusive institutions to collect taxes from citizens, the 
institutions facilitative of societal peace are also undermined.  
A related, but contrasting argument is offered by rentier-state theory, which holds that oil 
wealth provides the means for regimes to reduce the risk of armed opposition through 
repression or co-optation. The implication of this argument relating to conflict risk thus 
contradicts the other arguments. 
The Bureaucratic Weakness Mechanism 
First, the state weakness argument proposed by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Fearon (2005) 
focuses on how oil revenues’ reductive impact on bureaucratic institutions increase the 
feasibility of rebellion in oil wealthy states. When states’ financial dependence on taxes from 
the population diminishes, they fail to develop the administrative and bureaucratic control 
throughout their territories that would otherwise be requisite to their capacity to tax. This in 
turn increases both the feasibility and the likelihood of rebellion, as states’ administrative 
presence and control throughout territories is at the core of their counterinsurgency capacity in 
terms of their ability to forestall the emergence of insurgencies. Oil countries, they argue, tend 
                                               
21
 Social and environmental problems associated with oil production may include land expropriation, pollution of 
drinking water, -soil, hunting and fishing grounds, rapid labor migrations causing social disruption as well as 
low work opportunities for locals (Ross, 2004a, p. 41). 
22
 This stage in the causal chain is a central element of- and borrowed from rentier state theory: for elaborate 
reviews of this theory see Ross (1999, p. 312); Smith (2004, p. 233). 
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to have weaker bureaucratic institutions than other countries with the same per capita income, 
and this explains their higher propensity to experience insurgencies.23 
The Government Detachment Mechanism 
Next, the government detachment argument24 focuses on how oil-funded governments’ 
reduced need of taxation creates states with weak state-society linkages and weak 
accountability of rulers. The impact on conflict risk is rather complicated however; as the 
literature diverges over which direction the relationship takes. On one hand, this mechanism 
may increase the risk of armed conflict by engendering grievances and making the state 
unable to redress such grievances. On the other hand, rentier state theory suggests that oil-rich 
governments that are less accountable to their constituencies may more freely use oil rents 
strategically to prevent armed opposition. 
Oil-funded states that do not depend on raising tax from the population may bypass an 
important mechanism for strengthening the reciprocity of state-society linkages and state 
responsiveness to societal demands. Taxation provides citizens with information of 
government activity; create incentives to monitor government behavior, and demands for 
return provisions such as participation, accountability and services (Humphreys, 2005, p. 
512). States that are financially dependent on continued taxation have incentives to comply 
with such demands; cooperation being less costly than coercion. In contrast, governments 
financed by non-tax revenue, such as oil-funded states, have lower incentives to comply with 
demands of accountability and representation, as they do not rely on continual taxation. As a 
consequence, governments less dependent on tax extraction for their survival may become 
more detached from their constituencies, and less responsive to their demands (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2012, p. 7; Humphreys, 2005, p. 512). 
                                               
23
 Fearon and Laitin proxy state strenght by GDP per capita, and argue that oil-producing countries have lower 
state capacity than other countries at the same GDP per capita. One problem of this measure is that it is pretty 
distant to the phenomenon which they theoretically claim to define states’ counterinsurgency capacity: namely 
institutional outreach and bureacratic control. It might seem that their measure is based on a theoretical inference 
that oil countries by rule or nature have lower institutional outreach and control throughout territories rather than 
it being a valid and unambigous measure to really test the implications of their argument. Another problem 
suggested by (Ross, 2004a, p. 36) is that GDP per capita might be endogenous to conflict. When armed conflict 
is anticipated or takes place, manufacturing business may leave and reduce economic output. This way, lowered 
GDP may be a result of conflict rather than a valid predictor of armed conflict.  
24
 This argument resembles - but is not equivalent to - rentier state theory. Rentier state theory was developed 
from studies of oil-wealthy Middle-Eastern countries, and suggests particular theoretical propositions which are 
not shared by the argument described here. The specific propositions of the rentier state theory are returned to.   
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Lack of structures of interaction between rulers and ruled, and lack of incentives to respond to 
societal demands may plausibly inhibit the ability of governments to resolve grievances 
among the public. Failure to address increasing aspirations for redistribution and gains from 
high value resources may add tension and increase the likelihood of violent conflict through a 
relative deprivation mechanism. 
The Rentier State Mechanism 
The rentier state theory points out an opposite path. While oil-rich governments may become 
more disconnected from their electorate, they may employ oil rents strategically to pacify 
potential opposition: for instance via increased expenditure on patronage, social welfare 
spending, bolstering their repressive apparatus, and preventing the formation of independent 
social groups or social capital (Basedau & Lay, 2009). Following this reasoning, oil wealth 
may be utilized to decrease the risk of armed opposition through strategic co-optation and 
corruption (Fjelde, 2009), and prolong the durability of oil wealthy authoritarian regimes 
(Smith, 2004).25  
The Vulnerable Economy Mechanism 
A final version of state-centered causal explanations of the oil–armed conflict link focuses on 
the damaging impacts of oil income on countries’ economies. Development economists have 
long argued that countries’ richness in natural resources in general, and in oil in particular, 
paradoxically hampers economic growth  (Sachs & Warner, 1995). Economic dutch disease, 
combined with governance related conditions such as economic mismanagement; corruption 
and private rent-seeking are often cited as causes of such economic outcomes.26 Low per 
capita income, and low economic growth, in turn, has been identified among the most robust 
                                               
25
 Via a similar process, oil wealth may influence the risk of conflict indirectly by blocking democratic 
transitions. Oil wealth is found to strongly inhibit democratic transitions when oil-producing countries are 
compared with non-oil countries (Andersen & Ross, 2013; Ross, 2012). The causal mechanism is about the same 
as the one depicted above: oil rich governments may use oil rents to relieve social pressures that would otherwise 
promote accountability and representative government. Yet, oil countries’ failure to democratize may not imply 
a unidirectional impact on conflict risk, and the potential link between oil wealth, democracy and conflict has not 
been further examined in current conflict literature. 
26
 Economic outcomes such as low economic growth in resource abundant countries are not inevitable, but 
mediated by policy choices made by political elites, and institutions that constrain the way resource revenues are 
spent. Mehlum et al. (2006) demonstrate that the effect of natural resource revenues on countries performance in 
economic growth importantly depends on the quality of political institutions, whether they stimulate 
unproductive “grabbing” hampering growth, or productive entrepreneurship which stimulate growth.   
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determinants of armed conflict (Collier et al., 2009; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre & 
Sambanis, 2006).27  
The suggested link to armed conflict is that low economic opportunities in the regular 
economy make recruitment to insurgent groups unusually cheap. Another explanation, 
suggested by Humphreys (2005), is that failure to develop thick domestic trade networks in 
resource dependent economies heightens the risk of conflict, because internal trade generates 
high incentives to maintain peace within societies, while low levels of internal trade may 
imply a comparably lower extent of such incentives.  
3.1.3 Continuing Empirical and Theoretical Puzzles 
With so many mechanisms suggested to explain how petroleum resources increase the risk of 
armed conflict, what is left to explain? Closer inspection of the theoretical literature and 
empirical analyses supporting it reveals that the question of which mechanism mainly 
underlies and produces the observed correlation is actually far from settled. The purpose of 
the following section is to show that continued attention to this topic is justified, given that (1) 
there is no clear empirical support of any of the causal mechanisms; scholars disagree on this 
issue, and (2) there are remaining theoretical puzzles that need to be addressed. In particular, 
the explanations insufficiently explain variation in the dependent variable. Moreover, there is 
a considerable theoretical ambiguity as to whether oil wealth facilitates- or reduces the 
feasibility of rebellion. 
Contradictory and Inconclusive Empirical Findings 
None of the mechanisms presented above are substantiated by conclusive empirical support. 
While theorists like Humphreys (2005) and de Soysa and Neumayer (2007) present findings 
in support of the state-centered mechanisms, other theorists, including Ross (2012) and Lujala 
(2010), present findings in support of rebel-centered explanations while they object to the 
soundness of state-centered mechanisms. Findings on the impact of natural resources on 
secessionist conflict, presented in alleged support of rebel-centered mechanisms, prove 
                                               
27
 Other economic maladies argued to befall oil dependent economies with implications for conflict risk include 
exposure to trade shocks due to volatile world market prizes (Ross, 2006, p. 291), enclave economies in which 
oil industry dominates while other sectors are crowded out due to Dutch disease and failure to employ policies 
for economic diversification (Dunning, 2005, p. 453).  
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unrobust in similar analyses on petroleum resources and conflict type. These points are further 
elucidated in the discussion below.  
Humphreys (2005) finds that past oil income, albeit not oil reserves, significantly increases 
the risk of conflict onset. In his interpretation, this supports the weak state mechanism, while 
it challenges the honeypot (or rebel greed) argument.28 Yet, this is not the only possible 
interpretation. Correlation between past oil income and increased risk of armed conflict may 
also run through a rebel grievance causal path, possibly also rebel finance, however 
theoretically unlikely due to the limited lootability of  oil. 
De Soysa and Neumayer (2007) are like Humphreys in favor of the weak state mechanism, 
based on their distinction between energy rents and mineral rents as independent variables.29 
The latter is constructed to capture the size of a country’s non-lootable rents in a given year, 
whereas the former is supposed to capture the size of lootable rents. As they find that only 
energy rents, but not mineral rents, significantly increase the likelihood of conflict, they 
conclude that this supports the weak state mechanism while it challenges the looting 
mechanism. It must be noted, however, that they do not even consider the possibility of other 
causal mechanisms to underlie the relation between energy rents and armed conflict. As such, 
they do provide further support of the oil-armed conflict link, but may not provide further 
support for their favored mechanism.  
Theorists that favor rebel-centered explanations include Lujala (2010) and Ross (2012). An 
important empirical justification for this is that when disaggregating the independent variable, 
only on-shore oil production significantly increases the risk of armed conflict onset, while off-
shore oil production has no such malign effects (Lujala, 2010, p. 25; Ross, 2012, p. 164). If it 
was the detrimental effects of large oil revenues on state institutions that mattered, rents from 
off-shore oil production should be just as harmful as rents from on-shore production. When 
only on-shore oil matters, this may indicate that rebels’ access to oil is the main distinguishing 
condition, working on conflict risk via rebels’ motivation and capacities (Lujala, 2010).30 31   
                                               
28This is so because the weak state mechanism may be triggered by prior earned oil income, while the honeypot 
or rebel greed mechanism may be triggered by the anticipation of future oil income (Humphreys, 2005, p. 519) 
29
 Energy consists of oil, gas and coal, whereas minerals include bauxite, copper, iron ore, lead, nickel, 
phosphate rock, tin, zinc, gold and silver (de Soysa & Neumayer, 2007, p. 206). 
30
 The correlation between on-shore oil production and conflict does not enable distinction between different 
rebel-centered explanations, meaning that the honeypot, grievance or finance argument may be equally plausible. 
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Another claim in alleged support of rebel-centered explanations is that resource wealth in 
particular induces secessionist conflicts (Collier & Hoeffler, 2006; Ross, 2006, p. 289). While 
this is often argued to favor the honeypot argument as resource-wealth heightens the value of 
controlling a resource-rich region, it may not be distinguishable from rebel grievance or -
funding arguments as they also hypothesize local effects. In any case, the robustness of this 
finding has been challenged in the particular case of petroleum resources. Ross (2012, p. 185) 
finds that oil income significantly increase the risk of both conflicts over government and 
separatist conflicts by a largely equal amount.  
The economically oriented version of state-centered explanations also fails the test of 
empirical scrutiny. If oil revenues’ detrimental impact on economic growth fully explained 
the relationship, the correlation between oil income and armed conflict would disappear when 
controlling for growth. This is not the case (see for instance de Soysa & Neumayer, 2007, p. 
212). If oil countries’ lack of economic diversification and sparse domestic trade networks 
explained the relationship, controlling for this could reveal the nature of these relationships. 
Yet, Humphreys (2005, p. 524) finds that while domestic economic structure (measured by 
the degree of agricultural dependence of economies) matters for countries’ conflict risk, this 
condition does not reduce the conflict-inducing effect of oil production.32 In other words, the 
effect of oil not limited to the condition of domestic economic structure.33  
Theoretical Shortcomings of the Explanations 
In addition to disagreements over mechanisms and inconclusive empirical findings, the causal 
paths suggested in previous literature are also theoretically unsatisfying. Two main problems 
may be noted: they do not address how variation in the dependent variable comes about, and 
                                                                                                                                                   
31
 Another interesting finding provided by Lujala (2010), is that when petroleum reserves and -production are 
located within a conflict area, this nearly doubles the duration of conflict. This may be taken to support rebel-
centered arguments in general. Yet, production is not a necessary condition, located reserves are sufficient to 
bring about this effect. The latter finding in particular supports the honeypot argument, as both rebel grievance 
and looting opportunity is largely a consequence of production. 
32
 In fact, controlling for agricultural dependence increases rather than decreases the coefficient for oil 
production (Humphreys, 2005, p. 525-526).  
33
 What Humphreys does not address is whether the conflict-inducing effect of oil may be conditional on sparse 
economic networks. The combination of oil income and low economic diversification may make armed conflict 
more likely as both motive (heightened prize of state control) and low opportunity cost is present. This could 
also better capture economic inequality in society which may induce conflict by increasing grievances. 
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they disagree on (and underestimate) the paradox of rebel’s capacity to carry out armed 
insurgency against oil rich governments.  
Neither rebel-centered explanations nor state-centered explanations address why petroleum 
resources stimulate armed conflict in some instances, but not in others. If rebels’ increased 
motivations due to heightened prize of state control or perceived grievances explained the 
relationship, why does this come about in some countries, but not in others? State-centered 
causal explanations similarly appear to suggest that oil income almost unavoidably creates 
states with weaker state structures, reduced accountability, and obstructed growth; promoting 
the impression that this is an inevitable path towards conflict. The many cases where oil 
wealth has not been followed by armed conflict clearly demonstrate the need to locate 
conditioning circumstances. Thus, more attention to explain the divergent experience of 
conflict in oil countries is warranted.   
The review of literature also exposed an important theoretical disagreement concerning 
whether oil wealth improves or disrupts states’ abilities to prevent armed insurgencies. 
Proponents of the weak state hypothesis argue that limited incentives to develop 
administrative and bureaucratic capacity increases the feasibility of rebellion in oil countries. 
Contrary to this, proponents of the rentier state theory emphasize that oil wealth provides 
governments with sizeable rents that may be utilized to prevent the formation of violent 
challengers to the regime, by methods such as coercion and co-optation. Empirical findings to 
substantiate the latter are available. Fjelde (2009) finds that high levels of political corruption 
limit the conflict-inducing effect of oil income. Ross (2003, p. 13) finds that military 
expenditures in oil- and mineral-rich states are between two and four times as great as that of 
oil- and mineral-poor states. This could signify a bolstering rather than a weakening of 
counterinsurgency capacity. As the heightened prize of state control presumably also provides 
governments with high incentives to prevent loss of power, the capacity of rebel groups to 
stage armed insurgencies in oil rich countries remains puzzling.  
Summary of the Review and Research Gap 
In sum, this review of previous research reveals that the question of which causal path 
primarily connects petroleum resources to heightened danger of civil war is far from settled. 
Scholars disagree over whether the conflict-inducing effect of oil primarily works via rebels’ 
incentives or capacities or via weakened state institutions and economy. Empirically, there is 
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no unequivocal support of either causal story. Theoretically, the suggested mechanisms 
jointly come short in explaining two continuing puzzles: (1) why so many oil-producing 
countries are able to escape the seemingly inevitable path toward armed conflict; and (2) the 
paradox of rebels’ capacity to stage and sustain armed insurgency against oil-financed 
governments that enjoy the best available means to sustain repressive capacities and strategic 
co-optation to prevent opposition.  
Table 3.1: Summary of Mechanisms 
 
A subject that has received little attention so far is that countries’ highly different institutional 
and societal starting points may be quite influential for their propensity to experience armed 
conflict following the introduction of oil. While several explanations of the relationship 
between oil and armed conflict emphasize the role of states’ institutional capacity, no 
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contributions have addressed how variations in countries’ initial institutional capacity may 
mediate the conflict-inducing effect of oil.34 Another potentially salient issue that has 
remained unaddressed is how countries’ varying experience of armed conflict prior to oil may 
affect the risk of conflict outbreak in oil-producing countries. Previous conflict may serve as 
an indicator of deficient state capacity both in terms of coercive control and legitimacy of 
rule, but may also indicate an important source of rebel capacity. Latent conflict structures 
(previously mobilized groups, rebel skills, presence of arms etc.) represent important sources 
of organizational capital which may have been underestimated as a predictor of armed conflict 
following oil.  
In the following section, I introduce the perspective that oil countries’ divergent institutional 
legacies and conflict legacies are key to understand the divergent experience of armed conflict 
in oil-producing countries. More precisely, I argue that the conditions of institutional strength 
and organizational legacies of conflict at the time when oil revenue ensue may determine 
whether oil becomes a blessing or a curse. A particular advantage of this perspective is that it 
suggests an answer to the paradox of rebel capacity, and a way to understand the origin of 
divergent trajectories in oil’s impact on conflict risk via states’ institutional capacity.  
3.2 The Importance of Divergent Starting Points  
Sudan and Cameroon are two African oil-producing countries with a markedly different 
history of armed conflict following oil production. While Sudan represents a prominent 
example of the volatile mix of petroleum and armed conflict, Cameroon has been nearly 
wholly able to avoid internal armed conflict during its time as an oil-producer. 
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 Anecdotic addresses to this point have been made. Smith (2004, p. 243) in his concluding remarks suggests 
that the impact of oil revenues may vary according to the domestic political setting into which they are 
introduced, in particular whether the regime was already consolidated  or not. Karl (1997, p. 13) notes that petro-
state problems may be avoided when state-building has taken place prior to the introduction of oil revenues. As 
part of a wider research endeavor on natural resources and armed conflict, Humphreys (2005, p. 528) addresses 
empirically whether the impact of oil rents may be conditional on measures state strength. The potential 
theoretical implications of his findings however remain underdeveloped and are overshadowed by the larger 
research objective and multitude of other findings. In addition, his three measures of state strength have clear 
limitations; most notably they are all likely to be endogenous to conflict. The first two are derived from the 
Polity index of political regime, which as exposed by Vreeland (2008) operationalize regime with direct 
reference to political violence and civil war. The third measure of state strength used by Humphreys refer to the 
Weberianness of state structures (p. 527), but is measured at a fixed point in the late 1990ies and includes no 
time series. 
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In Sudan, oil was discovered in 1978. Production did not commence until the mid-1990s, 
reaching full scale and exports to the international market by 1999 (ECOS, 2008, p. 18). 
Disagreement over the country’s petroleum resources has been an important aspect of the 
conflict among the Sudanese government and the rebel groups (mainly the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)) over the years. Yet, oil was not what sparked the 
conflict initially. In fact, Sudan has experienced internal armed conflict nearly constantly 
since independence in 1956.35 Since independence the country has been characterized by 
extreme centralization, with power and resources located to Karthoum, while other areas have 
been left marginalized. The divide between the Arab/Muslim north and the African/Christian 
South has also been evident in terms of economic development. Compared with the north, the 
south has always been remote and underdeveloped (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, 2014). 
This has not improved much despite soaring national income since 2000. While oil rents have 
enriched an elite minority, most people of Sudan and South Sudan have seen few benefits 
(Rolandsen, 2012, p. 73). 
Exemplifying the peaceful oil producer, Cameroon started to produce oil in 1977-1978.36 
From its peak of production with an oil income about $200 per capita annually during the 
1980ies, Cameroon has in later years produced oil within the range of $40-$130 per capita 
which is around the median value of about $70 among oil countries. With the exception of a 
two-day failed quo attempt in 1984, Cameroon has been remarkably peaceful compared to 
other low-income oil countries.37 The decade leading up to first oil income was also free from 
organized political violence. An armed independence struggle in French Cameroon (northern 
part) had seen its two main goals accomplished with independence from France in 1960 and 
unification with British Cameroon (southern part) in 1961. Activities of the independence 
movement UPC (Union of the Populations of Cameroon) stemmed, as key leaders either were 
coopted or killed by the new regime of the unified Cameroons (DeLancey, 1989, p. 39). The 
years that followed were marked by centralization of state power on the hands of President 
Ahmadou Ahidjo. A highly authoritarian political system emerged; concentrating political 
                                               
35
 During 1963-1972 a territorial conflict concerning Southern Sudan took place. Conflict over government has 
been active in the years 1971, 1976 and 1983 until present, taking place in the South and in the Darfur region. In 
2011, South Sudan achieved independence, but fighting has continued in both countries since (UCDP Conflict 
Encyclopedia, 2014).  
36
 In Ross’ data, first oil income is recorded in 1977, while other sources state 1978 as the first year of 
production.  
37
 Throughout the period of study, GDP/cap in Cameroon is continuously around or below the 25th percentile of 
GDP/cap of all countries. 
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and economic power on the President by utilizing key tactics of coalition formation and 
cooptation, patronage networks and repression (DeLancey, 1989, pp. 52-63).  
At the same time as widespread patronage and repression may have induced stability, the 
regime also appears to have been capable in terms of public goods provision. According to 
DeLancey (1989, p. 91), the regime had a “drive toward universal primary education” since 
independence, which led to a considerable increase in education facilities and school 
enrolment in the period. According to the “Africa South of the Sahara” 1986 yearbook 
published by Europa Publications Limited, Cameroon had achieved one of the highest rates of 
school attendance in Africa, as a result of long term policy (p. 319). 
What may explain different experiences of armed conflict among oil-producing countries such 
as Sudan and Cameroon? This section lays out the argument that in order to understand why 
petroleum resources in some cases induces armed conflict, but not in others, it is necessary to 
pay attention to domestic conditions already in place when the country discovers oil and rents 
start to flow into government coffers. In particular, two conditions stand out as potentially 
salient in mediating the effect of oil on conflict risk: first, a country’s legacy of institutional 
capacity, and second, a country’s potential legacy of armed conflict prior to the entry of oil. 
These conditions may extend and improve both rebel-centered and state-centered 
explanations, as will be shown in the discussion below.   
3.2.1 Institutional Legacy  
As reviewed above, many theorists suggests that the impact of oil on conflict risk primarily 
run via oil revenues inhibiting impact on different aspects of states’ institutional capacity. In 
particular, oil was hypothesized to increase the risk of conflict by forestalling the 
development of state institutional capacities such as (1) bureaucratic strength (2) institutional 
capacity to engage and respond to citizens (reciprocal institutions), and (3) sound economic 
performance.  
The arguments centering on oil’s impact on states’ institutional capacity remain poorly tested 
empirically. If it is the damages on countries’ state institutions that actually explain oil 
countries’ heightened risk of armed conflict, this could be tested by using exogenous 
measures of the critical institutions. This has rarely been done: Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) 
analysis, for instance, is founded on the assumption that oil countries by definition have a 
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lower state capacity compared with other countries on the same level of GDP/per capita. In 
their analysis, oil is by itself used as an indicator of poor institutional outreach and 
bureaucratic control, although this critical aspect of state capacity may vary greatly among oil 
countries.  
Another important shortcoming of the state-centered explanations is that they fail to take into 
account that institutional destruction, poor economic performance, and heightened risk of 
conflict is not an inevitable outcome of oil. They also do not address how differences in 
states’ initial level of institutional capacity may play out on the mentioned mechanisms. The 
postulations of the state-centered explanations describe that oil income inhibits the formation 
and development of institutions central to maintain societal peace, but the explanations say 
nothing about how oil income will influence such institutions in countries where they have 
already been established.  
Addressing this shortcoming, my contention is that variations in countries’ institutional 
capacities at the point in time when oil income ensues (“institutional legacy”) may 
importantly mediate whether the state-centered mechanisms, and rebel-centered mechanisms, 
will be triggered or not following oil income.  
In simple terms, I claim that different institutional starting points may anticipate different 
institutional trajectories following oil wealth, with crucial implications for conflict risk: 
Countries with entrenched bureaucratic institutions and strong reciprocal institutions in place 
prior to oil may be able to resist the detrimental impact of oil revenue, and neither rebel 
incentives nor feasibility of rebellion may increase in the wake of oil. To the contrary, in 
countries with poorly developed bureaucracy and reciprocal institutions prior to oil, the causal 
paths suggested by state-centered and rebel-centered mechanisms may more plausibly be 
triggered and conflict risk increase.  
Since the focus on initial institutional context by definition entails a primary focus on the 
state, the convenient distinction between rebel-centered and state-centered arguments hitherto 
upheld will now be more difficult to pursue. Increasingly, the two theoretical focuses are 
found to reflect two sides of the same coin, indicating that they should be seen as 
complementary rather than opposing. In the following will try to explain how differences in 
the context of state’s institutional capacity may determine whether state-centered and rebel-
centered mechanisms will be triggered or not.   
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Institutional Legacy, Bureaucratic Weakness and Rebel Capacity 
The weak state mechanism portrays that oil income makes rebellion more feasible by 
weakening state bureaucratic and institutional control due to oil countries’ reduced need for 
extracting taxes from the population. The degree to which countries have developed robust 
bureaucratic control prior to onset of oil income may however influence whether this 
trajectory is realized or not.  
Oil income may be more likely to preclude the development of bureaucratic institutions where 
they are not present rather than to corrupt existing institutions. This suggests different 
institutional trajectories following oil wealth depending on the country’s initial bureaucratic 
capacity. In countries with entrenched bureaucratic presence and control throughout territories 
(originally developed to sustain capacity to tax) prior to oil, these institutions may be 
expected to persist rather than wane, for reasons that may be summed up as organizational 
inertia.38 In countries with strong bureaucratic institutions to facilitate tax-capacity established 
before the onset of oil revenue, a combination of domestic norms, institutions, procedures of 
national budgeting, people employed in bureaucracy etc. may be expected to sustain the 
continuation of this practice rather than abandoning it. Hence, in circumstances where robust 
institutions have already been established, oil income may not be expected to trigger the 
bureaucratic weakness mechanism. In these situations, the feasibility of rebellion may not 
automatically go up as a consequence of oil income to the government.  
On the other hand, if bureaucratic control is poorly developed prior to oil, the bureaucratic 
weakness mechanism as it is presented above may more plausibly be triggered. In countries 
with poor bureaucratic capacity prior to oil, oil income may limit the state’s incentives to 
extend its tax-extractive apparatuses and bureaucratic control throughout territories in order to 
raise finance. In such settings, oil may forestall development of a crucial source of the state’s 
counterinsurgency capacity, and the feasibility of rebellion and relative capacity of rebels to 
organize armed insurgency increase.  
Hypothesis 1: The conflict-inducing effect of oil income will be higher in countries with low 
bureaucratic control than in countries with high bureaucratic control at the commencement of oil 
income 
                                               
38
 Organizational inertia refers to the tendency of mature organizations to continue along their current 
trajectories, also during change in external conditions.  
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Institutional Legacy and the Government Detachment Mechanism 
The government detachment mechanism portrays that oil income brings about states that are 
more detached from the public, less accountable, less responsive to social needs and thereby 
less able to resolve social grievances. Exactly what types of state institutions facilitate 
accountability and responsiveness on the part of the government is not clearly specified in the 
literature referring to this mechanism. Yet, it is conceivable that the quality of most kinds of 
public institutions designed to respond to the needs of citizens may indicate the level of 
reciprocity of the state to society. As oil rents are expected to in particular heighten 
redistributive pressures on the part of the state, the quality of redistributive institutions 
providing public goods may be relevant to consider in this regard.  
The claim of this thesis is that the quality of such institutions in place at the time of onset of 
oil revenue may importantly condition whether the government detachment mechanism will 
be triggered or not. As in the case of the bureaucratic control mechanism, the government 
detachment mechanism postulates that oil income - by reducing the need for taxation – 
inhibits the formation and development of institutions that facilitate government 
accountability and reciprocity to society, while it says nothing on the impact of oil rents on 
such institutions where they are already in place. I propose that the onset of non-tax revenue 
such as oil rents need not corrode such capacities if they have already been developed. If a 
state has developed the institutional capacity to provide high quality public goods like general 
education and public health care prior to oil, this is a plausible indication of well-developed 
responsiveness to social needs on the part of the state. The same norms, principles and 
institutions underlying this capacity may be expected to guide the management of ensuing oil 
revenues, and improve the prospects that oil revenues will be utilized for public good. In other 
words, in contexts where institutions facilitating governments’ reciprocity to society and 
distribution of public goods are of high quality prior to the entry of oil, the propositions of the 
government detachment mechanism appear less plausible.  
If countries lack such institutions when oil rents start to flood into government coffers, the 
scenarios portrayed by the government detachment mechanism may more plausibly be 
triggered. Onset of large oil income in contexts where such institutions are missing may 
prevent that they ever emerge, following the logic that government’s financial reliance on 
taxation is the primary motive for creating institutions facilitating accountability of rulers and 
reciprocity towards society.  
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Institutional Legacy, Rebel Grievance and Rebel Honeypot 
Complementing the arguments above, pure rent-seeking motivations on the part of rebels (the 
honeypot mechanism) and the rebel grievance mechanism may also be alleviated by the 
presence of robust bureaucratic institutions and well-functioning redistributive institutions.   
The honeypot argument posits that that the presence or promise of oil rents increases the 
value of the state as a target, thereby increasing the risk of armed attempts at governmental 
power or regional sovereignty. However, the degree to which credible institutional constraints 
are in place to control elites’ use of such rents may importantly determine the size of the 
“prize” of state control. In countries with robust bureaucratic control, and well-functioning 
redistributive institutions, such institutions may indicate a capacity to oversee and constrain 
the management of public funds. Where such constraining institutions are present, private 
gains from violent attainment of power should be low, and the honeypot mechanism appears 
implausible. 
The rebel-centered grievance mechanism emphasizes how the discovery and extraction of oil 
may generate higher expectations for redistribution and gainful returns, which may engender 
conflict if such aspirations are unfulfilled. The robustness of institutions facilitating 
conversion of public funds into public goods may plausibly condition whether the rebel 
grievance mechanism will be triggered or not. 
Hypothesis 2: The conflict-inducing effect of oil income may be lower in countries with high 
quality of public service provision than in countries with low quality of public service 
provision at the commencement of oil income 
3.2.2 Armed Conflict Legacy 
As pointed out in the discussion of continuing theoretical puzzles, the question of rebel 
groups’ capacity to stage armed insurgency against oil financed governments is far from 
settled. Opposing theoretical projections include on the one hand Fearon and Laitin (2003), 
who propose that oil wealth increases the feasibility of rebellion by weakening states’ 
bureaucratic control and hence counterinsurgency capacity. On the other hand, proponents of 
the rentier state theory suggest that oil wealthy regimes may prevent armed challenges by 
using oil rents to strengthen repressive apparatuses and buy off opposition. Governments of 
oil-producing countries are identified as remarkably inclined to invest in military capability, 
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and their incentives for preventing loss of their position should be comparable to rebels 
tempted by the honeypot. 
Addressing this puzzle of rebels’ capacity to organize armed revolt against oil-financed 
regimes; I propose that the possible presence of latent conflict structures from a previous 
armed mobilization deserves attention. Thus far, the possible connection between armed 
conflict following oil production and armed conflict prior to oil has not been considered.  
Why may previous armed conflict be interesting to consider in the oil-armed conflict 
relationship? With reference to the state-centered explanations of the oil-armed conflict 
relationship, a previous armed conflict may be indicative of deficient state capacity.39 A 
perhaps more important perspective, however, is that organizational and structural legacies 
persisting from a previous mobilization may significantly add to the feasibility of rebellion in 
oil-producing countries. Thus, this condition suggests an answer to the previously identified 
puzzle of rebel capacity in oil-producing countries.  
How may prior armed conflict indicate enhanced viability of rebellion following oil? The 
feasibility of rebellion may rest on the ability of a dissident organization to gain the support of 
a considerable segment of the population, and to recruit a sufficient number of active 
members. The occurrence of armed conflict is indicative of the presence of “multiple 
sovereignties”, a concept originally used by Tilly (1978). This condition obtains when one or 
more armed challengers to the government emerge which commands the support of a 
significant segment of the population (Tilly, 1978, pp. 192, 200). As argued by (Mason et al., 
2011, p. 172), the degree to which the condition of multiple sovereignties persist in society 
after the formal end of a conflict may define the capacity of rebel groups to resume armed 
conflict at a later stage. Insofar as the condition of multiple sovereignties40 persists in the 
post-conflict society, this plausibly makes the mobilization of human and material resources 
necessary to resume insurgency at a later stage more feasible. 
A previous conflict may indicate the presence of unique resources aiding rebel capacity for 
renewed insurgency. Collier and Hoeffler (2004, p. 569) emphasize that so-called conflict-
                                               
39
 In addition, armed conflict may further weaken state capacity, by destroying economic infrastructure and 
diverting human capital as well as finances away from productive activity. Armed conflict reduces production 
and trade, and thereby hampers economic output and growth, implying that the causes and consequences of 
armed conflict are reciprocal (Collier et al., 2003). 
40
 Including organizational infrastructure and popular support base of an insurgency 
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specific capital inherited from a previous conflict improve the opportunities for rebellion. 
Similar to the multiple sovereignty approach they emphasize the importance of organizational 
capital, but they also point to the persistence of weapon stocks and rebel skills as capacity 
enhancing resources.41  
Social psychology theory on structural changes that occur during escalation of conflict also 
supports the idea that armed conflict may be more feasible in settings where former escalation 
has taken place. Armed conflict may be seen as the result of a broader process of conflict 
escalation. Rubin et al. (1994, p. 133) describe a range of structural changes that occur within 
society during escalation of conflict, including development of organizational infrastructure, 
hostile perceptions and attitudes among adversaries, and community polarization. Such 
structural changes tend to persist long after violence cease and conflict formally ends, and 
they make the escalation of future conflict more likely and more severe.  
Political issues related to petroleum resources (ownership, distribution of rents, job 
opportunities, etc.) may become more contentious and difficult to resolve when introduced in 
settings where such structural changes (mobilized groups, antagonistic attitudes and mistrust) 
have developed within society during a previously escalated conflict. In line with this thought, 
Rubin et al. (1994) note that a central feature of escalation is that more and more issues are 
incorporated into the contested incompatibility. In countries where a recent armed conflict has 
taken place and escalation structures persist, political issues related to the discovery and 
exploitation of oil may merge into antagonists incompatibility and be more flammable than 
when introduced into settings with no prior escalation.    
Hypothesis 3: Oil income increases conflict risk more severely in countries with a recent 
legacy of armed conflict than in countries without such a conflict legacy at the 
commencement of oil income 
The findings of Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) may be supportive of this notion. While they 
study the duration of post-conflict peace, not armed conflict onset, they find that conflicts 
with natural resource links (in particular conflicts motivated by incompatibility over natural 
resource distribution) are more likely to resume than conflicts without such links. This may 
indicate preliminary support to the notion that distributive issues related to natural resources 
                                               
41
 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) model such conflict-specific capital to gradually vane, measured by time since the 
last conflict. 
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may be particularly salient motive for continuing fighting in settings where conflict structures 
are present. Although Rustad and Binningsbø study natural resources in general, petroleum 
resources may be a highly relevant in this regard as oil exploitation generates exceptionally 
high values concentrated on few hands. Pressures for redistribution should in other words be 
particularly salient in the case of petroleum resources.  
The notion that organizational capital inherited from previous conflict is a particularly 
important source of rebel capacity and determinant of insurgency finds support in a recent 
study by Daly (2012). Studying determinants of violence in Colombian municipalities, she 
finds that past mobilization is the main predictor of rebellion, and more importantly so than 
poverty, rough terrain and lootable natural resources. On the basis of data from 274,428 
municipality-months, she finds that regions where previous mobilization has taken place are 
six times more likely to experience rebellion than regions without past mobilization. The 
mechanism, she suggests, is that organizational legacies from previous conflict ease 
mobilization for later militarized collective action (Daly, 2012, p. 477). 
A few qualifications to the proposition that past armed conflict may ease mobilization for 
renewed conflict following oil may be noted. The first is that the nearness in time of the 
previous conflict is likely not unimportant. Conflict-specific capital such as organizational 
infrastructure may be expected to decline with time after the end of the previous conflict, as 
pointed out by Collier and Hoeffler (2004).  
Second, the outcome of the previous conflict may distinguish whether the condition of 
multiple sovereignty persist in the post-conflict phase or not, and thereby be indicative of the 
regenerative potential. This is the main argument of Mason et al. (2011, p. 173). A negotiated 
settlement may preserve the condition of multiple sovereignties better than if the previous 
conflict ended with a military victory, or a total extermination of one side, such as in the last 
phases of the civil war in Sri Lanka in 2009. For the purpose of this study, it will suffice to 
expect that the condition of multiple sovereignties will more easily be revived in countries 
where a recent armed conflict has taken place compared with countries without such a recent 
conflict history. The occurrence of conflict is a manifestation that the legitimacy of the 
government is contested, and that society hosts a latent support base sufficient to sustain 
insurgency. 
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Finally, continuity between past mobilization and renewed conflict does not theoretically 
predicate that it is the identical rebel organization that is reincarnated following the onset of 
oil income. As emphasized by Daly (2012, p.477), insurgencies often draw on existing social 
structures and networks to overcome collective action and commitment problems, in which 
previously mobilized militant networks may be exceptionally suited for co-optation. For this 
reason, I hypothesize that the recent presence of an armed organization may add to the 
feasibility of renewed mobilization following oil, and whether or not this is the same rebel 
organization or a new one is regarded unimportant. 
Table 3.2 below sums up the main parts of the theoretical argument and affiliated hypotheses; 
before I move on to develop the empirical procedure in Chapter 4. 
 
Table 3.2: Summary of Hypotheses and Corresponding Explanations 
Hypothesis Explanation 
H1: The conflict-inducing effect of oil income will be higher in 
countries with low bureaucratic control than in countries with 
high bureaucratic control at the commencement of oil income 
 
Countries’ institutional legacy 
may condition the conflict-
inducing effect of oil  
 
H2: The conflict-inducing effect of oil income may be lower in 
countries with high quality of public service provision than in 
countries with low quality of public service provision at the 
commencement of oil income 
H3: Oil income increases conflict risk more severely in countries 
with a recent legacy of armed conflict than in countries without 
such a conflict legacy at the commencement of oil income 
 
Countries’ legacy of armed 
conflict may condition the 
conflict-inducing effect of oil 
Overarching explanation: Differences in exposure to armed conflict among oil income countries 
may be explained by differences in these countries’ institutional and societal starting points as oil 
income ensues. 
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4 Research Design 
This chapter presents the empirical procedure and quantitative research design developed for 
testing my proposition that institutional legacy and conflict legacy mediates the conflict-
inducing effect of oil. The purpose is to make this procedure transparent and replicable, 
expose challenges, and to discuss and justify important methodological choices (King et al., 
1994). The chapter is organized as follows. First, I describe the main properties of the 
empirical data used for the analysis, including structure of the dataset and the units of 
analysis. Second, I discuss the operationalization of independent variables and control 
variables, and reflect on issues relating to the validity and reliability of these measures.42 
Third, I present logistic analysis as the statistical model employed to test the hypotheses. 
Fourth, I discuss the main methodological challenges of the empirical procedure and how they 
are addressed in order to enhance the possibility of making valid inferences from results. 
4.1 Data Structure and Unit of Analysis 
This section describes the structure of the data which is utilized in the empirical analysis of 
my research question. The dataset used in the analysis is a time-series cross-section (TSCS) 
structure, with the country-year (eg. Algeria 1967) as the unit of analysis. The data includes 
yearly observations on relevant variables for all countries listed as independent members of 
the international system as classified by Gleditsch and Ward (1999).43 The years 1961-2007 is 
the time-period covered in the analysis of the dependent variable, as this is the period for 
which I have data on all operationalized independent- and control variables. The dataset also 
includes country-years from 1946 to 1960 in order to measure and determine the sequence of 
countries’ first oil income and conflict legacy.  
                                               
42
 While there many different definitions of the concepts of validity and reliability, I here use them in the 
following “common” sense: validity referring to the ability of the operationally defined variable to capture the 
theoretically defined concept they are intended to measure (Adcock & Collier, 2001). Deficiency in the validity 
of measures may lead to systematic measurement error and biased results. Reliability, on the other hand, refers to 
the accuracy of the measurement of the operational variables, and measures’ ability to yield consistent 
observations when repeated. Problems with reliability lead to unsystematic/random measurement errors. 
43
 There is one exception to this rule: non-independent countries that had incidence of extra-systemic conflict 
within their borders prior to independence have country-years from the first incidence of such conflict and up to 
independence included in the frame. This is to facilitate the construction of other variables (“conflict prior to oil” 
variables), and as these country-years contain no other data they are not included in any regression analyses.  
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4.2 Operationalizations 
This section describes how the theoretical concepts discussed in the theory section, which 
make up dependent and independent variables in my study, are made empirically measurable 
through the specification of indicators. The validity of measures are pursued by careful 
attention to the correspondence between theoretically defined concepts and the operationally 
defined indicators (Adcock & Collier, 2001). In the following, I account for the choice of 
indicators of the dependent and the independent variables, and present the set of control 
variables included in the analysis. The sources of data on these indicators are also presented. 
4.2.1 Dependent Variable: Internal Armed Conflict Onset 
My research question addresses the relationship between oil, various mediating variables, and 
risk of domestic armed conflict onset. The dependent variable is thus onset of internal armed 
conflict. This calls for a binary outcome measure of this variable: domestic armed conflict 
may (1) or may not (0) commence in a given country-year.44  
While there are several available data-compilations with information on domestic conflict 
onset,45 I utilize conflict data from UCDP/PRIO Onset of Intrastate Armed Conflict Dataset 
1946-2011 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themnér & Wallensteen, 2012).46 This dataset follows the 
Gleditsch and Ward (1999) classification of independent states, and contains yearly 
observations of onset of internal armed conflict for each country between 1946 and 2011. The 
dataset includes cases based on UCDP/PRIO’s standard definition of armed conflict,47 and 
                                               
44
 The choice of studying armed conflict onset is primarily for the purpose of comparability with other relevant 
studies in the field, as they predominantly focus on the relationship between oil and conflict onset risk (an 
exception being studies focusing on duration of conflict). 
45
 The most commonly used data-compilations include UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data (various versions); 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) data on civil wars; Correlates of War data; as well as Sambanis (2004) conflict data. 
The main differences in coding rules across these data-compilations include the amount of violence specified as 
criterion for inclusion; whether or not civilian killings are included in this count, and time-coverage. The number 
of onsets and country-years with domestic armed conflict vary notably according to which coding procedure is 
followed, as do time-period for study, which makes it hard to compare results from studies using one set of data 
from another (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). 
46
 This is the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2012 in a country-year version, structured for quantitative 
analysis. Downloadable from:  www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/onset_of_intrastate_armed_conflict/ 
47
 UCDP/PRIO employs the following definition of conflict: “[…..] a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” For more detailed information on the 
operationalization of various elements of the definition, I refer to the codebook (Themnér, 2012), and the list of 
definitions at the UCDP website: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/ 
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only includes cases of internal armed conflict, that is, cases where conflict takes place 
between a government and one or several internal organized groups (Themnér, 2012, p. 9).48 
Any armed confrontation between a government and an internal opposition group that reaches 
a threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year is included in the dataset. It is 
however a criterion that the internal opposition group is formally organized in the sense that it 
has announced a name for their group, and has stated an incompatibility with the government 
(Themnér, 2012, p. 2).  
More specifically, my dependent variable is coded 1 if an internal armed conflict begins in a 
given country-year, and 0 if otherwise. Consecutive conflict years are coded as 0 to allow for 
the possible onset of additional conflicts within the same country.49 If a conflict begins again 
after two consecutive years of peace, it is treated as a new onset event. This coding rule is 
somewhat arbitrary; it is not always easy to say what is an end of conflict and what is merely 
a phase of low activity. It is however a widely applied rule also in studies that I want to be 
able to compare my results to (eg. de Soysa & Neumayer, 2007; Lujala, 2010; Ross, 2012), so 
it makes sense to apply the same rule for the sake of comparability. The impact of prior 
conflict will nonetheless be controlled for in other ways. 
The choice of UCDP/PRIO’s conflict data as indicator of internal armed conflict is justified 
with regard to both the measures’ content validity and its reliability. Regarding content 
validity; the operational definition corresponds closely with the theoretical conceptualization 
of internal armed conflict presented in the introduction. Compared with other data-
compilations it has the advantage that it uses the relatively low threshold of 25 battle-deaths, 
which means that it offers more fine-grained data on the phenomena of interest than datasets 
employing higher thresholds for inclusion.50  
                                               
48
 Both cases of internal armed conflict without intervention from other states and cases with intervention from 
other states are included (referring to type 3 and 4 in UCDP’s typology of conflict). Cases of colonial- and 
interstate armed conflict (type 1 and 2 in UCDP’s typology) are excluded from this dataset. 
49
 This coding rule is also fair given that dropping consecutive conflict years from the sample would artificially 
increase the mean of the dependent variable in particular for countries that have experienced multiple onsets, 
possibly making these more influential in the data  (Fearon, 2005, p. 488). 
50
 At the same time, the battle-related criterion means that incidences of large-scaled one-sided violence, like 
massacres, genocide and communal violence, may not be included in the count. This may seem somewhat at 
odds with a common expectation of what should be considered armed conflict. Yet, the measure ensures strict 
attention to the phenomena of interest, which entails instrumental use of armed force in the struggle over 
incompatible political objectives between a government and a contending rebel organization. 
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Regarding reliability, the UCDP/PRIO data is superior in the sense that applied coding rules 
are consistent (across countries and years), well specified and transparent. This has been a 
problematic issue in particular concerning the correlates of war data (Sambanis, 2004, p. 
817).51 The UCDP/PRIO conflict data is also a highly reputed source, and widely applied in 
research in the field.52 Another beneficial feature is that this data covers a long time span. 
For the period 1961-2007 the data covers a total of 7169 country-years. A total of 235 onsets 
of internal armed conflict within the period give a mean of approximately .033, which may be 
interpreted as countries’ average annual risk of armed conflict of about 3.3 % within this 
period.  
 
Figure 4.1: Number of Internal Armed Conflict Onsets and Independent States by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
51
 A minor, yet noteworthy drawback to the reliability is that the temporal unit of the calendar year imposes 
some degree of arbitrariness in the measurement of cases: if for instance 25 battle deaths occurred within the 
period December 1975-November 1976, but not within January 1976 to December 1976, the value of the 
dependent variable in 1976 will nonetheless be measured as zero although the threshold was reached within a 
time period of a year in the first case. 
52
 For documentation, see: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/publications/Publications_using_UCDP_data/ 
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4.2.2 Independent Variables  
4.2.2.1 Petroleum Resources   
Two different indicators of the main independent variable are employed in this thesis, log oil 
income per capita and nationalized oil income per capita. The coming section describes how 
these indicators are constructed.  
Log oil income per capita 
As the primary indicator of the main independent variable: oil, I choose to rely on the 
measure provided by Ross (2012, p. 16). His oil variable, log oil income per capita is 
measured as the total value of oil and gas production, divided by a country’s population.53 
The measure is log-transformed to reduce the impact of extreme values of oil income. 
Compared to other available measures this measure is preferable for the following reasons:  
First, this measure avoids a number of sources of bias inherent in other measures. A 
commonly used measure is the value of a country’s export earnings from oil divided by its 
GDP per capita (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Sachs & Warner, 1995). Another commonly 
used measure is fuel exports as percentage of total exports, sometimes in a dummy format 
based on some cutoff point (e.g. Fearon, 2005; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Both types of 
measures consider resource exports only, which is problematic. It is not theoretically justified 
why only exports should count, and not rents from domestic fuel sales.54 Another problem is 
that the focus on exports introduces a potential bias upwards for poorer countries, which tend 
to export more of their produced oil and consume less domestically than richer countries. 
Dividing exports by GDP per capita introduces a similar bias, as countries with lower GDP in 
the denominator will have a larger oil exports to GDP ratio than countries with higher GDP. 
The problem is then to distinguish which variable is to blame for the effect on conflict risk. 
                                               
53
 Ross’ (2012) data-sources for constructing this measure are the following: The World Bank (figures on oil and 
gas production from 1970-2001), BP Statistical Review of World Energy (figures on oil and gas production after 
2001), US Geological Survey’s Mineral Yearbook (figures on oil and gas production before 1970). Data on oil 
and gas prices are obtained from BP Statistical Review. For further details see Ross (2012, p. 17). 
54
 These measures also include re-exports, which has the implication that some countries that have never 
produced oil domestically stand out as remarkable oil exporters (Humphreys, 2005, p. 522). 
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Ross’ oil measure avoids this problem altogether by dividing production figures (not exports) 
by the country’s population (not GDP per capita).55  
Second, this oil measure is more precise in the sense that it takes into account the varying 
value of oil on the world market. This is an improvement compared with e.g. Humphreys 
(2005, p. 523) oil measure, which considers only the quantity of oil produced. If it is the size 
of oil revenue that matters, fluctuating values of the commodity is an important aspect to 
include.56 Similarly, compared with dummy-indicators of oil production, Ross’ continuous 
measure provides more precise measurement, providing the possibility to consider quantity as 
an aspect related to the risk-inducing effect of oil.57  
Nationalized log oil income per capita 
A potential weakness of the log oil income per capita measure is that although it may be a 
precise indicator of the value of oil and gas produced in a country in a given year, it may not 
be a reliable indicator of the size of income from this production to the government of the 
country.58 As emphasized by Andersen and Ross (2013), up to the late 1960s, most of the oil 
rents generated by production in non-western countries typically benefited a few large 
international oil companies, the so-called “seven sisters”.59 Not before a wave of oil 
nationalizations occurred in the sector between the late 1960s and mid 1970s did most 
governments of oil producing countries gain control of the rents. This may be an important 
aspect to consider when measuring oil, as an implicit assumption of the state-centered causal 
explanations is that the point when massive revenue starts flowing into government holdings 
is where the detriment starts. 
In order to be able to distinguish between oil income seized by external companies and oil 
income seized by governments, I construct a new variable from Ross (2012) oil income 
measure: nationalized oil income per capita. This is the value of oil income per capita from 
the first year following a country’s nationalization of its oil industry. Information on year of 
                                               
55
 Another potential problem of dividing by GDP per capita is that oil itself often make up a substantial share of 
GDP per capita.  
56
 Eg. in January 1999 the oil prize $10 a barrel, while in June 2008 it was $145 a barrel (Ross, 2012, p. 10). 
57
 Unfortunately, Ross does not specify what type of monetary unit is used for value calculations. 
58
 As Ross (2012, p. 17) points out, reliable information on this is very hard to obtain, as this sector has been 
marked by great discretion over revenue flows over the years and governments of many countries have had 
incentives to conceal information on their petroleum earnings. 
59
 The ”seven sisters” comprised the Anglo-Persian Oil Company; Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of California; Texaco; 
Royal Dutch Shell; Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Standard Oil Company of New York. 
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oil nationalizations is obtained from Guriev et al. (2011), that provide data on “all 
nationalizations of foreign-owned oil companies around the world during 1960-2006” (Ibid., 
p. 4). This data provides year of nationalization by company rather than by country, meaning 
several incidences of nationalizations may occur within the same country, at different years. I 
operationalize a country’s year of nationalization as the year of the first nationalization of a 
foreign oil company in that country. Although this may not imply that the government of the 
country seizes control of all oil rents generated by extraction of oil within that country from 
that year, it is a plausible indicator that it gains control over substantially more rents from that 
year, compared to the time preceding the first nationalization. In my opinion, this may be a 
better approximation of oil rents to the government than the variable which does not take into 
account whether or not nationalizations in the oil industry have occurred.  
Guriev et al. (2011) provide data on nationalizations for 42 countries. Since there are 100 
different countries with oil income in the Ross (2012) data, countries lacking information on 
oil nationalization need to be handled. It could be that they have nationalized their oil industry 
prior to the time period covered by Guriev et al. (2011), or it could be that they have never 
nationalized. These two possibilities have quite different implications. The best approach to 
handle this would be to investigate each case qualitatively, but for me, time does not permit 
so. Instead of dropping these countries from the data, countries missing information on 
nationalization are treated as if they have nationalized their income from the initial year of oil 
income. Thus, nationalized oil income is oil income per capita for countries from the first year 
following an oil nationalization in the country, or from the first year of oil income if data on 
nationalization is missing.  
The arbitrariness of using first year of oil income as year of nationalization for countries 
missing such information is a clear limitation to the reliability of this measure. However, it 
may also be argued that compared with other studies, which either do not take nationalization 
into account at all or like Andersen and Ross (2014, p. 14) simply use a dummy for years 
1981-2006 based on the assumption that within this period nationalization has occurred 
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everywhere, my measure may approximate the actual year of nationalization more accurately 
and thus enhance estimation.60 
A list of oil countries, with year of first oil income and year of first nationalization is provided 
in Table A.1 in Appendix A.  
4.2.2.2 Institutional Legacy   
A main contention of this thesis that in order to understand why oil induces conflict in some 
countries, but not in others, we need to consider countries’ divergent starting points. One 
crucial aspect to consider is difference in countries’ initial institutional capacity. The theory 
section above has specified this claim further, and hypothesized that the effect of oil income 
on conflict risk is conditional on countries’ initial institutional capacity in terms of 
bureaucratic control and quality of public service provision. In the following, I describe how 
these two aspects of institutional capacity are operationalized, as well as sources of data for 
the measures.  
Legacy of Bureaucratic Control: The Bureaucratic Quality Index 
As a measure of a country’s level of bureaucratic control in a given year, I rely on a measure 
of bureaucratic quality developed by Hegre and Nygård (2014, p. 9). Their “bureaucratic 
quality index” covers country-years between 1960 and 2009, and is normalized to have mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of 1, so that low values indicate poor bureaucratic quality and 
high values indicate good bureaucratic quality. To investigate the hypothesis that the impact 
of oil is conditional on countries’ initial level of bureaucratic control, I construct a variable 
initial bureaucratic control, which reflects the country’s value on the bureaucratic quality 
index the first year of oil income following Ross’ oil data.61  
                                               
60
 For instance, for Burma, which nationalized their oil industry in 1962, employing an indicator of 
nationalization fixed for all countries to the period after 1980 lead to quite imprecise measures on which to base 
the test of the relationship between the dependent and independent variable. Burma is of course not the only 
example in this regard: according to my data there are 13 countries that nationalize during the 1960ies; and 25 
countries during the 1970ies, of which the main bulk during the first half of the decade.   
61
 Ross’ oil income data go back to 1960, although some countries started to produce oil long before that and 
thus may have had oil income earlier (see overview in Table A.1 in Appendix A). For all these countries, 
bureaucratic legacy is nonetheless operationalized as their 1960 score on the bureaucratic quality index, as this is 
the first available data. 
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To facilitate comparison with non-oil countries, I operationalize non-oil countries’ 
bureaucratic legacy as their value on the bureaucratic quality index for the year 1960, as this 
is the most frequent initial year of oil income among oil countries.62 
The bureaucratic quality index is constructed from two separate indicators: (1) a bureaucratic 
quality indicator from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and (2) a government 
effectiveness indicator from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Hegre & Nygård, 
2014, p. 9).63 These indicators measure the following:   
The ICRG bureaucratic quality indicates the institutional strength and quality of the 
bureaucracy in a country, in terms of its ability to facilitate continuation of policy and day-to 
day administrative functions, also when governments change.64 The WGI government 
effectiveness captures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies” (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 4).  
As indicated by the operational definitions above, the primary focus of the sub-indicators of 
the bureaucratic quality index is on the quality and resilience of bureaucratic institutions and 
public service provision. It may be argued that the indicators insufficiently reflect the aspect 
of bureaucratic institutions’ geographical reach and extension of state control into rural areas, 
which is a central aspect of the concept of bureaucratic control used by Fearon and Laitin 
(2003, p. 80). However, while quality rather than geographic dispersion of public institutions 
is primarily what the measure aims at, the latter is also partially incorporated by the measure: 
                                               
62
 Since non-oil countries have no first year of oil income, the selection of such a reference point for measuring 
bureaucratic legacy becomes somewhat arbitrary. Choosing 1960 may not be completely justified given that 
among oil countries, the reference point for measuring initial institutions varies between 1960 and 2005, and for 
more than half of these countries at some arbitrary point between 1961 and 2003 (see Table A.2 Appendix A). 
Ideally, my analysis would consider multiple reference points for non-oil countries to see how this affects 
results, but this is not feasible for me. Notwithstanding the problem of arbitrariness of the selected reference 
point, it is desirable to also include non-oil countries in the comparison to control for the potential impact of 
institutional legacy in the absence of oil. 
63
 Original ICRG data available for purchase at http://www.prsgroup.com/, while WGI data is available at   
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators. 
64
 High scores are given to countries where “the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without 
drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services”; and where the bureaucracy is “autonomous 
from political pressure and have an established mechanism for recruitment and training”(PRS Group, 2014, p. 7).  
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Of the many sub-indicators used to construct the WGI government effectiveness indicator, 
several of them capture aspects of public infrastructure (World Bank, 2014, p. 1).65  
In sum, this indicator may be among the best available measures of bureaucratic quality, 
constructed from reputable data sources with the best coverage over countries and years. Yet, 
it is not primarily an indicator of bureaucratic reach and “disciplining” of rural areas, and this 
affects what inferences may be made from analysis’ results. The measure justifies inferences 
related to the mediating effect of bureaucratic quality, but may not fully justify inferences on 
the mediating effect of bureaucratic control throughout territory; both of which are however 
constituting elements of bureaucratic control.   
Another qualification pertaining to content validity must be made. In the theory section, I 
distinguish between bureaucratic control and quality of public service provision as different 
aspects of institutional legacy. Yet, the operationalized variables may not justify full 
separation of these aspects, because the measures are partly overlapping; they capture some of 
the same stuff. In particular, the bureaucratic quality index partly draws on data on quality of 
public service via the WGI indicator. Thus, they may not be viewed as indicators of fully 
distinct aspects, rather as alternative indicators of the same phenomena, institutional legacy.  
The original ICRG bureaucratic quality indicator covers the years 1984-2009, and the WGI 
government effectiveness indicator reaches back to 1996. In order to reduce missing data, and 
to extend the time period covered by their composite bureaucratic quality index, the authors 
have performed multiple imputation (Hegre & Nygård, 2014, p. 9). Multiple imputation 
entails using all information available in the dataset to estimate values for observations with 
missing information. As the empirical indicators which the bureaucratic quality index is based 
on only have observations back to 1984 while data on the variable for years before that are 
imputed, this means that a considerable portion of the data on which I base my test of H1 are 
estimated rather than observed. This is a somewhat problematic issue, which I will discuss 
thoroughly in the section on methodological challenges.  
                                               
65
 Examples of sub-indicators focusing on infrastructure includes: satisfaction with roads and highways, 
satisfaction with public transportation service, electricity grids, sanitation and drinking water, and more (World 
Bank, 2014, p. 1). 
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Table 4.1 below provides an overview of oil countries’ scores on the variable initial 
bureaucratic control for the reader to inspect. I provide this here to show that although a 
share of these are estimated rather than observed values, they do not generally appear as 
unsound estimates of how countries rank in relation to each other on this variable. Apparent 
flaws to the face validity of values do however occur, such as Angola being ranked in the 60th 
to 80th percentile in 1975. For a full list of countries’ scores on the initial bureaucratic quality 
variable, including 1960 scores for non-oil countries, see Table A.2 in Appendix A. 
Table 4.1: Distribution of Oil Countries Across Percentiles of Initial Bureaucratic Control 
Percentiles Country (Year of Measurement) 
 
1-20 
Poorest Initial 
Bureaucratic 
Control 
Afghanistan (1967) 
Benin (1980) 
Chad (2003) 
Chile (1960) 
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) 
(1970) 
Egypt (1960) 
Equatorial Guinea (1994) 
Ghana (1978) 
Guatemala (1976) 
Iran (1960) 
Libya (1961) 
Philippines (1979) 
Rwanda (1970) 
Sudan (1993)  
Surinam (1986) 
Syria (1968) 
Turkmenistan (1991) 
Uzbekistan (1991) 
Vietnam, Dem.Rep. 
(1981) 
Yemen (Arab Rep.) 
(1986) 
 
 
 
21-40 
 
Azerbaijan (1991) 
Belarus (1991) 
Cambodia (2000) 
Cameroon (1977) 
China (1960) 
Congo(1960) 
Cote D'Ivoire (1978) 
Ecuador (1960) 
Gabon (1960) 
Georgia (1992) 
Iraq (1960) 
KyrgyzRepublic (1991) 
Lithuania (1992) 
Mexico (1960) 
Nigeria (1960) 
Qatar (1971) 
Rumania (1960) 
Tajikistan (1991) 
Tunisia (1966) 
Turkey (1960) 
 
 
 
41-60 
 
Algeria (1962) 
Bangladesh (1971) 
Bolivia (1960) 
Croatia (1991) 
Cuba (1960) 
Kazakhstan (1991) 
Kuwait (1961) 
Malaysia (1960) 
Myanmar (1960) 
Oman (1964) 
Pakistan (1960) 
Peru (1960) 
Poland (1960) 
Russia (Soviet U)(1960) 
Serbia (Yug.) (1960) 
Thailand (1963) 
Trinidad and Tobago 
(1962) 
Ukraine (1991) 
United Arab Em. (1971) 
United Kingdom (1960) 
 
 
 
61-80 
 
Albania (1960) 
Angola (1975) 
Argentina (1960) 
Bahrain (1971) 
Barbados (1966) 
Brazil (1960) 
Colombia (1960) 
Czech Republic (1993) 
India (1960) 
Indonesia (1960) 
Jordan (1986) 
Morocco (1969) 
New Zealand (1960) 
Papua N. Guinea (1992) 
Saudi Arabia (1960) 
Slovakia (1993) 
Slovenia (1991) 
Spain (1966) 
Taiwan (1960) 
Venezuela (1960) 
 
 
81-100 
Best Initial 
Bureaucratic 
Control 
Australia (1961) 
Austria (1960) 
Belgium (1970) 
Brunei (1984) 
Bulgaria (1960) 
Canada (1960) 
Denmark (1972) 
France (1960) 
German Fed. Rep. (1960) 
Greece (1981) 
Hungary (1960) 
Ireland (1978) 
Israel (1960) 
Italy (1960) 
Japan (1960) 
Netherlands (1960) 
Norway (1971) 
Sweden (1978) 
Switzerland (1985) 
United States of 
America (1960) 
Initial bureaucratic control is measured at first year of oil income, or in 1960 for countries with oil income prior 
to 1960, operationalized as countries’ scores on the “bureaucratic quality index” this year (Hegre & Nygård, 
2014). Information on year of first oil income is from Ross (2012), complemented by information in Petrodata 
(Lujala et al., 2007) 
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Legacy of Public Service Provision: Education Attainment Ratio 
I proxy the quality of countries’ public service provision their performance in providing 
education to its people. General provision of education requires considerable organizational 
and implementational capacity on the part of the state. Therefore, states’ efficiency in 
providing education may be seen as a plausible indicator of its’ capacity to formulate and 
implement public policy (Barakat & Urdal, 2009).66  
For data on countries’ education provision, I use a measure of male secondary education 
attainment developed by Hegre et al. (2013, p. 11). This variable reflects the “proportion of 
males aged 20-24 with secondary or higher education of all males aged 20-24”. The measure 
is carefully constructed on the basis of several reputed sources to expand the number of 
observations across countries and years.67 The original variable covers the years 1970-2009, 
but I rely on the identical variable from Hegre and Nygård (2014), which has been extended 
back to 1960 by multiple imputation.  
As with the foregoing measure of institutional legacy, I create a variable initial education to 
facilitate test of the hypothesis that the impact of oil is conditional on initial quality of public 
services. Initial education reflects the country’s value on the education attainment variable the 
first year of oil income, or the value of education in 1970 if the first year of oil income is 
1970 or before.68 To facilitate comparison with non-oil countries, I operationalize non-oil 
countries’ initial education as the value of education attainment in 1970. 
A threat to the validity of using education attainment as an indicator of the quality of a 
country’s public service provision is that education may also be provided by non-
governmental organizations or international organizations that operate independently from the 
state. However, I find it questionable whether NGO activities may greatly affect the general 
education level in a country. Moreover, focusing on secondary education may be a way to 
circumvent this problem as NGOs largely involve in primary education provision.  
                                               
66
 To recall, the theoretical concept that this is supposed to reflect is the level of reciprocity and responsiveness 
of state to society, or the relative “attachment” between a state and its’ populace, which are central ideas in the 
“government detachment” explanation of oil and armed conflict. 
67
 I refer to Hegre et al. (2013, pp. 11-12) for details on sources and methods for construction of the variable. 
68
 I consider it better to use the 1970 value of education as an approximation of initial education for countries 
with first oil income in or before 1970 since education data in 1970 is observed, while education data for earlier 
years are estimated. The same also applies to initial education for non-oil countries.  
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Another issue is that my measure of education only considers education attainment among 
males. While this may be interpreted as a shortcoming to the measures’ validity, I will claim 
the opposite. If female education attainment was to be included in the measure, observations 
would also reflect gender attitudes in a country, which is a somewhat different theoretical 
concept than the quality of public service provision. Attainment of secondary education 
among females could plausibly reflect a country’s gender attitudes more than the capacity of 
the state to provide education. If a state is able to provide education to males, but not to 
females, it may not be the states’ capacity to provide education that fails, rather prevailing 
gender norms of that society. By focusing on male education only possible disturbance from 
gender attitudes may be avoided.  
4.2.2.3 Conflict Legacy 
In order to test the hypothesis that the effect of oil income on conflict risk is mediated by a 
country’s recent experience of armed conflict prior to oil, I construct the variable pre-oil 
conflict. This is a dichotomous variable indicating whether (1) or not (0) a country 
experienced armed conflict on its territory during any of the 10 years leading up to the first 
year of oil income.69 For measuring the incidence of conflict within a country during the pre-
oil period, I use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2012 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; 
Themnér & Wallensteen, 2012), and include all types of conflict that include the use of force 
by a non-governmental formally organized group within a country’s territory.70 
Since my oil income data starts 1960, I assume that countries with first oil income in 1960 
may also have had oil income before 1960. For these countries I use the year of first 
production of oil and gas according to PETRODATA v.1.2 (Lujala et al., 2007) as year of 
first oil income.  
For countries with 1945 as first year of production, I am unable to measure whether they had 
an armed conflict during the 10 years leading up to 1945 as the conflict data only extends 
back to 1946. Including these countries in the analysis therefore introduces uncertainty to 
                                               
69
 For instance, for Oman, with first year of oil income 1964, the variable “previous conflict” indicates whether 
armed conflict occurred within the country’s territory during the ten-year period 1955-1964.  
70
 Following UCDP/PRIO typology, this applies to type 1 (“extra-systemic” (colonial)), 3 (“internal”) and 4 
(“internationalized internal”). Extra-systemic conflicts are coded such that they are measured as an incidence in 
the country where they geographically occurred, not as an incidence of the colonial power which is the default 
coding.  
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results. Excluding them from the analysis leads to fewer observations and reduced 
comparability with other studies. As it is unclear what is worse, I manage these countries in 
two different ways in the analysis. First, I include them, but treat them as if they had no armed 
conflict prior to oil. Second, I run an analysis where these countries are excluded entirely, and 
compare results to the analysis where they are included.71  
I also construct a secondary version of conflict legacy: pre-nationalization conflict indicates 
whether (1) or not (0) armed conflict occurred on a country’s territory during the ten years 
leading up to the first year of nationalized oil income.  
Two remarks on the reliability of these measures may be noted. First, the selected reference 
points for determining the period of measurement of previous conflict (year of first oil income 
and year of first nationalized oil income) may be criticized as somewhat arbitrary. This is 
because present theory is not definite on the issue of when oil starts to induce conflict: Is it 
when oil is discovered (as implicit in the honeypot and booty-futures financing mechanisms), 
when production commence (as in extraction related grievance mechanism), or when oil rents 
start to flow into governments accounts (as in state-centered mechanisms)? Due to different 
explanations of the relationship many possible reference points may be relevant. Yet, I find 
the two selected reference points defendable for the following reason: so far, there has been 
no quantitative empirical support that discovered reserves induce conflict,72 and both 
production start and income is proxied by the measure of first year of oil income applied here. 
Moreover, the reference point using first year of nationalized oil income approximates the 
point in time which following state-centered mechanisms should be the point when the 
conflict-inducing effect of oil ensues.  
A second remark relating to the reliability of the indicator is that measuring conflict prior to 
oil in a period of ten years is a somewhat arbitrarily selected time frame. While the choice 
may be justified by the notion that the effect of a prior conflict may be expected to decline 
over time due to a gradual reduction of conflict-specific capital (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004), it 
is not easy to justify why ten years is preferable to nine or eleven or some other frame. For 
now I will simply state that the arbitrariness of the selected time frame is a weak spot of the 
                                               
71
 See Table C.1 and C.2 in Appendix C for an overview of the legacy of armed conflict prior to oil income and 
oil nationalization for oil countries included in the sample. Countries with unknown pre-oil conflict legacy due 
to early commencement of oil production and -income are in a separate category.  
72
 Except the finding that petroleum reserves may prolong ongoing conflict when located within the conflict zone 
(Lujala, 2010). 
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measure, but at least it is applied consistently across cases. Eventual findings may indicate 
whether further inquiries with alternative operationalizations should be pursued.   
4.2.3 Control Variables   
In order to reduce the problem of omitted variable bias, my baseline model includes a set of 
control variables. These are variables that have been identified as robust and sizable 
determinants of armed conflict onset in previous inquiries. They are included not only for 
being robust determinants, but also because they are theoretically relevant and thus may 
introduce bias in other explanatory variables if omitted. I do however attempt to restrict the 
number of control variables, and the choice of including a variable is guided (while not 
always determined) by the variables’ contribution to improve the model’s predictive ability. 
As controls I include a country’s GDP per capita, population size, regime type and instability, 
and regional affiliation. I also control for temporal and spatial dependence of armed conflict 
onset. In the following, I account for why these variables are included, and provide 
information on operationalizations and sources of data of the variables.  
GDP per Capita 
Countries’ income level, or GDP per capita, stands out as one of the most robust determinants 
of armed conflict (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). It is a catch-all measure which has been used to 
proxy diverse theoretical concepts, most prominently the economic opportunity cost of 
participating in rebellion (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) and state capacity to prevent insurgency 
(Fearon & Laitin, 2003). The GDP per capita variable used here is taken from a dataset 
provided by Hegre and Nygård (2014). The variable is calculated on the basis of data from 
Maddison (2007) the World Bank (2011); and Gleditsch (2002), and measured in 
international Geary-Khamis dollars for comparability across national currencies. The variable 
is log transformed, and it is lagged one year to reduce endogenity. 
Population Size 
Another highly robust finding is that populous countries are exposed to greater risk of armed 
conflict than countries with smaller population (Raleigh & Hegre, 2009). Large populations 
may be more difficult to control and contain a larger number of potential rebel recruits 
(Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 81). The variable on countries’ population size is obtained from the 
Hegre and Nygård (2014) replication data, and based on original data from World Population 
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Prospects 2006 (United Nations, 2007) produced by the United Nation Population Division. 
The variable is log transformed in order to reduce the impact of very large populations.73 
Regime Type and Transition 
The relationship between regime type and conflict risk has been subject to extensive scrutiny 
and debate in recent years. In theory, the relationship is straightforward: semi-democracies 
and regimes in transition are the most conflict prone regime types as they engender both 
motivations and opportunities of rebellion, while autocracies and democracies are less at risk 
of internal conflict.74 In the empirical field, there has been a move from a near consensus 
around findings in support of these notions (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre et al., 2001), to 
noteworthy criticism concerning the applied measures (Vreeland, 2008), leading up to more 
improved indicators, but also more complex findings on relationships between regime type 
and armed conflict onset.75  
While democratic institutions per se may be ineffective in reducing conflict risk, there are 
nonetheless good theoretical expectations that different regime types may affiliate with 
different exposure to internal armed conflict (Gleditsch et al., 2009). Considering the 
plausible interrelationship between oil rents and regime (Andersen & Ross, 2013; Ross, 
2012), a variable for regime type should be included in order to reduce this potential source of 
omitted variable bias.  
For information on regime type and transition, I rely on data provided by Gates et al. (2006).76 
The nominal variable “regime type” is based on the so-called SIP (Scalar Index of Polities) 
scale, and indicates whether the country was an inconsistent regime (0), a regime in transition 
                                               
73
 Countries’ population size is also incorporated in the oil income per capita measure (and nationalized oil 
income per capita) and in the GDP per capita measure.  
74
 If armed conflict is seen as a product of rebels’ motive and opportunity, democracies should associate with 
lower probability of armed conflict based on the assumption that democracy reduces motivation for rebellion by 
providing non-violent channels for competition for political objectives (Gleditsch et al., 2009, p. 162). Autocratic 
regimes should associate with low probability of conflict as opportunity of rebellion is constrained by effective 
repression. In mixed and transiting regimes, where non-violent political channels are partly barred, and 
repression only partly applied, the mix of opportunity and motive produce a higher risk of armed conflict. 
75
 For instance, findings by Hegre (2003) and Collier and Rohner (2008) indicate that the effect of democracy 
may be contingent on countries’ economic status; and Buhaug (2006) finds that democracies are more prone to 
territorial conflicts than the other regime types, while democratization may place countries at risk of conflict 
over government.  
76
 I find this the most appropriate source of data on regime type as other data sources such as the Polity index 
and Freedom house data are coded with reference to political violence, implying an apparent problem of 
endogeneity (Vreeland, 2008, p. 414). 
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(1), an autocracy (2), or a democracy (3) in the observed country-year.77 The variable is 
lagged one year to mitigate reverse causality. In the empirical analysis, this variable 
transformed to a set of categorical dummy variables, where inconsistent regimes are used as 
the reference-category.  
Rough Terrain 
I include a variable indicating the percentage of a country’s territory covered by mountains, as 
this has been found to be a robust determinant of civil war (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre & 
Sambanis, 2006) and may proxy availability of rebel sanctuaries. I rely on data from Tollefsen 
et al. (2012) for this measure, which has better country coverage than the indicator used by 
Fearon and Laitin (2003). The variable is log transformed. The variable may be regarded 
time-invariant within the analyzed time period and therefore only make sense to include in 
cross-country comparison.78   
Regional Affiliation 
Internal armed conflict is not uniformly distributed across the globe, some geographical 
regions are more conflict prone than others. To reduce the potential of bias from this, a 
number of regional control variables were added in the basis model. None of them were 
significant, and I decided to include only the one regional control which improved the 
explanatory ability of the model; the Middle-East and Northern-Africa region.79 This is also a 
theoretically relevant region when it comes to oil-producing countries: the entire field of 
rentier-state theory builds on studies of oil countries in the Middle-East region. The variable 
is dichotomous, (1) if the country belongs to the Middle-East North-Africa region, (0) if not.  
Temporal Dependence: Time since Conflict  
As emphasized by Beck et al. (1998), observations in binary dependent variables in TSCS 
data are likely to be temporally dependent, which violates the assumption of independent 
observations and may lead to incorrect parameter estimates. Applied to my analysis, this 
                                               
77
 The original SIP scale is a continuous variable assigning each country-year a value between 0 and 1, based on 
features of the country’s regime that year, and where “ideal” autocratic regimes are found near the low end of the 
scale while “ideal” democratic regimes are found near the high end of the scale. Regimes in transition are coded 
as missing. For further information on the coding rules of the SIP scale I refer to Gates et al. (2006, p. 898). The 
regime type variable which I use in my analysis codes country-years with a SIP score between 0 and 0.2 as 
autocracies, SIP scores between 0.8 and 1 as democracies, SIP scores > 0.2 & <0.8 as inconsistent regimes, and 
missing SIP scores as transitioning regimes.   
78
 I refer to Tollefsen (2012, p. 10) for more information on the coding of this variable. 
79
 This investigation was conducted by a series of likelihood ratio tests of the baseline model with particular 
regional dummies versus models without the particular region dummy.  
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means that an outbreak of conflict in one year may increase the likelihood of conflict outbreak 
in subsequent years. Another condition that may introduce temporal dependence of 
observations is a country’s recent liberation. In order minimize the potential bias in estimates 
introduced by a previous outbreak of conflict or independence; a parameter for the impact of 
this on conflict risk should be included in the baseline model.  
There are several solutions to this problem available in the literature. I rely on a procedure 
suggested by Raknerud and Hegre (1997), and model the expectation that the impact of the 
previous conflict will decline over time, expressed by the following decay function: 2^(-time 
since last onset or independence/α), where “α” refers to the half-life parameter.80  After 
testing and comparing the log-likelihood of the baseline model using different half-life 
parameters, I choose the parameter which predicts the data best, which is 10 years.81  
Spatial Dependence: Neighborhood Conflict 
Several studies demonstrate that armed conflict in adjacent territories have a spill-over effect 
across borders which increases the risk of armed conflict within a country (Gleditsch, 2007; 
Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). This contagion effect is more richly described in qualitative works, 
illuminating many transnational aspects of armed conflict.82 In my analysis, this challenges 
the assumption that observations of the dependent variable are independently and identically 
distributed, and may lead to incorrect parameter estimates. I address the potential dependency 
between armed conflict onset and neighborhood conflict by adding a control variable 
indicating whether (1) or not (0) there was armed conflict in the neighborhood during the year 
prior to the year of observation of the dependent variable.83  
                                               
80
 In more sophisticated approaches to handle this problem, the impact of proximity of independence and 
proximity of conflict are estimated separately (see e.g. Hegre et al., 2001, p. 37). Yet combining the estimate of 
the impact of proximity of conflict and independence is common, and involves little practical difference to 
separate estimates.  
81
 This is the procedure pursued by Buhaug (2006, p. 699) and Fjelde (2009, p. 206). Increasing the half-life 
parameter above 10 years (20, 50 and 100) yielded nearly identical log likelihoods, and had no impact on the 
estimates of other variables. 
82
 Dokken (2008, pp. 55-77) note the following contagion aspects of conflicts in Africa: strategic alliances 
between rebel groups and political elites of neighboring countries, trade-networks and recycling of small arms 
and light weapons, cross-border mercenaries and militarized refugees, “ordinary” refugee flows, and natural 
resource trade.   
83
 A country’s neighborhood is defined as all countries that share a border with the country, defined as “having 
less than 100 km between any points of their territories” (Hegre et al., 2013, p. 9). 
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Table 4.2 below summarizes the indicators and data sources of dependent-, independent- and 
control variables of this analysis. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.3 and Table 
4.4 on the next page. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Overview of Variables, Indicators and Sources 
 Variable Name Data source(s) 
Dependent variable Internal Armed Conflict Onset UCDP/PRIO Onset of Intrastate 
Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2012 
Independent variable   
  Petroleum Resources Log Oil Income per Capita Ross (2012).  
 Nationalized Log Oil Income per 
Capita 
Nationalizations data: Guriev et 
al. (2011); Oil data: Ross (2012) 
Mediating variables    
    Institutional Legacy Initial Bureaucratic Control Hegre and Nygård (2014). 
Original sources: ICRG 
Bureaucratic Quality and WGI 
Government Effectiveness. 
     Initial Education Hegre et al. (2013); Hegre and 
Nygård (2014). Original 
sources:Lutz et al. (2007); Barro 
(2000); Samir et al. (2010)  
          Conflict Legacy Pre-Oil Conflict  UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset v.4-2012. Oil Data: 
Lujala et al. (2007); Ross (2012). 
Nationalizations: Guriev et al. 
(2011). 
 (Pre-Nationalization Conflict) 
Control variables Log GDP per Capita Hegre and Nygård (2014). 
Original sources: Maddison 
(2007) the World Bank (2011); 
and Gleditsch (2002). 
 Log Population Size Hegre and Nygård (2014). 
Original source: World 
Population Prospects 2006 
(United Nations 2007). 
 Regime Type and Transition 
   (Inconsistent, Transition,    
   Autocracy, Democracy) 
 
Gates et al. (2006) 
 Log Rough Terrain Tollefsen et al. (2012) 
 Middle-East and North-Africa Ross (2012) 
 Proximity of Conflict  Estimated following Raknerud 
and Hegre (1997) 
 Neighborhood Conflict Hegre and Nygård (2014) 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 1961-2007 
N Mean SD Min Max 5th pctile 95th pctile Missing 
Ln Oil Income/cap t-1 6847 2,164 2,820 0 11,147 0 7,871 322 
Ln Nationalized 
Oil/Cap
 t-1 6847 1,974 2,746 0 11,147 0 7,743 322 
Initial Bureaucratic 
Control 7125 0,134 0,866 -1,879 2,084 -0,999 1,807 44 
Initial Education 
Attainment 7085 0,461 0,292 0,022 1 0,075 0,993 84 
Ln GDP/cap
 t-1 6939 8,003 1,121 5,330 10,905 6,361 9,840 230 
Ln Population 7087 8,864 1,677 4,690 14,100 5,863 11,599 82 
Ln Rough Terrain  7122 2,368 1,587 -3,571 4,565 -0,383 4,337 47 
Proximity of Conflict 7127 0,128 0,253 0 1 0 0,707 42 
 
Table 4.4: Frequency Tables for Categorical Variables 1961-2007 
Onset of Internal Armed Conflict   Frequency Percent 
 0 6,892 96.14 
 1 235 3.28 
 . 42 0.59 
 Total 7,169 100.00 
Pre-Oil Income Conflict  Frequency Percent 
 0 6,537  91.18  
 1 632  8.82  
 Total 7,169  100.00  
Pre-Nationalization Conflict  Frequency Percent 
 0  5,748 80.18  
 1 1,421  19.82  
 Total 7,169  100.00  
Regime Type and Transition
 t-1  Frequency Percent 
Inconsistent 0 1,325  18.48  
Transition 1 623   8.69 
Autocratic 2  2,818 39.31  
Democratic 3 2,338  32.61  
 . 65  0.91  
 Total 7,169 100.00 
Middle East and North Africa  Frequency Percent 
 0 6,341  88.45  
 1 828  11.55  
 Total 7,169   100.00 
Neighborhood Conflict t-1  Frequency Percent 
 0 2,806  39.14  
 1 4,281 59.72  
 . 82 1.14 
 Total 7,169  100.00  
t-1Variables lagged one year 
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4.3 Statistical Model 
As the dependent variable in this analysis is dichotomous, I will apply logistic regression as 
this is a statistical model well suited for estimation of binary outcome variables (Stock & 
Watson, 2012, pp. 423-447). Two commonly noted benefits of using the logistic model 
compared with a linear probability model are that logistic regression always yields estimated 
probabilities of an event occurring within the 0-1 range,84 and the stretched-S functional form 
better captures the non-linear nature of the population regression function.85 
In my analysis, the logistic model estimates a function for the log odds that the value of the 
dependent variable equals one; that is, the log odds of an armed conflict onset. Coefficients of 
independent variables indicate the expected change in log odds of conflict onset associated 
with a one-unit change in the independent variable. As change in likelihood of an event 
occurring expressed in log odds is not intuitively accessible, I will report results in odds 
ratios.86 Expressed in odds ratios, the value of a coefficient indicates the multiplicative 
increase in odds of armed conflict onset for a one-unit change in the dependent variable. 
Coefficient values above 1 indicate an increase in odds (and probability) of armed conflict 
onset, while values below 1 indicate a decrease in odds (and probability) of conflict onset. 
As armed conflict onsets rarely occur (internal armed conflict commenced in only 235 of the 
7169 country-years included in the analysis), standard logistic estimation may lead to 
underestimation of the probability of such rare events (King & Zeng, 2001). I therefore 
considered using rare events logit as a procedure for correcting for this, but found that results 
were largely the same regardless of model employed. I prefer ordinary logit as this model 
allows for interaction terms and comparison of log likelihoods. 
In order to make analysis results sensible, I will supplement regression tables with 
calculations of predicted probabilities for meaningful values of independent variables and 
                                               
84
 A linear probability model may yield estimates that are outside the 0-1 range, which is meaningless when the 
coefficient is to be interpreted as the estimated probability of an event occurring. 
85
 Logistic regression is not the only statistical model with these benefits, however. The probit model has nearly 
identical properties as the logistic model, and the models produce approximately identical estimates in equal 
analyses (Stock & Watson, 2012, p. 435). 
86
 Odds ratios express the probability that Y=1, divided by the probability that Y=0. Log odds are natural 
logarithms of the odds. 
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calculations of expected changes in probability for meaningful changes in independent 
variables.87  
4.4 Methodological Challenges 
This section addresses a number of methodological challenges that all represent threats to the 
validity of inferences made from the analysis results. Some have been briefly mentioned 
above, but here I will discuss them in a more structured manner in terms of what problems 
they introduce and what is done to alleviate them. 
Omitted Variable Bias 
Omitted variable bias becomes an issue when a variable which is excluded from the analysis 
is correlated both with the dependent variable and one or several independent variables. This 
may lead to misleading estimates of impact of the explanatory variable(s) on the dependent 
variable, and is always a potential problem in regression analysis (Stock & Watson, 2012, p. 
221). The inclusion of control variables identified as important conflict determinants in other 
studies reduces this problem, and the intercept also incorporates effects from omitted 
variables. Omitted variable bias will also be addressed by testing the robustness of results by 
using an OLS linear probability model with country fixed effects.88  
Imputed Data 
An important methodological dilemma of this thesis is that it relies on data which to a notable 
extent has been estimated by multiple imputation in order to overcome the problem of missing 
observations and extend coverage back in time. This issue is particularly relevant in the test of 
the hypothesis that the conflict-inducing effect of oil is mediated by a country’s bureaucratic 
legacy, as nearly all of the observations on this variable will reflect estimated, not empirically 
observed values.89 As noted in the description of this variable, it is based on replication data 
                                               
87
 All statistical analyses, graphed results and calculations of substantive results are conducted in Stata 13. 
88
 Using country-fixed effects is a way of controlling for country-specific omitted variable bias. Country-fixed 
effects in logistic analysis may not be appropriate, however, as countries with no variation in the dependent 
variable will be excluded from the analysis (Beck & Katz, 2001).  
89
 This is because initial bureaucratic quality is either measured at the time when the country started to earn oil 
income, or 1960 for non-oil countries, which are predominantly points in time before observed data on the 
operationalized independent variable exist. 
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from the Hegre and Nygård (2014) bureaucratic quality index, which is constructed on the 
basis of observational data from 1984, while data back to 1960 are estimated.90 
The main drawback of relying on this measure is that the hypothesis is tested on a 
considerable amount of estimated, not observed data. This obviously challenges the general 
rule that in order to produce reliable knowledge about causal relationships in real-world 
phenomena, theoretical expectations need to be evaluated against empirical observations. Yet, 
when it comes to bureaucratic quality, country-wide observational data on this prior to mid-
1980 does not exist. This does however not mean that bureaucratic quality was a non-existent 
phenomenon prior to 1980. What it does mean is that to be able to bring this condition into 
the analysis, I have to use some approximation of it. 
Accepting this, I find the use of the bureaucratic quality index defendable for the following 
reasons: First, it is constructed on the basis on two of the best existing data sources of 
bureaucratic quality with the best coverage in countries and years: the ICRG and WGI data 
material.91 Second, the measure has been developed by highly reputed scholars in the field, 
that developed it for their own purposes, and their resultant work has been accepted for 
publication in the journal of peace research, which is a peer-reviewed journal. 
Third, it may be seen as a more sophisticated measure for capturing an institutional aspect 
central in state-centered explanations of the resource curse than any alternative measures 
employed so far in the scholarly debate. Scholars investigating the topic so far have either 
used no exogenous measure for institutional dimensions implicit in their arguments,92 or quite 
distant proxies for states’ institutional capacity,93 or they have employed fixed measures of 
                                               
90
 Other variables that I have obtained from the Hegre and Nygård (2014) replication data have also undergone 
multiple imputation in order to reduce missingness, including the education attainment variable (years 1960 to 
1969), and also the GDP per capita variable. The replication data represent the mean of imputed values from 
repeated imputation of variables, and could thus be interpreted as the “best guess” for the true value of the 
missing observation. 
91
 In a recent review of construct validity of measures used in the state capacity debate, Hendrix (2010, p. 283) 
finds that measures capturing bureaucratic quality are among the most valid indicators of state capacity 
compared with alternatives. 
92
 In the analyses by Fearon and Laitin (2003)and Fearon (2005), oil exports is presented as a default indicator of 
weak state capacity. In de Soysa and Neumayer (2007), the conflict-inducing effect of non-lootable rents is 
explained as a result of their impact on state capacity, while no exogenous measures of such capacity are 
employed.  
93
 Humphreys (2005) shows that conflict risk increases with past oil production, using this as a proxy of the link 
between oil and weak state capacity.  
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institutional capacity often measured at a later point in time than the phenomena they wish to 
explain, hence disregarding the logic that cause must precede effect.94  
Using initial education attainment ratio as an alternative indicator of institutional legacy offers 
the possibility of convergent validation of the measure (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 540). 
Insofar as countries’ scores on alternative indicators of the concept of institutional legacy are 
empirically related and produce similar results in analysis, this may be taken to support that 
the indicators capture the same underlying theoretical concept. The correlation coefficient 
between the bureaucratic quality measure and the education attainment measure is 0.6, which 
indicates a strong positive relationship and thus a high degree of convergence between the 
measures. The correlation coefficient for initial bureaucratic quality and initial education is 
0.55, which also verifies a substantial convergence among the measures.  
While I have used these two indicators of institutional legacy, they are clearly not the only 
ones possible; and different proxies of institutional legacy could potentially be derived from 
the theoretical concept. Replicating the analysis with several alternative indicators could thus 
provide further indication of the strength of the hypothesized relationship. 
Simultaneous Causality 
A main threat to the validity of inferences on the nature of causal relationships based on 
results from statistical analysis is that it may be difficult to determine which direction the 
causal relationship takes (Lund, 2002). While the empirical design assumes that the causal 
effect runs from the independent variables to the dependent variable, armed conflict may 
simultaneously affect several of the independent variables. In my analysis, armed conflict 
may be expected to affect oil income, bureaucratic quality, education attainment, GDP per 
capita and also regime type. In order to reduce the problem of endogeneity, these explanatory 
variables are lagged one year, so as to comply with the logic that cause(s) precede effect in 
time. Although this is a widely applied way of coping with the problem of simultaneous 
causality, it may not eliminate the problem altogether.  
                                               
94
 In their study of the mediating effect of institutional quality on the resource curse, Mehlum et al. (2006) 
measure institutional quality at a point in time towards the end of the period for which they measure the 
dependent variable. The outcome variable, GDP growth, indicates the average GDP per capita growth between 
1965 and 1990, while the purported mediating variable; institutional quality; is measured at one point in time in 
1982 (Mehlum et al., 2006, pp. 13, 16). The problem of this type of design is that it makes no attempt to 
ascertain that cause comes before effect, which is necessary for their causal explanation to hold. 
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Non-Independent Observations 
An assumption underlying statistical inference is that observations are independently and 
identically distributed, so that the value of Y2 is independent from Y1. This assumption is 
likely to be violated in the case of the dependent variable, as the likelihood of an internal 
armed conflict onset may be partly dependent on previous onsets in the same country and in 
neighbor countries. As discussed above, including a decay function for previous onset of 
armed conflict in the same country as well as a control variable for armed conflict (lagged) in 
an adjacent country aims to reduce the problem of such dependencies. 
Autocorrelation and Heteroscedasticity  
Some common problems associated with TSCS data structures will be mentioned as they have 
implications for the analysis. First, TSCS data is often characterized by temporal and spatial 
autocorrelation and panel-level heteroscedasticity.95 In OLS estimation, these issues violate 
the assumption that error terms are uncorrelated and have the same variance (Kennedy, 2003, 
8.1-8.4). The same issues may be problematic in logistic regression, which is the statistical 
model used here, and lead to biased and misleading parameter estimates and incorrect 
standard errors. Panel-level heteroscedasticity will here be addressed by clustering standard 
errors on country.96 Temporal autocorrelation will be addressed by controlling for previous 
conflict. 
Chapter 5 on the coming page proceeds with results from the empirical analysis. 
                                               
95
 Temporal autocorrelation refers to correlation between error terms across time, for instance within a panel. An 
example could be that the error term for armed conflict onset in Malawi in 1978 is likely to be correlated with 
Malawi in 1977. Spatial autocorrelation occurs where error terms are correlated across panels within a time 
period. Heteroscedasticity occurs when error terms do not have constant variance across panels, for instance if 
Malawi repeatedly had larger variance in error terms than Cambodia throughout a time-series.  
96
 Clustered standard errors allow errors to have an arbitrary correlation pattern within a cluster, but assume that 
the errors are uncorrelated between clusters. 
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5 Results 
This chapter presents the results from the quantitative analysis of the hypotheses outlined in 
the theory chapter. These hypotheses proposed that the conflict-inducing effect of oil income 
may be conditioned by  
• the extent of initial bureaucratic control in a country (H1)  
• the quality of initial public service provision (measured by initial education) (H2) 
• a country’s legacy of armed conflict at the commencement of oil income (H3) 
Before embarking on the test of hypotheses, I will briefly review results from the baseline 
model used in all further regressions. Next, results from the analyses of H1, H2 and H3 will 
be presented. For each hypothesis, I present results from regression models conducted on two 
different samples: including a sample of 100 oil countries, and a “full sample” of 170 oil and 
non-oil countries.97 All coefficients in regression tables are exponentiated and reported in 
odds ratios rather than log odds for more intuitive interpretation. 
In order to aid evaluation of size and significance of interaction terms, regression tables are 
supplemented with graphed results of the conditional effect of oil income on risk of onset for 
representative values of the hypothesized mediating variables, while holding other variables 
constant at values representative for oil-countries at large.  
To further facilitate interpretation of the results in substantive terms, I graph predicted 
probabilities of armed conflict onset across the range of values of oil income, conditional on 
values of interest of mediating variables. As the values of control variables also greatly matter 
for predicted probabilities, I draw on two real-world cases of aspiring petroleum countries: 
Tanzania and Uganda, and fix control variables to values representative of each country in 
2007. This enables grasping the conditional nature of the impact of oil income on conflict 
risk, dependent on initial institutional legacy and conflict legacy; given present conditions of 
two conceivable cases.  
                                               
97
 An exception to this is H3, for which the analysis of the sub-sample of oil countries is conducted by a bivariate 
analysis. Since the research objective both addresses what explains divergent experiences of armed conflict 
among oil countries, and what conditions the general conflict-inducing effect of oil, I find it justified to study the 
hypotheses both a within a sample of oil countries, and within a sample of all oil and non-oil countries.  
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In order to validate the obtained findings, the regression analyses are supplemented with a 
systematic evaluation of models’ performance and robustness. 
 The main findings are as follows:  
• Results indicate partial support of the proposition initial bureaucratic control mediates the 
effect of oil income on conflict risk (H1). At lower values of initial bureaucratic control, 
the effect of oil on conflict risk is high (relatively speaking) and significant, while this 
effect is gradually vanes and becomes inseparable from zero at higher values of initial 
bureaucratic control. As this conditional effect is not consistent across the entire range of 
initial bureaucratic control, the interaction coefficient does not achieve overall 
significance. This interpretation is unchanged upon removal of influential outliers. 
• The proposition initial education attainment mediates the effect of oil income on conflict 
risk (H2) receives partial to full support. At lower initial education attainment ratios the 
effect of oil on conflict risk is relatively high and significant, while for higher initial 
education attainment ratios, the effect of oil income on conflict risk is reduced and 
becomes inseparable from zero. This conditional effect is significant when 5 influential 
deviant country-years are excluded from the analysis of 6695 country-years between 1961 
and 2007. 
• Results do not support the proposition that countries’ legacy of armed conflict mediates 
the conflict-inducing effect of oil income (H3). Yet, there is significant evidence that 
conflict legacy distinguishes oil countries’ risk of conflict onset independently from size 
of oil income. Whether or not this strong effect of conflict legacy is entirely independent 
from the presence of oil remains unsettled due to a limitation of the research design. 
• Interacting oil income with variables such as initial bureaucratic control, initial education 
and conflict legacy only slightly adds to the ability to predict observations correctly, as 
indicated by comparison of ROC-curves. This improvement of prediction comes at the 
expense of more complex models, as indicated by the models’ AIC.  
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5.1 Statistical Analysis Results  
5.1.1 Baseline Model 
This section will briefly review results from the baseline regression models which are used 
throughout the analysis. Since the baseline models do not test any of the hypotheses, I have 
placed tabular results in Table B.1 in Appendix B. Yet, it is of interest to know how the two 
specifications of the main independent variable, oil, and the control variables behave when 
regressed on the sample of oil countries and on the full sample of countries.  
Figure 5.1 ahead provides a coefficient plot of the baseline models, regressed on the full 
sample of countries (left plot) and on the subsample of oil countries (right plot). Models using 
log oil income/pop as the measure of oil (blue color) are plotted against the identical model 
using nationalized log oil income/pop as the operationalization of oil income (red color). All 
coefficients are exponentiated, and indicate the multiplicative impact of a unit increase in the 
independent variable on the odds of internal armed conflict onset in a country-year.98 When 
reading the figure it must be kept in mind that independent and control variables vary in terms 
of scales of measurement, some are measured in dichotomous categories while others are at 
continuous with different ranges; meaning that the sizes of coefficients, or the magnitude of 
variables’ impact, may not be readily compared across variables of different scales. 
As indicated by the graph, the models using log oil income/pop as the measure of oil 
replicates the general finding that oil income increases the likelihood of armed conflict onset. 
The coefficient of log oil income/pop is significant at the 95% level and of a similar size both 
when the model is regressed on the subsample of oil countries and when regressed on the full 
sample of countries. The same is not true when nationalized log oil income/pop is employed 
as the measure of oil: In neither sample is the coefficient for nationalized oil separable from 
zero. This is somewhat surprising in light of state-centered explanations of the oil-conflict 
relationship which build on the premise that oil rents seized by governments is the source of 
the trouble.  
                                               
98
 Expressed in odds ratios, coefficient values above 1 indicate that an increase in the value of the independent 
variable is associated with an increase in the odds (and likelihood) of conflict onset, while coefficients below 1 
indicates a reductive impact on the odds (and likelihood) of onset for the given variable. Coefficients exactly at 1 
would indicate perfectly null impact on the odds of conflict onset for the variable, and unless the confidence 
interval of the coefficient excludes the value 1 for the given level of significance the null hypothesis of zero 
impact of the variable may not be rejected.   
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Figure 5.1: Coefficients Plot of Baseline Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The left plot graphs results from the baseline models when regressed on the full sample of 170 countries. The 
right plot graphs results from the identical models when regressed on the sample of 100 oil countries. Results in 
tabular form are available in Table B.1 in Appendix B. As the coefficient for proximity of conflict is very large 
compared to the rest and disturbs the graphs scale, it is left out from the figure along with the intercept, although 
both are included in the regression. Coefficients for regime variables are estimated with inconsistent regimes as 
reference category.  
 
Coefficients of control variables behave as expected. Increases in GDP per capita relate to 
significantly lower odds of onset, while larger populations, conflict in the neighborhood and 
proximate conflict on own territory affiliate with significantly higher odds of onset in all 
models. The coefficient for rough terrain is larger and more significant in models regressed on 
the sample of oil countries, indicating that rougher terrain significantly relates to higher 
conflict risk in particular among oil countries. Being a MENA country also increases the odds 
of armed conflict, albeit only significantly so in the regressions of the full sample when using 
nationalized oil income as the measure of oil. None of the regime coefficients are significant, 
although they suggest that autocracies are somewhat less conflict prone, while regime 
transitions and democracies are somewhat more conflict prone (and slightly more so in the 
subset of oil countries than in the full sample), than inconsistent regimes. 
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5.1.2 Effects of Oil Income Given Initial Bureaucratic Control 
The first hypothesis proposes that the conflict-inducing effect of oil may be stronger in 
countries with low initial bureaucratic control than in countries with high initial bureaucratic 
control. I test this hypothesis by adding an interaction term between log oil income per capita 
and initial bureaucratic control to the baseline model.99 I first conduct the analysis on a subset 
of oil countries and next on the full sample of countries.  
Findings indicate partial support for the hypothesis. As evident in Table 5.1 on the next page, 
none of the interaction terms of oil income and initial bureaucratic control are statistically 
significant (see model 3 and 6). Yet, to inspect the possibility that the coefficient for oil 
income may differ across the range of initial bureaucratic control, I plot the estimated impact 
of an x-unit increase in oil income on conflict risk for different values of initial bureaucratic 
control, holding other variables constant. Plotted results do provide support that there is a 
difference in the significance of the effect of oil on conflict risk dependent on whether initial 
bureaucratic control is low or high.  
The three columns to the left in Table 5.1 are models regressed on a subset of oil countries, 
while the three columns to the right are models regressed on the full sample of countries. 
Model 1 is the baseline model with log oil income as independent variable, included for 
comparison. In model 2, initial bureaucratic control is added as a single term, to inspect the 
independent effect of this variable. The coefficient below 1 indicates that higher scores on 
initial bureaucratic control relate to lower odds of conflict onset, but the finding is far from 
significant (p-value 0.84). In model 3 an interaction term between initial bureaucratic control 
and oil income is introduced. The individual coefficient of oil income remains unchanged in 
size and significance, which may be interpreted such that when the value of initial 
bureaucratic control is at 0 (slightly below the mean value of 0.13), increases in oil income 
significantly increases the odds of conflict. The individual coefficient of initial bureaucratic 
control changes direction, but remains insignificant. The interaction term coefficient of 0.97 
indicates that when both oil income and initial bureaucratic control increase in value, this is 
related to a decrease in odds of conflict onset. The interaction term is not significant, however 
(p-value 0.41). Control variables remain largely unchanged across these models. 
                                               
99
 Since only log oil income/pop was found to significantly relate to onset, I will base the inspection of the 
conditioning impact of institutional legacy on this measure of oil. 
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Table 5.1: Interacting Oil Income and Bureaucratic Legacy. Logistic Regression of the Onset of Armed Conflict 1961-2007 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 Oil Countries Oil Countries Oil Countries All Countries All Countries All Countries 
Log Oil Income/Pop t-1 1.108** 
(0.010) 
1.108** 
(0.011) 
1.108** 
(0.010) 
1.090** 
(0.013) 
1.090** 
(0.014) 
1.089** 
(0.014) 
Initial Bureaucratic Control  
 
0.967 
(0.835) 
1.068 
(0.751) 
 
 
0.939 
(0.595) 
0.953 
(0.724) 
Initial Bureaucratic Control * 
Oil Income/Pop t-1 
 
 
 
 
0.970 
(0.408) 
 
 
 
 
0.993 
(0.838) 
Log GDP/Cap t-1 0.585*** 
(0.000) 
0.591*** 
(0.000) 
0.589*** 
(0.000) 
0.599*** 
(0.000) 
0.608*** 
(0.000) 
0.609*** 
(0.000) 
Log population 1.271*** 
(0.003) 
1.275*** 
(0.003) 
1.267*** 
(0.005) 
1.309*** 
(0.000) 
1.315*** 
(0.000) 
1.314*** 
(0.000) 
Log Rough Terrain 1.240*** 
(0.010) 
1.239** 
(0.011) 
1.235** 
(0.012) 
1.089* 
(0.091) 
1.090* 
(0.086) 
1.089* 
(0.086) 
Inconsistent Regime t-1 (Ref. 
Cat.)
 
- - - - - - 
Regime Transition t-1 1.046 
(0.918) 
1.044 
(0.921) 
1.059 
(0.896) 
1.099 
(0.744) 
1.102 
(0.739) 
1.103 
(0.738) 
Autocratic Regime t-1 0.810 
(0.470) 
0.812 
(0.471) 
0.816 
(0.482) 
0.783 
(0.264) 
0.784 
(0.266) 
0.784 
(0.267) 
Democratic Regime
 t-1 1.164 
(0.570) 
1.185 
(0.540) 
1.187 
(0.536) 
1.045 
(0.846) 
1.071 
(0.764) 
1.074 
(0.757) 
Mideast and N Africa 1.322 
(0.289) 
1.313 
(0.290) 
1.270 
(0.357) 
1.469 
(0.128) 
1.448 
(0.137) 
1.438 
(0.145) 
Neighborhood Conflict t-1 1.443* 
(0.061) 
1.431* 
(0.083) 
1.424* 
(0.084) 
1.572*** 
(0.005) 
1.558*** 
(0.006) 
1.556*** 
(0.006) 
Proximity of Conflict 3.661*** 3.674*** 3.661*** 2.689*** 2.707*** 2.706*** 
Observations 3999 3999 3999 6741 6741 6741 
Countries 100 100 100 170 170 170 
Onsets 152 152 152 222 222 222 
Log Likelihood -578.503 -578.478 -578.251 -886.978 -886.826 -886.811 
AIC 1179.006 1180.955 1182.501 1795.956 1797.652 1799.621 
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses; t-1 variable lagged one year; SE clustered on country * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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The three columns to the right repeat this procedure on the full sample of countries. Findings 
are similar. The single coefficient of initial bureaucratic control in model 5 remains 
insignificant, although the p-value indicates that the estimate is somewhat more precise than 
among only oil countries. When the interaction term is added in model 6, the individual 
coefficient for oil income remains largely unaltered in size and significance. The confidence 
of estimated interaction effects in model 6 is further reduced (p-value 0.84), and the size is 
further neutralized, approaching no impact.  
Although tabled results appear to disappoint the proposition, graphed results are somewhat 
more supportive. Figure 5.2 and 5.3 below plots the conditional effect of a unit increase in oil 
income for different values of initial bureaucratic control. Figure 5.2 graphs results from 
model 3 regressed on the subset of oil countries, while Figure 5.3 graphs results from model 6 
regressed on the full sample of countries. To facilitate comparison under equal terms, values 
of control variables are held constant at representative values for oil income countries in 
1961.100 Both plots show estimates with 90% confidence intervals, and effects are reported as 
the effects of a unit increase in log oil income/pop on probability, not odds, of armed conflict 
onset. The distribution of observations of initial bureaucratic control is indicated by reference 
to percentiles on the x axis (p10= 10th percentile).   
Both graphs indicate that for lower values of initial bureaucratic control, the impact of oil on 
conflict risk is higher, while this impact is reduced and not significantly different from zero 
for higher initial bureaucratic control. Comparing the plots, the conditioning impact of initial 
bureaucratic control on the effect of oil is larger in the subset of oil countries than in the full 
sample, as indicated by a steeper slope and a higher impact of oil income for the lowest initial 
bureaucratic quality. Figure 5.2 shows that among oil countries, an increase in oil income 
significantly increases conflict risk for values of initial bureaucratic control between -1 to 
about .6, a range within which observations between the 10th and 50th percentile of initial 
bureaucratic control are located.101 For values higher than approximately .6 of initial 
bureaucratic control (values shared by observations in the upper quartile of the data), the 
effect of oil is reduced and is not significantly separable from zero.  
                                               
100
 As the focus of this thesis is on the role played by initial conditions for the conflict-inducing effect of oil I 
find it appropriate to use representative values (mean, median or mode) on control variables from the first year 
for which information is available, which is 1961. The same values on control variables are used for estimating 
conditional effects of oil throughout the rest of the chapter, except for the estimates of predicted probabilities 
where another set of fixed values for control variables are employed.  
101
 For values below -1 of initial bureaucratic control, the effect of oil is highest, but not significant. 
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   Figure 5.2: Graphed Results of Model 3. Sample Oil Countries                              Figure 5.3: Graphed Results of Model 6. Sample All Countries 
Both graphs show the conditional effect of oil income for different values of initial bureaucratic control, with 90% confidence intervals. Percentiles of observed 
values of initial bureaucratic control (for respective samples) are indicated on the x-axis (p10-p90). Other variables are set to mean, median or most frequent values of 
oil income countries in 1961. 
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The results from the full sample of countries (Figure 5.3) appear less convincing, but do point 
in the direction that the conflict-inducing effect of oil is offset by higher levels of initial 
bureaucratic control. The size of the conditioning impact is however reduced in terms that 
higher values of initial bureaucratic control involves less of a reduction in the effect of oil 
income on conflict risk than it did in the sample of oil countries. Here, the conflict-inducing 
effect of oil income is significant for values of initial bureaucratic control between about -.7 
to about .9, gradually decreasing for higher levels of initial bureaucratic control. However, it 
appears that among both oil and non-oil countries, only very good initial bureaucratic 
institutions are able to offset the conflict-inducing effect of oil, as only observations above the 
80th -90th percentile lay within the range where the effect is lowest and confidence intervals 
overlap zero. In this plot as well, values of initial bureaucratic control below -.75 are affiliated 
with the highest impact of oil income on conflict risk, but the estimates are not significant. 
In sum, these findings offer partial support of H1, which proposes that the conflict-inducing 
effect of oil income is conditioned by initial bureaucratic control. Both in the sample of oil 
countries and in the full sample, the trend in the data is that oil increases conflict risk more 
severely for lower values of initial bureaucratic control, while the effect is gradually offset by 
higher initial bureaucratic control. Although interaction terms in the table are void of 
significance, the finding that at certain lower percentiles of initial bureaucratic control the 
effect of oil income is significantly different from zero, while the effect of oil is reduced and 
becomes insignificant at the highest values of initial bureaucratic control, may be interpreted 
such that under certain circumstances, there is a significant difference in the effect of oil 
conditioned by initial bureaucratic control.  
5.1.3 Effects of Oil Income Given Initial Education Attainment 
Hypothesis two proposes that the effect of oil income may be offset in countries with high 
initial quality of public service provision, here operationalized by initial education attainment. 
As with the former hypothesis, I conduct the test by adding an interaction term between oil 
income and initial education first in a regression conducted on a subsample of oil countries, 
next on the full sample of countries. Results are presented in Table 5.2 on the next page. The 
three columns to the left present the analyses of the subset of oil countries, while the three 
columns to the right present the analyses of the full sample of countries. 
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Table 5.2: Interacting Oil Income and Education Legacy. Logistic Regression of the Onset of Armed Conflict 1961- 2007 
 
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses; t-1 variable lagged one year; SE clustered on country* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) Model (12) 
 Oil Countries Oil Countries Oil Countries All Countries All Countries All Countries 
Log Oil Income/Pop t-1 1.103** 
(0.016) 
1.088** 
(0.039) 
1.143** 
(0.045) 
1.088** 
(0.016) 
1.087** 
(0.015) 
1.115** 
(0.044) 
Initial Education  
 
0.462* 
(0.066) 
0.719 
(0.592) 
 
 
0.453** 
(0.039) 
0.546 
(0.187) 
Initial Education * Oil 
Income/Pop t-1 
 
 
 
 
0.893 
(0.428) 
 
 
 
 
0.937 
(0.584) 
Log GDP/Cap t-1 0.598*** 
(0.000) 
0.677*** 
(0.004) 
0.672*** 
(0.003) 
0.603*** 
(0.000) 
0.686*** 
(0.001) 
0.683*** 
(0.001) 
Log population 1.276*** 
(0.003) 
1.266*** 
(0.004) 
1.267*** 
(0.004) 
1.310*** 
(0.000) 
1.315*** 
(0.000) 
1.311*** 
(0.000) 
Log Rough Terrain 1.239** 
(0.010) 
1.234** 
(0.014) 
1.233** 
(0.013) 
1.089* 
(0.087) 
1.093* 
(0.066) 
1.093* 
(0.069) 
Inconsistent Regime t-1  
(Ref. Cat.) 
- - - - - - 
Regime Transition t-1 1.153 
(0.745) 
1.108 
(0.814) 
1.117 
(0.802) 
1.102 
(0.737) 
1.096 
(0.754) 
1.091 
(0.766) 
Autocratic Regime t-1 0.789 
(0.422) 
0.775 
(0.386) 
0.774 
(0.382) 
0.788 
(0.277) 
0.785 
(0.269) 
0.783 
(0.260) 
Democratic Regime
 t-1 1.130 
(0.647) 
1.096 
(0.736) 
1.086 
(0.759) 
1.040 
(0.864) 
1.040 
(0.866) 
1.032 
(0.892) 
Mideast and N Africa 1.325 
(0.286) 
1.167 
(0.558) 
1.132 
(0.628) 
1.462 
(0.133) 
1.305 
(0.287) 
1.273 
(0.337) 
Neighborhood Conflict t-1 1.445* 
(0.062) 
1.438* 
(0.061) 
1.451* 
(0.059) 
1.574*** 
(0.005) 
1.562*** 
(0.005) 
1.568*** 
(0.005) 
Proximity of Conflict 3.708*** 3.632*** 3.608*** 2.671*** 2.645*** 2.632*** 
Observations 3910 3910 3910 6695 6695 6695 
Countries 98  98  98  169  169  169  
Onsets 150 150 150 222 222 222 
Log Likelihood -569.134 -567.623 -567.317 -886.360 -884.272 -884.110 
AIC 1160.268 1159.246 1160.635 1794.721 1792.545 1794.221 
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Again, findings indicate partial support of the hypothesis. The table conveys that none of the 
interaction terms between oil income and initial education achieve significance. Yet, when 
plotting conditional effects of oil for the low to high range of initial education, there is a clear 
trend that at higher levels of initial education, the effect of oil on conflict risk is offset. The 
conditioning impact is greatest when studying the subset of oil countries. 
Model 7 is the baseline model for oil countries included for comparison.102 Model 8 includes 
the variable initial education as a single term. The coefficient indicates that higher levels of 
initial education relates to significantly lower odds of armed conflict onset with 90% 
confidence. When adding the interaction term in model 9, the coefficient for oil increases 
somewhat in size and remains significant at the 95% level, and indicate that for initial 
education attainment ratio of 0, a one unit increase in oil income multiplies the odds of armed 
conflict by 1.143.103 The single term of initial education indicates that higher levels of initial 
education when oil income is zero relate to lower odds of armed conflict. The interaction 
coefficient of 0.89 indicates that when an increase in oil income is combined with an increase 
in initial education, the impact of oil on conflict risk changes direction. Yet, neither the 
interaction term nor the single term of initial education achieves significance.  
Results from the analysis conducted on the full sample of countries (model 10-12) are largely 
similar. Model 10 is the baseline model regressed on all countries included for comparison.104 
When controlling for initial education level in model 11, the coefficient indicates that higher 
levels of initial education level significantly relates to a lower odds of conflict among 
countries in general. In model 12, the single coefficient of oil income remains significantly 
above 1, while both the single term of education along with the interaction term drop below 1 
and indicate a reductive impact on odds of conflict, both failing to achieve significance.    
Although interaction term coefficients are void of stars, graphed results below do support that 
the initial level of education conditions the effect of oil income. Figure 5.4 and 5.5 graphs 
estimates of how the impact of an x unit increase in oil income on probability of onset 
changes across the range of initial education attainment. Figure 5.4 is based on model 9, 
regressed on only oil countries, while Figure 5.5 is based on model 12 regressed on the full 
sample of countries.  
                                               
102
 Model 7 is identical to model 1 in Table 5.1, only excluding two countries due to missing education data. 
103
 Since 0 is outside the range of initial education, this estimate is not substantially meaningful. 
104
 Model 10 is identical to model 4 in Table 5.1, only excluding one country due to missing education data. 
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Figure 5.4: Graphed Results of Model 9. Sample: Oil Countries                             Figure 5.5: Graphed Results of Model 12. Sample: All Countries 
Both graphs show the conditional effect of oil income for different values of initial education attainment, with 90% confidence intervals. Effects are reported in 
probabilities. Percentiles of observed values of initial education attainment (for respective samples) are indicated on the x-axis (p10-p90). Other variables are set to 
mean, median or most frequent values of oil income countries in 1961. 
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Plotted results tell the same story whether analysis is conducted on the subset of oil countries 
or on the full sample of countries. The effect of a unit increase in oil income on probability of 
conflict onset is highest for lowest initial education attainment, while this effect gradually 
diminishes for higher values of initial education. Up to an initial education attainment ratio of 
about .45 (among oil countries), or up to an initial education ratio of about .55 (among the full 
set of countries), oil significantly increases the probability of onset, while for initial education 
ratios above these points this conflict-inducing effect of oil is no longer significant. Again, the 
size of the conditioning impact is larger when analyzed on the subset of oil countries than 
among the full set of countries, as visible from the greater absolute difference in effect at the 
extremes of initial education in the upper graph.  
5.1.4 Effects of Oil Income Given Conflict Legacy 
To test the hypothesis that the conflict-inducing effect of oil income depends on countries’ 
legacy of armed conflict during the years leading up to first oil income, I add an interaction 
term between oil and conflict legacy to the baseline model. The logistic analysis is conducted 
on the full set of countries. Several different specifications of the interaction are employed. 
First; I interact the “ordinary” oil measure log oil income per capita with pre-oil conflict 
legacy.105 As many countries started to earn oil income before 1946, I am not able to 
determine whether these “early” oil countries had a conflict legacy prior to oil or not. In the 
main analysis, I treat these countries as if they had no conflict legacy prior to oil. Yet, upon 
closer inspection, results are clearly sensitive to how these countries are handled, and I 
supplement graphed results from the main analysis with graphs showing how this conditional 
relationship is affected when countries with an unknown conflict legacy are treated as a 
separate category. The results from the logistic analysis of the full set of countries are 
complemented with a bivariate analysis conducted on the subset of countries with oil income.  
The hypothesis has also been tested by a different specification, namely whether the effect of 
nationalized oil income may be conditional on pre-nationalization conflict legacy. As results 
                                               
105
 That is, a dummy variable indicating whether or not the country had an incidence of armed conflict during the 
ten years leading up to oil first income. 
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are largely similar for both specifications, results from this test will not be presented in the 
main text, but is available in Appendix D.106 
Results do not support the hypothesis that the conflict-inducing effect of oil income is 
conditioned by countries’ conflict legacy. When countries with an unknown conflict legacy 
are treated as a separate category, having or not having a conflict legacy is of negligible 
difference for the conflict-inducing effect of oil.  
Conflict legacy prior to oil is nevertheless of significant importance for countries’ propensity 
to conflict. The bivariate analysis complement this story: Among countries with oil income or 
nationalized oil income, a having or not having a legacy of armed conflict significantly 
differentiates the likelihood of armed conflict onset among these countries.  
Results from the logistic analysis are presented in Table 5.3 on the next page. Model 13 is the 
baseline model, identical to model 4 in previous tables, only excluding 10 years prior to first 
oil income as they are used for assessing conflict legacy. When controlling for pre-oil conflict 
singly in model 14, the coefficient for oil remains largely unaltered in size and significance. 
The coefficient of 1.23 indicates that conflict legacy increases odds of onset, but the finding is 
not significant. When inserting an interaction term in model 15, both single coefficients for oil 
income and pre-oil conflict are positive and significant, but the interaction coefficient is 
negative and insignificant. For this coding of conflict legacy, the single coefficient of oil 
income indicates that when conflict legacy is zero, an increase in oil income significantly 
increases odds of onset. The single, significant coefficient of pre-oil conflict indicates that 
when oil income is zero, odds of onset for countries with conflict legacy are 1.53 times higher 
than for countries with no conflict legacy.107 The interaction coefficient of 0.92 surprisingly 
indicates that for countries with pre-oil conflict, increases in oil income relate to lower odds of 
onset, albeit not significantly (p-value 0.24).  
A problem with this puzzling finding that is that among countries with pre-oil conflict coded 
as zero, a large share of them have an unknown conflict legacy (33 of the 85 countries coded 
as having no pre-oil conflict actually have an unknown legacy, see Table C.1 Appendix C). 
 
                                               
106
 Results from the analysis of nationalized oil income and conflict legacy actually fall slightly more in line with 
expectations of the hypothesis, but short of significance, they are inconsequential for the final interpretation of 
findings.  
107
 The combination of zero oil income and pre-oil conflict of 1 is rare, but does occur in the data. 
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Table 5.3: Interacting Oil Income and Conflict Legacy.  
Logistic Regression of Armed Conflict Onset 1961-2007. 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in ( ); Inconsistent Regimet-1 as reference category for regime 
dummies; SE clustered on country * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. In model 13-15 ten years prior 
to year of first oil income are censored as they are endogenous to pre-oil conflict legacy.  
 
To see what happens if these countries are separated from the group of countries with no 
conflict legacy, I therefore rerun model 15, but treat countries with an unknown conflict 
legacy as a separate category of conflict legacy in the interaction term.108 
When comparing plotted results, it is clear that the observed higher effect of oil on conflict 
risk among countries with no conflict legacy (Figure 5.6) is driven up by an even higher 
(albeit not significant) oil effect among the countries with an unknown conflict legacy (Figure 
                                               
108
 Tabular results from model 15b are available in Table B.2 in Appendix B. 
 Model (13) Model (14) Model (15) 
 All Countries All Countries All Countries 
Log Oil Income/Pop t-1 1.091** 
(0.015) 
1.086** 
(0.023) 
1.101** 
(0.011) 
Pre-Oil Conflict Legacy  
 
1.225 
(0.374) 
1.533* 
(0.087) 
Pre-Oil Conflict Legacy*  
Oil Income/Pop t-1 
  0.921 
(0.242) 
Log GDP/Cap t-1 
0.591*** 
(0.000) 
0.600*** 
(0.000) 
0.592*** 
(0.000) 
Log population 1.313*** 
(0.000) 
1.319*** 
(0.000) 
1.313*** 
(0.000) 
Log Rough Terrain 1.082 
(0.116) 
1.083 
(0.120) 
1.087 
(0.106) 
Regime Transition t-1 (0/1) 1.125 
(0.703) 
1.093 
(0.778) 
1.061 
(0.852) 
Autocratic Regime t-1 (0/1) 0.827 
(0.394) 
0.822 
(0.385) 
0.819 
(0.372) 
Democratic Regime t-1 (0/1) 1.078 
(0.746) 
1.067 
(0.781) 
1.064 
(0.790) 
Mideast and N Africa  1.437 
(0.177) 
1.409 
(0.222) 
1.440 
(0.185) 
Neighborhood Conflict t-1 1.466** 
(0.021) 
1.460** 
(0.024) 
1.436** 
(0.030) 
Proximity of Conflict 2.713*** 2.691*** 2.671*** 
Observations 6456 6456 6456 
Log Likelihood -856.519 -856.103 -855.567 
AIC 1735.037 1736.206 1737.133 
Countries 170 170 170 
Onsets 215 215 215 
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5.7). Among countries with a measured pre-oil conflict legacy, the effect of oil income on 
conflict risk is of nearly identical and rather low size, and both insignificant.    
 
Figure 5.6: Model 15. Conditional Effects of Oil Given Conflict Legacy (0, 1) 
Both graphs show the conditional 
effect of oil income for different 
categories of conflict legacy, with 
90% confidence intervals. Other 
variables are set to mean, median or 
most frequent values of oil income 
countries in 1961. Figure 5.7 is based 
on the same model as Figure 5.6, 
except that countries with an 
unknown conflict legacy are 
interacted with oil income as a 
separate category instead of being 
included in the category of countries 
with no conflict legacy. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Model 15b. Conditional Effect of Oil Given Conflict Legacy (0, 1 or Unknown)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even if none of these findings support the hypothesis that countries’ conflict legacy mediates 
the effect of oil income on conflict risk; conflict legacy prior to oil income does seem to have 
an independent effect on conflict risk, as indicated by the large and significant coefficient of 
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the single term of conflict legacy in model 15.109 Results from a bivariate analysis of the 
relationship between conflict legacy and armed conflict onset conducted on a subsample of oil 
countries underscores that differences in oil countries’ exposure to armed conflict is 
significantly determined by their legacy of armed conflict prior to oil. Table 5.4 below shows 
the frequency of oil countries with at least one conflict onset and no onset, ordered according 
to whether they had conflict legacy prior to oil.  
 
Table 5.4: Bivariate Analysis: Conflict Legacy and Conflict Onset Among Countries With First Oil 
Income After 1946 
Pearson chi2(1) =  5.695   Pr = 0.017 
 
The table shows that among 15 countries with conflict legacy prior to first oil income, 11 (or 
73.3%) of them experienced at least one new onset following oil. Only 4 countries with a 
conflict legacy escaped new onset following oil, but it does not mean that they escaped 
conflict altogether: Sudan, Guatemala and Papua New Guinea are among these 4 and had 
continuous ongoing conflicts both prior and following first oil income. Among 52 countries 
without a conflict legacy prior to first oil income, 20 of them (or 38.5%) experienced at least 
one onset. In other words, oil countries with a conflict legacy were nearly 35 percentage 
points more likely to experience new conflict following oil than countries without a conflict 
legacy.110 The probability of observing this difference if there was no relationship between 
conflict legacy and conflict onset among oil countries would be very low (Pr= 0.017).111 
                                               
109
 This also becomes apparent when predicted probabilities are calculated in section 5.2 ahead. 
110
 This corresponds to a relative difference of about 190%.  
111
 A list identifying countries within each category is provided in Table C.3 in Appendix C. An alternative table 
showing the relationship between conflict legacy and incidence of armed conflict as dependent variable is also 
provided here (Table C.4). 
 
 
No. Countries with Onset of Armed 
Conflict Following Oil Income  
 
Total: 
At least 1 onset No onset 
No. Countries with 
Conflict Legacy Prior 
to First Oil Income 
Yes 11 
(73.3%) 
4 
(26.7%) 
15  
(100%) 
No 20 
(38.5%) 
32 
(61.5%) 
52  
(100%) 
Total: 31 
(46.3%) 
36 
(53.7%) 
67 
(100%) 
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To sum up, the bivariate table demonstrates that countries’ conflict legacy prior to oil income 
significantly differentiates oil countries likelihood of experiencing armed conflict following 
oil income. Yet, the findings from the logistic regression analysis conducted on the full 
sample of countries do not provide support of the hypothesis that countries’ conflict legacy 
mediates the effect of oil on conflict risk among countries at large. 
5.2 Scenarios: Petroleum and Conflict Risk in 
Tanzania and Uganda 
The findings presented above indicated that both countries’ initial bureaucratic control and 
initial education attainment may have a distinguishing impact on the effect of oil on their risk 
of armed conflict onset in subsequent years. Also, conflict legacy proved to importantly affect 
oil countries’ onset risk, albeit in a direct manner rather than by mediating the effect of oil 
income. Yet, results presented so far say little about how much having robust or poor 
institutions or conflict legacy at the onset of oil income matters for real-world countries’ 
conflict propensity as their oil revenue grows.  
Tanzania and Uganda are two African countries that are now in the initial phases of petroleum 
exploration and production. How much more dangerous would a certain amount of oil income 
be, if these countries have fragile initial institutions, compared to if they had robust initial 
institutions? How important may their divergent conflict legacy be for their risk of new onsets 
following oil? This section attempts to make findings obtained in the analysis more 
appreciable by providing a visual approximation of how much countries’ institutional legacy 
and conflict legacy may distinguish the effect of oil income on predicted probabilities of 
onset.  
When calculating predicted probabilities, the values assigned to control variables also greatly 
matter for the resulting estimate. I control for the impact of other variables by setting them at 
values representative of the two countries mentioned above, Tanzania and Uganda in 2007.112 
These countries are of particular interest for two main reasons: First, they represent two soon-
to-be petroleum producing countries in East Africa, a region which has been highlighted to 
harbor most promising oil and gas discoveries in the world in present years (Deloitte, 2013, p. 
                                               
112
 This may offer more substance to estimates than fixing control variables to their mean values, which may not 
be representative of any real-world country. 
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2). Second, the two countries display some variation over critical characteristics such as 
income level, stability and size. Simply put, Tanzania is a large, poor, populous, relatively 
peaceful country (which is also mountainous), while Uganda is a smaller, somewhat less poor, 
conflict-ravaged neighbor with less mountainous terrain. In combination, the two countries 
offer the possibility to visualize the implications of different institutional and societal starting 
points for the relationship between size of oil income and probability of onset across countries 
with these characteristics.  
Graphed predictions using representative values for Tanzania 2007 on control variables are 
presented and discussed in the main text. Since estimated probabilities are very similar also 
when shifting control variables to values representative of Uganda in 2007, these graphs will 
not be further discussed in the text, but they are included for inspection in Appendix E.  
All graphs present the predicted probability of internal armed conflict onset on the y-axis for a 
representative range of size of oil income per capita measured in dollars (from 1st to 
approximately 99th percentile of observations of country years with oil income above zero) on 
the x-axis. The percentiles of observed oil income per capita are indicated by a p on the x-
axis. Estimates for the conditional relationship between oil income and probability of onset 
are provided for the 10th and the 90th percentile of observations on initial institutions 
(bureaucratic control and education attainment), and for conflict legacy of 0, 1 and unknown. 
All estimated probabilities are reported with 90% level confidence intervals.113  
5.2.1 The Mediating Role of Initial Bureaucratic Control 
Figure 5.8 below graphs the predicted probabilities of onset for increasing oil income per 
capita conditional on fragile (10th percentile) or robust (90th percentile) initial bureaucratic 
control. The estimate is based on results from model 3, fixing control variables on values 
representative of Tanzania in 2007. The blue line shows the predicted probability of onset for 
increasing values of oil income per capita, when initial bureaucratic control is set to represent 
the lowest 10th percentile of observations on this variable. The red line expresses the 
predictions of onset for increasing values of oil when initial bureaucratic control is at the 90th 
percentile of observations on this variable. The green line projects how growing oil income 
                                               
113
 All estimates of marginal effects and predictive margins have been conducted using Stata 13 Margins 
commands.  
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would affect probability of onset given bureaucratic control at the level observed in Tanzania 
in 2007.114  
As indicated by the difference in steepness of the red and blue curves, higher levels of oil 
income in countries with poorest initial bureaucratic control (blue line) more dramatically 
increases conflict risk than in it would in countries with robust initial bureaucratic control (red 
line). The slight incline of the red line indicates that even for a high level of initial 
bureaucratic control, higher oil income affiliate with higher probability of onset, but recalling 
results from Figure 5.2, this effect was not close to significance.115  
 
Figure 5.8: Tanzania. Predicted Probability of Armed Conflict for Increasing Oil Income at the 10th 
and 90th Percentile of Initial Bureaucratic Control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted probabilities of onset with 90% confidence intervals. Other variables set to representative values 
for Tanzania in 2007. Estimates based on model 3 (oil countries). 
                                               
114
 A more precise estimate of the impact of growing oil income on conflict risk given values representative of 
Tanzania would probably be less dramatic than what this graph indicates, as growing oil income would increase 
GDP per capita and thereby reduce estimated conflict risk. This inflexibility is admittedly a drawback of the 
estimate.  At the same time, a country with a large population like Tanzania may be less likely reach very high 
levels of oil income per capita, so that the differentiating impact of initial institutions may never become as great 
as indicated towards the right side of the graph. 
115
 The effect of oil on conflict risk at the 10th percentile of initial bureaucratic control also barely achieved 
significance at the 90% level, while at the 25th and 50th percentile there was a more clear and significant 
incremental effect of oil on conflict risk. 
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For a country with the characteristics of Tanzania in 2007 and initial bureaucratic control at 
the level of the frailest 10th percentile, an increase from zero oil income to 400 $ per capita 
annually would increase the predicted annual probability of onset by about 5 percentage 
points from approximately 4% to 9%. If initial bureaucratic control were at the robust 90th 
percentile, prognoses would be better: the same increase in oil income would increase the 
predicted probability of onset by 2 percentage points (from 5% to 7%). For higher levels of 
oil income per capita, the difference becomes greater.116 In any event, large and overlapping 
confidence intervals of the predicated probabilities of onset mean that these plots may only 
describe a somewhat uncertain trend.117  
5.2.2 The Distinguishing Impact of Initial Education  
Figure 5.9 on the next page shows predicted probabilities of onset for increasing levels of oil 
income conditional on initial education level at the 10th and 90th percentile of all observations 
among oil countries, with other variables held at Tanzania-2007 values. 
The distinguishing impact of initial education appears unambiguous. At the 90th percentile of 
initial education (red line), increasing oil income has virtually no impact on the predicted 
probability of armed conflict onset. The difference between minimum and maximum of oil 
income at this level relates to a less than 1 percentage point increase in predicted probability 
of onset; but from Figure 5.4 it may be recalled that this small effect is insignificant.  
At the 10th percentile of initial education (blue line), higher levels of oil income gradually 
increases probability of onset. For a country with the characteristics of Tanzania in 2007 and 
initial education at the 10th percentile of all oil countries, an annual probability of onset of 5% 
for zero oil income is estimated to increase to about 7.5% for oil income of about 50$/cap 
annually, which is a bit less than the median oil income among oil countries. Recalling from 
Figure 5.4 the effect of oil on conflict risk on this level of initial education was significant. An 
oil income of about 400$/cap (a little less than the size of oil income at the 75th percentile) at 
                                               
116
 But estimates also become more problematic at high levels of oil income due to the unlikely combination of a 
very high value of oil income and low GDP per capita, which is default in the baseline calculation. 
117
 The only thing that can be said with 90% confidence is that higher oil income per capita in a country with 
poor initial bureaucratic control does increase conflict risk, while we can’t be as certain that higher oil income in 
a country with robust initial institutions does the same. 
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this level of initial education further yields predicted risk of onset of about 9%.118 The green 
line indicates that oil income in Tanzania might be even riskier, with an education attainment 
ratio of .13 in 2007 the country scores below the 10th percentile of initial education among oil 
countries at large.  
 
Figure 5.9: Tanzania. Predicted Probability of Armed Conflict for Increasing Oil Income at the 10th 
and 90th Percentile of Initial Education Attainment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted probabilities of onset with 90% confidence intervals. Other variables set to representative 
values for Tanzania in 2007. Estimates based on model  9 (oil countries). 
 
Again, large and partly overlapping confidence intervals of the predicted probabilities imply 
that estimates indicate a trend with a considerable degree of uncertainty. Yet, what we may 
state with confidence is that at the lower scale of initial education, increases in oil income 
does relate to increases in probability of onset, whereas among countries at the high end of 
initial education, increases in oil income may dubiously relate to a tiny increase in conflict 
risk. 
                                               
118
 Again, predictions would most likely appear less dramatic if the model also took into account that increases in 
oil income would also yield increases in GDP per capita, which would counteract the size of the effect of 
increasing oil on predictions according to my model. 
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5.2.3 The Added Risk of Conflict Legacy 
Figure 5.10 visualizes the predicted probability of armed conflict onset for increasing levels 
of oil income per capita, dependent on conflict legacy prior to oil income. Countries with an 
unknown conflict legacy are treated as a separate category, as they were found to drive the 
results for countries with no conflict legacy when included in this category (see Figure 5.7).  
Figure 5.10: Tanzania. Predicted Probability of Armed Conflict for Increasing Oil Income, With or 
Without Conflict Legacy  
Predicted probabilities of onset with 90% confidence intervals. Other variables set to 
representative values for Tanzania in 2007. Estimates based on model 15b in Appendix B. 
 
The graph shows that conflict legacy is a condition of distinguishing importance for later 
probability of onset across the entire range of oil income. Restricting attention to the estimates 
based on observations with a known conflict legacy prior to oil, predicted probability of onset 
is higher if the country has a conflict legacy (red line) than if it has no conflict legacy prior to 
oil (blue line), for any value of oil income.  
At the minimum value of oil income per capita, a country like Tanzania in 2007 would be 
estimated to have a 5% probability of armed conflict onset if it had no legacy of armed 
conflict prior to oil; whereas the probability would be estimated to 8% at the same level of oil 
income if the country had a pre-oil conflict legacy. Increasing the size of oil income slightly 
adds to the probability of onset both if the country has a conflict legacy prior to oil or not, but 
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recalling Figure 5.7, none of the coefficients of oil income were significant for these 
categories.119  
In sum, the graph illustrates that conflict legacy may not have a distinguishing impact on the 
effect of increases in oil income on probability of onset. Yet, conflict legacy does appear to be 
a differentiating condition for oil countries’ propensity to new onsets: For any value of oil 
income, having a pre-oil conflict legacy puts the country at higher risk of new onset than if it 
had no conflict legacy. 
5.3 Models’ Performance and Robustness 
5.3.1 Predictive Power and Goodness of Fit 
The hypotheses presented in this thesis all seek to enhance explanations of the relationship 
between oil income and armed conflict. Therefore, it is also worth to consider whether adding 
variables such as initial bureaucratic control, initial education and conflict legacy adds to the 
predictive power of the models. I will concentrate the evaluation of models’ predictive power 
and fit to the main models of interest, namely those with interaction terms as they are used for 
the test of hypotheses. The predictive power of the models with interaction terms will be 
compared to the predictive power of the same models without the interaction terms, when 
these are regressed on an identical sample. I evaluate predictive power by addressing the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and assess goodness of fit by inspecting the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves of the models.  
The AIC indicates the relative quality of a model for a given set of data. Understood as a 
measure of the distance between the fitted likelihood function of a model and the unknown 
true likelihood function of the data, a lower AIC is better as it indicates that the model is 
“closer to the truth” (Kennedy, 2003, p. 101). AIC takes into account the trade-off between 
goodness of fit and models’ complexity, meaning more complex models of equal fit will be 
punished with a higher AIC.  
                                               
119
 It appears to be most interesting if country has an unknown conflict legacy (i.e. belong to the category of 
“early” oil countries that started to earn oil income prior to 1946). The green line indicates that if the country 
belongs to this category the probability of armed conflict onset increases nearly linearly for increasing values of 
oil income. It seems that there may be countries in this category that mainly drive the results for the relationship 
between oil and conflict onset, irrespective of the condition under scrutiny here. 
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Comparing the AIC of models with interaction terms to the same models without interaction 
terms reveals that adding interaction terms does little to aid models’ performance. When 
initial bureaucratic quality is interacted with oil, this only serves to slightly increase the AIC 
compared to the same models without the interaction term (see AIC of model 3 versus 1, and 
of model 6 versus 4 in Table 5.1). The same is true for the model that interacts oil income 
with conflict legacy using the ordinary log oil income measure (see AIC of model 15 versus 
13 in Table 5.3). The models interacting initial education with oil income achieve a nearly 
identical AIC as the same models without the interaction terms (see AIC of model 9 versus 7, 
and of model 12 versus 10 in Table 5.2). The general lack of improvement of AICs may be 
interpreted as a sign that the interaction terms generally add to the complexity of the models, 
without “compensating” this added complexity in terms of improving fit. 
Comparing ROC-curves of these models supplements this impression. The ROC-plot 
visualizes the relationship between the fraction of true positives (i.e. the number of correctly 
predicted onsets divided by the total number of onsets) and the fraction of false positives (i.e. 
the number of incorrectly predicted onsets of armed conflict divided by the total number of 
non-onsets) at different thresholds.  
The size of the area between the x-axis and the ROC-curve (the “area under the curve”, or 
AUC) indicates the predictive power of the model, as it indicates the how well the model 
predicts observations compared with that of a random model (AUC of 0.5) and a perfectly 
predicting model (AUC of 1.0). 
Figure 5.11 on the next page plots the ROC-curves of models testing the conditioning impact 
of initial bureaucratic control on the effect of oil income, against models with only oil income 
as an independent variable. Figure 5.12 repeats the same for models testing the conditioning 
impact of initial education on the effect of oil income, against models with only oil income as 
an independent variable. Figure 5.13 combines ROC-plots of the model testing the 
conditioning impact of conflict legacy on the effect of oil income against the simpler model 
without the interaction term. 
AUCs for each model are in parentheses, and models on the same horizontal line in the legend 
are tested on the identical sample of countries and may thus be compared. 
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   Figure 5.11: ROC-Plots Oil and Initial Bureaucratic Quality                     Figure 5.12: ROC-Plots Oil and Initial Education  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13: ROC-Plots Oil and Conflict Legacy 
 
 
The figures show ROC-curves for models testing the conditional relationship of oil 
income on conflict risk versus the more simple models with only oil income as a 
single independent variable. Area under the curve for each model in parentheses. 
Models on the same horizontal line in legends are tested on the identical sample of 
countries and may thus be compared, in order to assess whether the more complex 
models with interaction terms are able to enhance the ability to predict 
observations correctly.  
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Comparing the ROC-curves, all of the models with interaction terms have a marginally larger 
area under the curve compared to the same models without interaction terms. This means that 
adding the interaction terms slightly adds to the ability to correctly predict onsets compared to 
models without the interaction terms. Yet, as indicated by the general lack of improvement of 
AICs, this slight improvement in predicting observations comes at the expense of a more 
complex model of explaining the same observations. 
5.3.2 Robustness of Results 
In order for the presented analysis to be valid, my models have to satisfy the assumptions 
underlying logistic regression. If these assumptions are not met, problems such as biased 
coefficient estimates, inflated standard errors of coefficient estimates may arise; which could 
lead to invalid statistical inferences regarding support or non-support of hypotheses. In the 
following, I will assess the potential problems of influential observations, multicollinearity, 
and omitted variable bias.   
Influential Observations 
Logistic regression estimates are highly sensitive to outliers and influential data points. 
Sometimes deviant observations have great impact on coefficient estimates, in the sense that 
excluding the observation from the regression would importantly change the parameter 
estimate (Pregibon, 1981, p. 713, Fig. 3).120 In order to ascertain that obtained estimates are fit 
to represent the main share of observations, and not driven by a few influential deviant 
observations, it is necessary to inspect how results are affected by the removal of such 
influential observations.  
In order to identify such influential observations I utilize the Pregibon (1981) ∆  influence 
statistic. The statistic summarizes the change incurred by deleting the ith observation in the 
model’s fitted regression function (Long & Freese, 2006, p. 151). For each of the models 
employed to test H1, H2 and H3, I calculate observations’ ∆  influence statistic, and plot this 
                                               
120
 Indeed, Pregibon (1981, p. 706) points out that an observation’s residual from the fitted line is important for 
detecting poorly predicted/fitted observations, but observations with smaller residuals may exert more leverage 
on a model’s fit than observations with the largest residuals. 
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against observations’ id (see Figure F.1-F.3 in Appendix F). I then repeat the regressions, only 
excluding the most influential observations as identified in the graphs.121  
In order to recognize how the removal of influential observations affects the estimates 
obtained in the original analysis, I graph the conditional effects of oil income across 
hypothesized mediating variables for each model. Graphed results from models run without 
influential outliers are placed alongside graphed results from the same models in the original 
analysis. The graphs are available for inspection in Appendix F. Following this procedure, I 
find the following:  
• For models testing H1 (Figure F.5 and F.6), removal of the five most influential 
observations either has no impact (model 3) or make obtained results slightly more 
supportive (model 6) of the proposition that countries’ initial bureaucratic control 
mediates the effect of oil income on conflict risk. In other words, results obtained from the 
analysis of this proposition are not driven by a few influential observations: Rather, we 
may be confident that they are representative of the main share of observations.122 
• For models testing H2 (model 9 and 12), removal of the five most influential observations 
make results more supportive of the hypothesis (Figure F.7 and F.8): The size of the 
conditioning effect becomes substantially larger for both models. Moreover, the effect of 
oil conditional on initial education becomes significant at the 90% level when the 5 most 
influential country-years are removed from the full sample of 6695 country-years in 
model 12.123  
• For the model 15b testing H3, removal of the five most influential observations imposes 
no notable change on estimates. Conflict legacy continues to be of no distinguishing 
impact for the effect of oil income. Only among countries with an unknown conflict 
legacy does the effect of oil income become significant (Figure F.4).  
 
In sum, this analysis of influential outliers corroborates that the findings obtained in the 
original analysis are consistent, and not an outcome driven by a few deviant cases. Moreover, 
the effect of oil conditional on initial education becomes significant (p-value 0.058) upon 
                                               
121
 There is no strict rule regarding how extreme an observation must be to justify exclusion: the only rule of 
thumb is that the distance between the observation and the main bulk of observations is large compared to others. 
122
 I also tried lower thresholds for excluding outliers, which only served to change results in favor of the 
hypothesis by enlarging the size of the conditional effect of oil income, albeit not accompanied by significance. 
123
 In analysis of oil countries (model 9), the effect of oil conditional on initial education becomes significant at 
the 90% level if the 19 most influential country-years are removed from the sample of 3910 country-years. 
86 
 
removal of the five most deviant observations from the full sample of oil and non-oil and 
countries (model 12). This means that support for H2 is further reinforced when the 
assumption of no large outliers is addressed. For the other hypotheses, interpretation of results 
remains unchanged. 
Multicollinearity  
A potential threat to the precision of estimates is if there is high correlation among some of 
the independent- and control variables, that is, if there is imperfect multicollinearity present 
among two or more regressors in a model (Stock & Watson, 2012, p. 241).124 The 
consequence of this in my analysis would be that the coefficient for at least one of the 
regressors affected by multicollinearity would by imprecisely estimated. With higher degree 
of multicollinearity, coefficient estimates become unstable, and standard errors as well as 
confidence intervals expand. The risk of accepting a false null hypothesis (type-II error) 
increases.  
In order to assess whether multicollinearity poses a problem to the obtained estimates, I use 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) command after estimating each model. The VIF-value of a 
variable indicates how much the variance of an estimated regression coefficient is increased 
due to collinearity. A rule of thumb is that variables with VIF-values above 5 are somewhat 
problematic, while VIF-values above 10 are unacceptably high. 
Following this procedure, I find that multicollinearity does not seem to be a critical problem 
for the robustness of obtained results. VIF-values of explanatory- and control variables in 
models testing H1 and H2 are generally low (Table F.1 and F.3 Appendix F), while the 
interaction term in models testing H3 introduce some degree of multicollinearity between the 
explanatory variables (values ranging between 3.1-7.6 for key independent variables, see 
Table F.2). This is not unexpected since constitutive terms will be correlated with 
interactions, and it means that standard errors of these variables are higher than if these were 
not correlated. As they all remain below the critical VIF-value of 10, I interpret this such that 
multicollinearity does not threaten the validity of these findings.125   
                                               
124
 This is contrast perfect multicollinearity, which occurs if a regressor is a perfect linear function of other 
regressors. 
125
 This assessment also seems reasonable given that these models have yielded very similar results across 
different samples, and across exclusion and inclusion of influential outliers.  
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Omitted Variable Bias 
The selection of control variables was guided by the principle of including variables that, if 
excluded, would represent probable sources of omitted variable bias. Yet, influence from 
omitted variables is difficult to guard completely against, and in particular, unobserved 
differences at the country-level could produce biased estimates and invalid inferences. A 
procedure for correcting for this would be to employ country-fixed effects, which entails 
giving each country an own intercept to control for country-specific effects.  
There is however certain issues that preclude employing fixed effects in my analysis. In a 
logit model, fixed effects would throw out all countries that were in peace during the whole 
period (Beck & Katz, 2001).126 Given my research objective, which is to sort out why some 
oil countries remain in peace, while others become marred in conflict, it is unsound to discard 
information from oil countries that have remained peaceful throughout the period.  
Applying OLS with fixed effects as a linear probability model could have been a solution as it 
does not throw out countries that remained in peace from the estimate. Yet, on testing this, 
another problem was revealed: Since several of the constituent variables in interaction terms 
are time-invariant (initial bureaucratic control, initial education, conflict legacy), this prevents 
estimation of these interaction terms. This is likely because coefficients of interaction terms 
indicate the effect on conflict risk when both constituent terms increase, which does not occur 
when estimated only within units.  
For these reasons, I am not able to control for omitted country-specific factors that are 
determinants of conflict onset at the same time as they correlate with other independent 
variables. This can’t be ruled out as a source of uncertainty in estimates. 
5.4 Summary of Findings 
This chapter has empirically evaluated three hypotheses formulated in the theory chapter on 
conditioning factors in the relationship between oil income and armed conflict risk. Each of 
the three hypothesized conditional relationships has been inspected among oil countries in 
particular, and among oil and non-oil countries in general, within the period 1961-2007. Table 
5.5 ahead summarizes the main findings of the empirical investigation of the hypotheses.  
                                               
126
 This is because fixed effects models estimates effects on changes within units; and if the country remained in 
peace there would be no change in the dependent variable to estimate such effects from. 
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Table 5.5: Summary of Results From the Empirical Tests of Hypotheses  
Hypothesis Empirical Support? 
H1:  
The conflict-inducing effect 
of oil income will be higher 
in countries with low 
bureaucratic control than 
in countries with high 
bureaucratic control at the 
commencement of oil 
income 
Partially supported.  
At lower values of initial bureaucratic control, the effect of oil on 
conflict risk is higher, and the effect declines for higher values of initial 
bureaucratic control.  
Overall, the interaction coefficient for oil income and initial 
bureaucratic control does not achieve significance. Yet; within certain 
ranges of initial bureaucratic control there is a difference in the 
significance of the effect of oil on conflict risk between lower and 
higher values of initial bureaucratic control.  
The finding is unaltered by removal of influential outliers. 
H2:  
The conflict-inducing effect 
of oil income may be lower 
in countries with high 
quality of public service 
provision than in countries 
with low quality of public 
service provision at the 
commencement of oil 
income 
Partial to full support.  
For the indicator of public service provision employed here; education, 
the analysis shows that for higher initial education ratios, oil income 
does not significantly increase the risk of onset. At lower initial 
education ratios; the effect of oil income on conflict risk is relatively 
higher and significant.  
The interaction coefficient for oil income and initial bureaucratic control 
does not achieve significance in the primary analysis, but when 5 
observations with undue influence on estimates are excluded from the 
full sample of 6695 country-years, the conditional effect becomes 
significant at the 90% level. 
H3:  
Oil income increases 
conflict risk more severely 
in countries with a recent 
legacy of armed conflict 
than in countries without 
such a conflict legacy at 
the commencement of oil 
income 
Not supported. 
When countries with an unknown conflict legacy prior to first oil 
income are treated as a separate category, having or not having a 
conflict legacy is inconsequential for the effect of oil income. 
Yet, conflict legacy is in itself an important distinguishing condition for 
oil countries’ risk of armed conflict onset. For any size of oil income, 
countries with a conflict legacy prior to oil are at a higher risk of onset 
than countries with no conflict legacy. 
This finding is robust when outliers are removed, and the same trend 
applies when studying the relationship between nationalized oil income, 
pre-nationalization conflict legacy and conflict onset.    
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5.4.1 Discussion  
As the table above has synthesized the main findings of the empirical analysis, I will not 
repeat them in detail here. Rather, I will in the following address a few issues of relevance for 
the further interpretation of these findings.  
First, the results obtained in this analysis only partially supported the hypothesis that initial 
bureaucratic control conditions the effect of oil on conflict risk. Are we from this right to infer 
that initial bureaucratic control is only moderately important for the effect of oil on conflict 
risk? A justified complaint which may be raised against this interpretation is that the 
operational measure of bureaucratic control applied in this analysis only reflects one side of 
the concept it is meant to gauge.  
As discussed in the operationalization chapter, the operational indicator specifically captures 
the quality and resilience aspect of bureaucratic control. There is no way to ascertain that 
observations of this variable in country-years also reflect the geographic dispersion of such 
institutions. The geographic outreach and extension of state control into rural areas is an 
important aspect of the concept of bureaucratic control used by Fearon and Laitin (2003), as 
well as in conceptualizations of the sources of states’ coercive strength (Fjelde & de Soysa, 
2009). The potential role of this aspect of bureaucratic control may be underestimated in this 
analysis because of the chosen indicator insufficiently incorporates this feature. The 
suggestive findings attained in this analysis warrant further exploration of the conditioning 
role of bureaucratic control, using indicators more precisely targeting the geographic 
extension of state institutions into rural areas.  
Throughout the analysis, initial bureaucratic control and initial education attainment are used 
as if to indicate diverse aspects of institutional capacity. Results indicated that education 
attainment somewhat more confidently conditioned the effect of oil income on conflict risk. 
This difference in effect does however not warrant the inference that public service provision 
(or accommodative/co-optative capacity) more importantly conditions the effect of oil income 
than bureaucratic control (or coercive/regulatory capacity). As was discussed in the research 
design chapter, the operationally defined indicators measure overlapping phenomena, since 
the bureaucratic quality index also incorporate quality of public service provision. The correct 
interpretation must therefore be that the variables initial bureaucratic control and initial 
education attainment represent alternative indicators of the larger theoretical concept 
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institutional legacy. The partial to complete support provided by these two alternative proxies 
of institutional legacy may be taken as encouraging support of the notion that countries’ 
institutional legacy is of importance for the subsequent effect of oil on conflict risk.  
The findings obtained in the analysis of H3 suggest that the proposition that conflict legacy 
may be distinguishing for the effect of oil must be rejected. At the same time, pre-oil conflict 
legacy was found to have a notable and significant individual effect on conflict risk  
There are two main drawbacks of the data and design applied to test H3, which limit the 
ability to draw definite inferences on the basis of the findings. A first notable challenge is that 
year of first oil income for a considerable share of oil countries are prior to the period during 
which conflict data is available. As the conflict legacy of these countries remains unsettled, 
this means that the proposition is not fully tested.  
Secondly, the variables pre-oil- (and pre-nationalization) conflict legacy are operationalized 
such that they by definition incorporate the presence of oil income (or nationalized oil 
income). This means that there could be omitted variable bias from oil in the estimated 
separate effect of conflict legacy. Even if size of oil income is controlled for in the log oil 
income measure, the mere promise of oil in a country may also trigger violent struggle. As we 
have no observations of pre-oil conflict or pre-nationalization conflict equal to one for 
countries that have never had oil, there is a difficulty of separating the effect of “only” 
conflict legacy from the potential added effect of oil.  In other words, inferring that the 
individual effects of pre-oil and pre-nationalization conflict legacy are completely 
independent of the presence of oil may not be correct. 
Finally, the finding that nationalized oil income does not significantly increase conflict risk is 
in itself worth a few thoughts.  This non-finding could be regarded surprising in light of state-
centered explanations of the oil-conflict relationship which build on the premise that oil rents 
seized by governments is the source of the trouble. If this was true, the measure gauging oil 
rents available to governments following nationalization should be expected to be more 
conflict-inducing than the ordinary oil income measure which does not distinguish between 
rents captured by foreign firms or by governments. In contrast, the finding may pretty well 
support that the mechanisms suggested by state-centered theories are not inevitable: 
bureaucratic decay, detached governments and increased conflict risk are not necessary 
consequences of large oil income into government coffers.  
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6 Conclusion 
This thesis has explored conditioning circumstances in the relationship between petroleum 
resources and internal armed conflict. While the conflict-proneness of oil countries has 
received considerable scholarly attention in recent years, the question of what mechanisms 
mainly underlies and generates this occurrence remains disputed. Previous contributions have 
emphasized opposite paths: state-centered and rebel-centered causal routes. Moreover, none 
of the explanations resolve the puzzle of why the curse of armed conflict befalls some oil 
countries, while others emerge unharmed.  
Attempting to fill in missing pieces of the causal narrative, I suggested the perspective that 
differences in oil countries’ initial starting points are worth considering. The precise objective 
of this thesis has been to explore countries’ institutional legacy and conflict legacy as two 
potential conditioning factors of the effect of oil income on armed conflict risk. 
In my line of argumentation, countries’ institutional legacy is expected to condition whether 
the scenarios portrayed by state-centered and rebel-centered mechanisms are likely to play 
out. State-centered mechanisms in previous literature describe how oil income inhibits the 
origin and growth of state institutional capacity facilitative of societal peace, including 
bureaucratic control and reciprocity of state-society relations.127 These causal arguments say 
nothing about what happens when such institutional capacities are already in place. I argue 
that the scenarios portrayed by state-centered mechanisms are plausible among countries with 
a fragile institutional starting point, but less plausible among countries with a robust 
institutional starting point. In countries where robust institutional capacity (in terms of 
bureaucratic control and reciprocity of state-society relations) has already been established, 
they are persevered by norms, practices, formal regulations, peoples’ expectations, people 
employed, physical buildings, etc; which may not be expected to wither by the onset of oil 
rents. In short, I argue that the fragility or robustness of countries institutional legacy at the 
commencement of oil income is likely to anticipate the subsequent institutional trajectory, 
with differential implications for conflict risk.  
                                               
127
 This is ostensibly because such institutional capacities originate from government’s dependency on extracting 
taxes from the population. Availability of “easy” rents from petroleum alleviates governments’ reliance on tax, 
and thereby precludes the development of institutional capacity that sustains the ability to tax. 
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Conflict legacy, on the other hand, was suggested to represent an unusual aid for rebel 
capacity of revolt following oil income. As oil-financed regimes control unique assets which 
may be used to repress or buy off potential opposition, the ability of challengers to organize 
rebellion against such regimes may be seen as a paradox. The proposition of this thesis was 
that in countries’ with a recent history of armed conflict, organizational legacies and conflict-
specific capital persists in the post-conflict phase which may be expected to ease new 
mobilization following oil income to the government. 
Observable implications of these arguments were tested by quantitative analysis of data from 
a total of 170 oil and non-oil countries in the years 1961 to 2007.  
Main Findings 
For two operational indicators of institutional legacy, initial bureaucratic control and initial 
education attainment, findings indicated partial support of the argument that institutional 
legacy conditions the effect of oil income. Across both measures and several models, there 
was an unfailing trend that the effect of oil income on conflict risk was higher for poorer 
performance of initial institutions, while this effect was steadily reduced for higher 
performance of initial institutions. Under specific conditions, both initial bureaucratic control 
and initial education attainment significantly distinguished the effect of oil on conflict risk: 
within certain lower intervals of institutional indicators, the effect of oil income on conflict 
risk was relatively higher and separable from zero, while this effect declined and became 
insignificantly different from zero at higher intervals of initial institutions.  
Robustness tests revealed that these findings were not driven by influential outliers or 
problematic due to high multicollinearity. Excluding a low number of influential outliers only 
served to strengthen the findings’ support of this proposition. 
With regard to the second suggested mediating factor, conflict legacy, obtained results did not 
support that this condition saliently differentiates the effect of increases in oil income on 
conflict risk. The estimated effect of oil income on conflict risk was largely equal among 
countries with and without a settled conflict legacy prior to oil.128  
On the other hand, conflict legacy was found to have a significant individual impact, 
irrespective of size of oil income. As such, this finding does propose one answer to the 
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 The consistency of this finding was also corroborated by robustness tests. 
   
93 
 
problem of the differential experience of armed conflict among oil countries, as underscored 
by results obtained in the bivariate analysis. Yet, that having a conflict legacy put countries at 
risk of renewed conflict is an already established “truth” in peace research, which my finding 
only adds unsurprising evidence of. Most important for my argument, is that the condition 
does not resolve the puzzle of what makes oil income conflict-inducing among countries 
general. 
Qualifications  
Two caveats to the definiteness of the interpretation on the role of conflict legacy were noted. 
First, the conflict legacy of many countries which started to earn oil income prior to 1946 
remains unsettled. If these countries’ pre-oil conflict legacy was settled, this could possibly 
alter results. As found in my analysis, the effect of oil income on conflict risk was highest 
precisely within this group.129 A second caveat is that there might be omitted variable bias 
from oil in the “conflict legacy” variable.130 Some of its strong individual effect may be due 
to the inherency of oil in the measure. After all, the effect of oil on conflict risk may only be 
due to the actual size of oil income; the mere promise of oil has also been found to stir violent 
political struggle.131 While there may be ways to solve this problem, for this thesis it will have 
to suffice to emphasize that this limitation in the design leaves some uncertainty in the 
inference that conflict legacy is of no distinguishing importance for the effect of oil on 
conflict risk.  
Implications of This Study and Road Ahead 
Taken together, the findings of this analysis suggest some interesting implications for the 
understanding of what factors condition the relationship between oil income and armed 
conflict. Most importantly, countries’ institutional legacy should not be rejected as a 
distinguishing condition for the effect of oil on conflict risk. The finding that nationalized oil 
income does not significantly increase the risk of conflict further underscore that institutional 
decay and increased danger of conflict is not an unavoidable path in the wake of large rents to 
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 When a few outliers were removed, the effect of oil on conflict risk among these countries remained 
relatively higher and achieved significance.   
130
 This is because it is operationalized as “incidence of armed conflict during ten years prior to first oil income”, 
and therefore is contingent on oil income: For countries with no first year of oil income it is not measured. It is 
not certain that conflict legacy is equally conflict-inducing in the absence of oil.   
131
 This effect has been seen for instance in Chad, where oil stirred political and violent conflict many years 
before extraction commenced (Gould & Winters, 2011; Humphreys, 2005). 
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government assets. The notion that differences in institutional starting points may give rise to 
divergent institutional trajectories, with differential implications for conflict risk, receives 
encouraging, albeit not ideal support from these findings.  
Several further avenues may be worth exploring in relation to countries’ institutional legacy 
as a conditioning circumstance. First of all, identifying and employing more precise indicators 
of bureaucratic control, which also takes in the geographic dispersion of state institutions into 
peripheral regions, is desirable in order to enhance the test of this argument. Secondly, 
identifying and employing alternative indicators of institutional capacity may be desirable. 
The concept institutional capacity comprises several partly overlapping aspects for which 
there may be only imperfect observational data available. If using different sorts of indicators 
of the same underlying concept yield results that point in the same direction, this could be one 
approach to ascertain its’ role.   
My argument on the distinguishing role of institutional legacy rests on the premise that 
divergent institutional starting points give rise to divergent institutional trajectories following 
oil.132 While findings yield preliminary support of the overall argument, the assumption that 
fragile initial institutions will remain fragile in the wake of oil, while robust initial institutions 
will persist, remains an untested part of the argument. Further analysis is required for this 
aspect is to be ascertained. If true, this seems to give emerging African oil producers with 
fragile bureaucratic control and low performance in public service provision gloomy outlooks 
for the future. Yet, there is no definiteness that the obtained findings which are representative 
of country-years between 1961 and 2007 are generalizable as conflict forecasts for future oil 
income countries.  
Awareness of the problems associated with large resource rents may be better than in earlier 
years, and steps are currently taken in the attempt to mitigate adverse effects in new oil 
nations. Efforts are made to prepare future oil economies’ ability to manage oil revenues 
(Dovi, 2013) and increase transparency in the resource sector such as the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI). Examining the interrelationships between such restorative 
interventions, quality of institutions, and ability to manage political pressures that arise in the 
wake of petroleum production remains a promising agenda for future research.  
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 In essence: In countries with fragile initial institutions, oil income will inhibit their improvement by 
alleviating the need to tax, and these countries will be more susceptible to armed civil conflict. In countries with 
robust initial institutions, oil income may not induce their decay, and no heightened risk of conflict is expected. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1:   List of Countries with Year of First Oil Income, Nationalization and Number of Onsets 
Country First oil income 
First 
nationalization 
Onsets During 
Years of Oil Income 
 (1961-2007) 
Onsets During Years of 
Nationalized Oil  
(1961-2007) 
Albania 1945  0 0 
Argentina 1945 1963 2 1 
Austria 1945  0 0 
Bolivia 1945 1969 1 0 
Brazil 1945  0 0 
Canada 1945  0 0 
China 1945  0 0 
Colombia 1945 1972 1 0 
Cuba 1945  1 1 
Ecuador 1945 1969 0 0 
Egypt 1945 1961 1 1 
France 1945  1 1 
German Federal Republic 1945  0 0 
Hungary 1945  0 0 
India 1945 1975 14 12 
Indonesia 1945 1960 9 9 
Iran (Persia) 1945 1973 8 7 
Iraq 1945 1961 8 7 
Japan 1945  0 0 
Malaysia 1945 1973 3 2 
Mexico 1945  1 1 
Myanmar (Burma) 1945 1962 13 12 
Netherlands 1945  0 0 
New Zealand 1945  0 0 
Pakistan 1945 1974 6 3 
Peru 1945 1968 3 1 
Poland 1945  0 0 
Rumania 1945  1 1 
Russia (Soviet Union) 1945 2006 5  - 
Saudi Arabia 1945 1972 1 1 
United Kingdom 1945  2 2 
United States of America 1945  1 1 
Venezuela 1945 1971 3 2 
Chile 1950  1 1 
Italy/Sardinia 1952  0 0 
Serbia (Yugoslavia) 1952  1 1 
Bulgaria 1954  0 0 
Israel 1956  3 3 
Congo 1957 1974 3 3 
Gabon 1957 1973 1 0 
Nigeria 1958 1971 3 1 
Taiwan 1960  0 0 
Turkey (Ottoman Empire) 1960  3 3 
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Country First oil income 
First 
nationalization 
Onsets During 
Years of Oil Income 
(1961-2007) 
Onsets During Years of 
Nationalized Oil 
 (1961-2007) 
Kuwait 1961 1972 0 0 
Libya 1961 1969 0 0 
Algeria 1962 1962 1 1 
Trinidad and Tobago 1962 1969 1 1 
Thailand 1963  2 2 
Oman 1964 1972 1 0 
Barbados 1966  0 0 
Spain 1966  3 3 
Tunisia 1966  1 1 
Afghanistan 1967  1 1 
Syria 1968  1 1 
Morocco 1969 1975 2 0 
Belgium 1970  0 0 
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) 1970  4 3 
Rwanda 1970  1 1 
Bahrain 1971 1974 0 0 
Bangladesh 1971 1975 1 0 
Norway 1971  0 0 
Qatar 1971 1972 0 0 
United Arab Emirates 1971 1971 0 0 
Denmark 1972  0 0 
Angola 1975 1976 5 4 
Guatemala 1976  0 0 
Cameroon 1977  1 1 
Cote D’Ivoire 1978  0 0 
Ghana 1978 1974 1 1 
Ireland 1978  0 0 
Sweden 1978  0 0 
Philippines 1979 1973 1 1 
Benin 1980  0 0 
Greece 1981  0 0 
Vietnam (Dem. Rep.) 1981  0 0 
Brunei 1984  0 0 
Switzerland 1985  0 0 
Jordan 1986  0 0 
Surinam 1986  1 1 
Yemen (Arab Rep.) 1986 1969 1 1 
Azerbaijan 1991  2 2 
Belarus (Byelorussia) 1991  0 0 
Croatia 1991  1 1 
Kazakhstan 1991  0 0 
Kyrgyz Republic 1991  0 0 
Slovenia 1991  0 0 
Tajikistan 1991  1 1 
Turkmenistan 1991  0 0 
Ukraine 1991  0 0 
Uzbekistan 1991  2 2 
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Country First oil income 
First 
nationalization 
Onsets During 
Years of Oil Income 
(1961-2007) 
Onsets During Years of 
Nationalized Oil  
(1961-2007) 
Georgia 1992  1 1 
Lithuania 1992  0 0 
Papua New Guinea 1992  0 0 
Czech Republic 1993  0 0 
Slovakia 1993  0 0 
Sudan 1993 1976 0 0 
Equatorial Guinea 1994  0 0 
Cambodia (Kampuchea) 2000 1968 0 0 
Chad 2003 2006 1 - 
   
  
   
  
     
   
  
   
  
   
  
SOURCES: Year of first oil income is based on the Ross (2012) data, but for countries with oil income in 1960 year 
of first income is replaced with first recorded year of oil production according to PETRODATA v.1.2. Year of first 
nationalization is based on Guriev et.al. (2011). Onsets from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2012. 
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Table A.2: Countries’ Score on Initial Bureaucratic Control (BQ) 
Non-Oil Countries (Measured 1960) Oil Countries 
Country Initial BQ 
Dominican Republic -1,88 
Djibouti -1,35 
Guinea-Bissau -0,99 
Comoros -0,91 
Korea, Republic of -0,91 
Central African 
Republic 
-0,87 
Niger -0,84 
Jamaica -0,79 
Laos -0,71 
Guinea -0,69 
Armenia -0,69 
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) -0,69 
Macedonia (FYROM) -0,69 
Bosnia-Herzegovina -0,68 
Uganda -0,66 
Guyana -0,62 
Mali -0,62 
Mozambique -0,62 
Somalia -0,61 
Haiti -0,58 
Moldova -0,52 
East Timor -0,51 
Korea, P. Rep. -0,49 
Burundi -0,49 
Malawi -0,47 
Eritrea -0,44 
Senegal -0,42 
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) -0,41 
Fiji -0,37 
Nepal -0,37 
Sierra Leone -0,37 
Burkina Faso  -0,28 
Kenya -0,26 
Namibia -0,23 
Paraguay -0,22 
Mauritania -0,22 
Tanzania -0,18 
Finland -0,17 
Lesotho -0,13 
Uruguay -0,13 
Madagascar -0,11 
Botswana -0,07 
Lebanon -0,05 
Zambia -0,04 
 
 
Country Initial BQ 
Equatorial Guinea (1994) 
Syria (1968) 
Yemen, Arab Rep.(1986) 
Surinam (1986) 
Ghana (1978) 
Vietnam, Dem. Rep. (1981) 
Sudan (1993) 
Uzbekistan (1991) 
Afghanistan (1967) 
Guatemala (1976) 
Rwanda (1970) 
Benin (1980) 
Libya (1961) 
Chad (2003) 
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) (1970) 
Turkmenistan (1991) 
Chile (1960) 
Iran (1960) 
Egypt (1960) 
Philippines (1979) 
Tajikistan (1991) 
Mexico (1960) 
Nigeria (1960) 
Azerbaijan (1991) 
Belarus (1991) 
Congo (1960) 
Cameroon (1977) 
Cambodia  (2000) 
China (1960) 
Rumania (1960) 
Georgia (1992) 
Gabon (1960) 
Tunisia (1966) 
Kyrgyz Republic (1991) 
Qatar (1971) 
Iraq (1960) 
Lithuania (1992) 
Cote D’Ivoire (1978) 
Turkey (1960) 
 
 
-1,53 
-1,34 
-1,30 
-1,07 
-1,07 
-1,04 
-1,00 
-0,99 
-0,98 
-0,98 
-0,97 
-0,95 
-0,95 
-0,91 
-0,91 
-0,84 
-0,74 
-0,68 
-0,63 
-0,63 
-0,62 
-0,61 
-0,55 
-0,52 
-0,50 
-0,48 
-0,47 
-0,44 
-0,27 
-0,26 
-0,22 
-0,20 
-0,19 
-0,18 
-0,14 
-0,13 
-0,12 
-0,12 
-0,11 
 
 
   
103 
 
Non-Oil Countries (Measured 1960) 
Country                                Initial BQ 
Liberia -0,02 
Montenegro 0,01 
El Salvador 0,02 
Maldives 0,03 
Honduras 0,08 
Mongolia 0,15 
Costa Rica 0,15 
Panama 0,20 
Nicaragua 0,22 
Gambia 0,25 
Swaziland 0,31 
South Africa 0,36 
Togo 0,44 
Estonia 0,50 
Portugal 0,54 
Bhutan 0,59 
Belize 0,61 
Singapore 0,61 
Latvia 0,69 
Czechoslovakia 0,77 
Malta 0,97 
Ethiopia 1,01 
Cyprus 1,06 
German Dem. Rep. 1,48 
Mauritius 1,51 
Solomon Islands 1,57 
Iceland 1,63 
Cape Verde 1,76 
Luxembourg 1,98 
Bahamas 2,08 
 
Oil Countries 
Country 
Ecuador (1960) 
Bangladesh (1971) 
Oman (1964) 
Pakistan (1960) 
Kazakhstan (1991) 
Russia (Soviet Union) (1960) 
Malaysia (1960) 
Trinidad and Tobago (1962) 
Peru (1960) 
Bolivia (1960) 
Kuwait (1961) 
Ukraine (1991) 
Serbia (Yugoslavia) (1960) 
Algeria (1962) 
Poland (1960) 
Myanmar (Burma) (1960) 
United Arab Emirates (1971) 
Cuba (1960) 
Croatia (1991) 
Thailand (1963) 
United Kingdom (1960) 
Brazil (1960) 
Colombia (1960) 
Venezuela (1960) 
New Zealand (1960) 
Saudi Arabia (1960) 
Morocco (1969) 
Spain (1966) 
Angola (1975) 
Indonesia(1960) 
Jordan (1986) 
Taiwan (1960) 
Bahrain (1971) 
Barbados (1966) 
Argentina (1960) 
Albania (1960) 
Slovakia (1993) 
Czech Republic (1993) 
India (1960) 
Slovenia (1991) 
Papua New Guinea (1992) 
 
Initial BQ 
-0,06 
-0,04 
-0,02 
0,01 
0,02 
0,02 
0,03 
0,05 
0,09 
0,16 
0,18 
0,20 
0,20 
0,23 
0,23 
0,26 
0,26 
0,33 
0,35 
0,38 
0,41 
0,43 
0,46 
0,52 
0,56 
0,61 
0,62 
0,62 
0,63 
0,64 
0,65 
0,65 
0,65 
0,70 
0,73 
0,74 
0,75 
0,77 
0,82 
0,85 
0,85 
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SOURCES: Bureaucratic Quality Index by Hegre and Nygård (20014), measured at first year of oil income, 
alternatively 1960. Year of first oil income is based on the Ross (2012) data, but for countries with oil income in 
1960 year of first income is replaced with first recorded year of oil production according to PETRODATA v.1.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oil Countries 
Country 
Ireland (1978) 
Denmark (1972) 
Israel (1960) 
German Fed. Rep. (1960) 
Belgium (1970) 
Sweden (1978) 
Italy (1960) 
Hungary (1960) 
Austria (1960) 
Bulgaria (1960) 
France (1960) 
Norway (1971) 
Japan (1960) 
Canada (1960) 
Greece (1981) 
Australia (1961) 
Netherlands (1960) 
United States of America (1960) 
Switzerland (1985) 
Brunei (1984) 
 
Initial BQ 
1,22 
1,24 
1,25 
1,27 
1,30 
1,32 
1,35 
1,35 
1,44 
1,64 
1,66 
1,69 
1,74 
1,81 
1,90 
1,93 
1,97 
2,01 
2,05 
1,17 
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Appendix B 
Table B.1: Baselinemodel. Logistic Regression of the Onset of Internal Armed Conflict Onset 1961-2007 
 Model (A) Model (B) Model (C) Model (D) Model (E) Model (F) 
 All Countries All Countries All Countries Oil Countries  Oil Countries Oil Countries 
Log Oil Income/Popt-1  
 
1.090** 
(0.013) 
 
 
 
 
1.108** 
(0.010) 
 
 
Nationalized Oil Income/Pop t-1  
 
 
 
1.019 
(0.616) 
 
 
 
 
1.013 
(0.735) 
Log GDP/Cap t-1 0.682*** 
(0.000) 
0.599*** 
(0.000) 
0.666*** 
(0.000) 
0.689*** 
(0.000) 
0.585*** 
(0.000) 
0.676*** 
(0.001) 
Log population 1.358*** 
(0.000) 
1.309*** 
(0.000) 
1.348*** 
(0.000) 
1.295*** 
(0.002) 
1.271*** 
(0.003) 
1.292*** 
(0.002) 
Log Rough Terrain 1.071 
(0.157) 
1.089* 
(0.091) 
1.074 
(0.138) 
1.198** 
(0.032) 
1.240*** 
(0.010) 
1.202** 
(0.027) 
Inconsistent Regimet-1   - - - - - - 
Regime Transition t-1 1.147 
(0.628) 
1.099 
(0.744) 
1.134 
(0.657) 
1.150 
(0.737) 
1.046 
(0.918) 
1.132 
(0.767) 
Autocratic Regime t-1 0.840 
(0.430) 
0.783 
(0.264) 
0.826 
(0.382) 
0.867 
(0.632) 
0.810 
(0.470) 
0.857 
(0.598) 
Democratic Regime t-1 1.007 
(0.977) 
1.045 
(0.846) 
1.011 
(0.963) 
1.089 
(0.758) 
1.164 
(0.570) 
1.095 
(0.748) 
Mideast and N Africa  1.713** 
(0.040) 
1.469 
(0.128) 
1.662* 
(0.053) 
1.507 
(0.155) 
1.322 
(0.289) 
1.483 
(0.169) 
Neighborhood Conflict t-1 1.618*** 
(0.003) 
1.572*** 
(0.005) 
1.609*** 
(0.003) 
1.517** 
(0.029) 
1.443* 
(0.061) 
1.507** 
(0.031) 
Proximity of Conflict 2.846*** 
(0.000) 
2.689*** 
(0.000) 
2.828*** 
(0.000) 
3.964*** 
(0.000) 
3.661*** 
(0.000) 
3.944*** 
(0.000) 
Observations 6741 6741 6741 3999 3999 3999 
Countries 170 170 170 100 100 100 
Onsets 222 222 222 152 152 152 
Log Likelihood -889.756 -886.978 -889.625 -581.347 -578.503 -581.290 
AIC 1799.512 1795.956 1801.249 1182.694 1179.006 1184.580 
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses; t-1 variable lagged one year; SE clustered on country* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table B.2: Interacting Conflict Legacy - Logistic Regression. Countries With Unknown 
Conflict Legacy Interacted as Separate Category 
 Model (15b) 
 All Countries 
Log Oil Income/Pop t-1 1.044 
(0.410) 
Pre-Oil Conflict Legacy 1.603* 
(0.056) 
  
Unknown Conflict Legacy 1.386 
(0.499) 
Pre-Oil Conflict Legacy*  
Oil Income/Pop t-1 
0.977 
(0.764) 
  
Unknown Conflict Legacy*  
Oil Income/Pop t-1 
1.052 
(0.572) 
  
Log GDP/Cap t-1 0.578*** 
(0.000) 
Log population 1.246*** 
(0.003) 
Log Rough Terrain 1.065 
(0.195) 
Regime Transition t-1  1.053 
(0.869) 
Autocratic Regime t-1 0.788 
(0.261) 
Democratic Regime t-1 1.019 
(0.936) 
Mideast and N Africa   1.380 
(0.214) 
Neighborhood Conflict t-1 1.485** 
(0.022) 
Proximity of Conflict 2.493*** 
(0.000) 
Observations 6456 
Log Likelihood -853.040 
AIC 1736.079 
Countries 170 
Onsets 215 
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses *variable lagged one year. SE clustered 
on country* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Ten years prior to year of first oil income are 
censored as they are endogenous to pre-oil conflict legacy. 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C.1: Conflict Legacy of Oil Income Countries 
 
Oil countries with armed 
conflict during 10 years 
prior to first oil income 
 
Oil countries without armed conflict during 10 years 
prior to first oil income  
Oil countries with 
unknown  conflict 
legacy (first oil 
income prior to 1946) 
 
Israel 
Algeria 
Oman 
Syria 
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) 
Angola 
Guatemala 
Philippines 
Yemen, Arab Rep.  
Azerbaijan 
Georgia 
Papua New Guinea 
Sudan 
Cambodia  
Chad 
 
 
Gabon  
Nigeria 
Morocco 
Bangladesh 
Chile 
Italy/Sardinia 
Serbia (Yugoslavia) 
Bulgaria 
Congo 
Taiwan 
Turkey  
Australia 
Kuwait 
Libya 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Thailand 
Barbados 
Spain 
Tunisia 
Afghanistan 
Belgium 
Rwanda 
Bahrain 
Benin 
Greece 
Vietnam, Dem. Rep. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brunei 
Switzerland 
Jordan 
Surinam 
Belarus  
Croatia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Slovenia 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
Lithuania 
Czech Republic 
Slovakia 
Equatorial Guinea 
Norway 
Qatar 
United Arab Emirates 
Denmark 
Cameroon 
Cote D’Ivoire 
Ghana 
Ireland 
Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Colombia 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Malaysia 
Myanmar 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Russia (Soviet 
Union) 
Venezuela 
Albania 
Austria 
Brazil 
Canada 
China 
Cuba 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
France 
German Fed. Rep. 
Hungary 
Japan 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Poland 
Rumania 
Saudi Arabia 
United Kingdom 
United States of 
America 
 
Total: 15 Total: 52 Total: 33 
Sources: Year of first oil income from Ross (2012), supplemented by PETRODATA . Conflict data: 
PRIO/UCDP Armed Conflict Data v4-2012. 
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Table C.2: Legacy of Armed Conflict Prior to Nationalization 
 
Oil countries with armed 
conflict during 10 years prior 
to oil nationalization 
 
Oil countries without armed conflict during 10 
years prior to nationalization  
Oil countries with 
unknown  conflict 
legacy prior to 
nationalization 
 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Azerbaijan 
Bangladesh 
Bolivia 
Cambodia (Kampuchea) 
Chad 
Colombia 
Congo, DR  (Zaire) 
Gabon 
Georgia 
Guatemala 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran (Persia) 
Iraq 
Israel 
Malaysia 
Morocco 
Myanmar (Burma) 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Peru 
Philippines 
Russia (Soviet Union) 
Sudan 
Syria 
Venezuela 
Yemen (Arab Rep.) 
 
Afghanistan 
Australia 
Bahrain 
Barbados 
Belarus (Byelorussia) 
Belgium 
Benin 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Cameroon 
Chile 
Congo 
Cote D’Ivoire 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Equatorial Guinea 
Ghana 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy/Sardinia 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kuwait 
 
 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Norway 
Qatar 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Serbia (Yugoslavia) 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Surinam 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey (Ottoman Empire) 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam, Dem. Rep. 
 
 
Albania 
Austria 
Brazil 
Canada 
China 
Cuba 
France 
German Fed. Rep. 
Hungary 
Japan 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Poland 
Rumania 
United Kingdom 
United States of 
America 
 
Total:  32 Total: 51 Total:  17 
Sources: Data on year of first nationalization from Guriev et al.(2011). If missing data on nationalization, year of 
first oil income from Ross (2012) is employed, supplemented by PETRODATA if first year of oil income is 
1960. Conflict data: PRIO/UCDP Armed Conflict Data v4-2012. 
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Table C.3: Country Overview: Conflict Legacy and Onset Following Oil Income 
 
Table C.4: Bivariate Analysis: Conflict Legacy and Incidence of Conflict Among Countries With 
First Oil Income After 1946 
     Pearson chi2(1) = 14.0241   Pr = 0.000 
Countries with conflict 
legacy and conflict 
onset following oil 
Countries with conflict 
legacy, but no new 
onset following oil.  
Countries with no 
conflict legacy but 
conflict onset following 
oil income 
Countries with no 
conflict legacy and no 
conflict onset or 
incidence following oil 
income 
 
Georgia  
Azerbaijan 
Chad  
Congo, D.R. (Zaire)  
Angola  
Algeria  
Syria  
Israel  
Yemen (Arab Rep.)  
Oman  
Philippines  
 
Cambodia  
Guatemala*  
Papua New Guinea*  
Sudan*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries with * have 
continuous conflict 
prior to and following 
oil income 
Afghanistan  
Bangladesh   
Cameroon  
Chile  
Congo  
Croatia  
Gabon  
Ghana  
Morocco  
Nigeria  
Rwanda  
Serbia (Yugoslavia)  
Spain  
Surinam  
Tajikistan  
Thailand  
Trinidad and Tobago  
Tunisia  
Turkey (Ottoman 
Empire)  
Uzbekistan  
 
 
Australia 
Bahrain                               
Barbados  
Belarus (Byelorussia)  
Belgium  
Benin  
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Cote D’Ivoire 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Equatorial Guinea 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy/Sardinia 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Norway 
Qatar 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
Vietnam, Dem. Rep. 
 
 
No. Countries with Incidence of Armed 
Conflict Following Oil Income 
 
Total: 
At least 1 incidence No incidence 
No. Countries with 
Conflict Legacy Prior to 
First Oil Income 
Yes 14 
(93.3%) 
1 
 (6.7%) 
15  
(100%) 
No 20 
(38.5%) 
32 
(61.5%) 
52  
(100%) 
Total: 34 
(50.7%) 
33 
(49.3%) 
67 
(100%) 
110 
 
Appendix D 
 
Table D.1: Interacting Nationalized Oil Income and Conflict Legacy - Logistic Regression of 
Armed Conflict Onset 1961-2007. All Countries Included in Estimates. 
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in ( ); Inconsistent Regimet-1 as reference category for regime dummies; 
SE clustered on country * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Ten years prior to nationalization year are 
censored as they are endogenous to conflict legacy variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model (16) Model (17) Model (18) 
 Nationalized 
Oil 
Income/Pop 
Nationalized 
Oil 
Income/Pop 
Nationalized 
Oil 
Income/Pop 
Nationalized Oil Income/Pop t-1 1.054 
(0.199) 
1.005 
(0.911) 
0.972 
(0.638) 
Pre-Nationalization Conflict  
 
2.088*** 
(0.001) 
1.805** 
(0.045) 
Pre-Nationalization Conflict * 
Nationalized Oil Income t-1 
  1.063 
(0.405) 
Log GDP/Cap t-1 
0.645*** 
(0.000) 
0.695*** 
(0.002) 
0.703*** 
(0.003) 
Log population 1.331*** 
(0.000) 
1.264*** 
(0.001) 
1.276*** 
(0.001) 
Log Rough Terrain 1.062 
(0.276) 
1.069 
(0.289) 
1.064 
(0.317) 
Regime Transition t-1 (0/1) 1.229 
(0.512) 
1.208 
(0.557) 
1.238 
(0.504) 
Autocratic Regime t-1 (0/1) 0.904 
(0.659) 
0.904 
(0.643) 
0.912 
(0.674) 
Democratic Regime t-1 (0/1) 1.082 
(0.749) 
0.981 
(0.938) 
0.990 
(0.967) 
Mideast and N Africa  1.343 
(0.344) 
1.165 
(0.624) 
1.154 
(0.633) 
Neighborhood Conflict t-1 1.764*** 
(0.002) 
1.684*** 
(0.006) 
1.698*** 
(0.005) 
Proximity of Conflict 2.922*** 2.237*** 2.194*** 
Observations 6272 6272 6272 
Log Likelihood -786.915 -779.007 -778.584 
AIC 1595.830 1582.013 1583.167 
Countries 170  170  170  
Onsets 194 194 194 
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Figure D.1: Model 18. Effect of Nationalized Oil Given Conflict Legacy 
Figure D.1 and D.2 shows the 
conditional effect of nationalized oil 
income for different categories of 
conflict legacy, with 90% confidence 
intervals. Other variables are set to 
mean, median or most frequent 
values of oil income countries in 
1961. 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.2: Effect of Nationalized Oil Given Conflict Legacy (0, 1 or Unknown) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D.2: Bivariate Analysis: Conflict Legacy and Conflict Onset Among Countries With First 
Nationalized Oil Income After 1946 
      Pearson chi2(1) =   7.465   Pr = 0.006 
 
 
No. Countries with Onset of Armed 
Conflict Following Nationalized Oil 
Income  
 
Total: 
At least 1 onset No onset 
No. Countries with 
Conflict Legacy Prior to 
First Nationalization 
Yes 20 
(66.7%) 
10 
(33.3%) 
30  
(100%) 
No 18 
(35.3%) 
33 
(64.7%) 
51   
(100%) 
Total: 38 
( 46.9%) 
43 
( 53.1%) 
 81 
(100%) 
112 
 
Table D.3: Country Overview: Conflict Legacy and Onset Following Nationalized Oil Income 
 
Table D.4: Bivariate Analysis: Conflict Legacy and Incidence of Conflict Among Countries With 
First Nationalized Oil Income After 1946 
     Pearson chi2(1) =  22.8944   Pr = 0.000 
Countries with conflict 
legacy and conflict 
onset following 
nationalized oil 
income 
Countries with conflict 
legacy, but no new 
onset following 
nationalized oil 
income 
Countries with no 
conflict legacy but 
conflict onset 
following nationalized 
oil income 
Countries with no 
conflict legacy and no 
conflict following 
nationalized oil 
income 
Algeria  
Angola  
Argentina  
Azerbaijan  
Congo, DR (Zaire) 
Georgia  
India  
Indonesia  
Iran (Persia)  
Iraq 
Israel  
Malaysia 
Myanmar (Burma) 
Nigeria  
Pakistan 
Peru  
Syria  
Venezuela  
Philippines                             
Yemen (Arab Rep.) 
 
Bolivia  
Cambodia  
Gabon  
Colombia*  
Bangladesh* 
Guatemala*  
Morocco* 
Oman*  
Papua New Guinea* 
Sudan* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries with * have 
continuous conflict 
prior to and following 
nationalized oil 
income 
Afghanistan 
Cameroon 
Chile 
Congo 
Croatia 
Egypt 
Ghana 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Serbia (Yugoslavia) 
Spain 
Surinam 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey  
Uzbekistan 
 
Australia 
Bahrain 
Barbados 
Belarus (Byelorussia) 
Belgium 
Benin 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Cote D’Ivoire 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Ecuador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy/Sardinia 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Norway 
Qatar 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
Vietnam, Dem. Rep. 
 
 
No. Countries with Incidence of Armed 
Conflict Following  Nationalized Oil  
 
Total: 
At least 1 incidence No incidence 
No. Countries with 
Conflict Legacy Prior to 
First Nationalization 
Yes 27 
(90 %) 
3 
(10%) 
30  
(100%) 
No 18 
(35.3%) 
33 
(64.7%) 
51   
(100%) 
Total: 45  
(55.6%) 
36 
(44.4 %) 
81 
(100%) 
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Appendix E 
Figure E.1: Uganda. Predicted Probability of Armed Conflict for Increasing Oil Income at 10th and 
90th Percentile of Initial Bureaucratic Control  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted probabilities with 90% confidence intervals. Other variables set to representative values for Uganda 
in 2007. Estimates based on model 3 (oil countries). 
Figure E.2: Uganda. Predicted Probability of Armed Conflict for Increasing Oil Income at 10th and 
90th Percentile of Initial Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
           
 
Other variables set to representative of Uganda in 2007. Based on model 9 (oil countries). 90% CIs. 
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Figure E.3: Uganda. Predicted Probability of Armed Conflict for Increasing Values of Oil Income 
Conditional on Conflict Legacy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted probabilities with 90% confidence intervals. Other variables set to representative values for Uganda 
in 2007. Countries with an unknown conflict legacy are treated as a separate category. Estimates based on 
model 15b.  
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Appendix F 
Figure F.1: Influential Observations in Regressions Testing H1 
 
 
Figure F.2: Influential Observations in Regressions Testing H2 
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Figure F.3: Influential Observations in Regressions Testing H3 (Model 15b to the Left) 
 
 
Figure F.4: Graphed Results of Model 15b, With and Without Influential Outliers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The graph to the left identical to previously graphed results from model 15b. Both graphs present estimates 
with 90% confidence level. In the right hand graph, the following 5 outlier observations are excluded: Cuba 
1961, Trinidad and Tobago 1990, Uruguay 1972, Spain 1978, Pakistan 1971. 
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Figure F.5: Graphed Results of Model 3, With and Without Influential Outliers                                                                            
                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The graph to the left is identical to previously graphed results from model 3. Both graphs present estimates 
with 90% confidence level. In the right hand graph, the following 6 outlier observations are excluded: United 
States of America 2001, Cuba 1961, Trinidad and Tobago 1990, Surinam 1987, Spain 1978, Congo 1993. 
Figure F.6: Graphed Results of Model 6, With and Without Influential Outliers                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The graph to the left identical to previously graphed results from model 6. Both graphs present estimates with 
90% confidence level. In the right hand graph, the following 5 outlier observations are excluded: United 
States of America 2001, Dominican Republic 1965, Surinam 1987, Uruguay 1972, Spain 1978. 
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Figure F.7: Graphed Results of Model 9, With and Without Influential Outliers                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
The graph to the left identical to previously graphed results from model 9. Both graphs present estimates with 
90% confidence level. In the right hand graph, the following 5 outlier observations are excluded:                                                                  
Surinam 1987, Spain 1978, Serbia 1991, Russia (Soviet Union) 1990, Russia 1994. 
 
Figure F.8: Graphed Results of Model 12, With and Without Influential Outliers                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The graph to the left identical to previously graphed results from model 12. Both graphs present estimates 
with 90% confidence level. In the right hand graph, the following 5 outlier observations are excluded: 
Russia (Soviet Union) 1990, Russia 1994, Russia 1999, Azerbaijan 1993, Azerbaijan 2005. 
    
119 
 
Multicollinearity Assessment  
VIF-values are obtained by the Stata collin postestimation command. VIF-values of 
variables in models important for the test of H1, H2 and H3 are reported. 
Table F.1: VIF-Values for Variables in Model 3 and 6 (Testing H1) 
Variable VIF-Value 
Model 3 
 (Oil Countries) 
Model 6  
(All Countries) 
Log Oil Income/Pop t-1 1.69 1.76 
Initial Bureaucratic Control (BQ) 3.80 2.35 
Log Oil Income*Initial BQ 2.54 1.82 
Log GDP/Cap t-1 2.60 2.23 
Log population 1.34 1.27 
Log Rough Terrain 1.20 1.14 
Regime Type t-1 1.32 1.21 
Mideast and N Africa 1.34 1.36 
Neighborhood Conflict t-1 1.17 1.15 
Proximity of Conflict 1.24 1.20 
 
Table F.2: VIF-Values for Variables in Model 9 and 12 (Testing H2) 
Variable VIF-Value 
Model 9 
 (Oil Countries) 
Model 12  
(All Countries) 
Log Oil Income/Pop t-1 6.81     6.33     
Initial Education 4.40     3.09     
Log Oil Income*Initial Edu. 7.64 6.60 
Log GDP/Cap t-1 2.54     2.74     
Log population 1.32     1.28     
Log Rough Terrain 1.19     1.14     
Regime Type t-1 1.25     1.17     
Mideast and N Africa 1.40     1.41     
Neighborhood Conflict t-1 1.18     1.16     
Proximity of Conflict 1.23     1.20     
 
Table F.3:  VIF-Values for Variables in Model 15 and 15b (Testing H3) 
Variable VIF-Value VIF-Value 
Model 15  
(All Countries) 
Model 15b 
(All Countries) 
Log Oil Income/Pop t-1 1.75    2.28 
Conflict Legacy 1.90       4.54 
Log Oil Income*Conflict Legacy 2.01 5.07 
Log GDP/Cap t-1 1.66     1.64 
Log population 1.27     1.58 
Log Rough Terrain 1.14     1.15 
Regime Type t-1 1.17   1.18 
Mideast and N Africa 1.34    1.30 
Neighborhood Conflict t-1 1.16     1.16 
Proximity of Conflict 1.22 1.21 
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Replication Data 
 
Replication data and do-file is available at: http://bit.ly/1kmxW4D  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
